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This dissertation involves a content analysis of public discussion by government officials 
involved in the debate over the use of force against Iraq.  Elite participants in government made 
public announcements to justify policy positions to constituents, educate interested participants 
inside government and external to the process, and persuade fellow decision-makers in 
government that the decision to use force against Iraq was the correct decision.  Government 
officials’ public statements regarding the potential use of force against Iraq comprise the “policy 
primeval soup” from which the policy of an invasion emerged.  This analysis examines how U.S. 
political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq from when President Bush took 
office on January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, the day the invasion of Iraq began.  This research 
identifies aspects of the debate over which groups of officials most disagreed in the public 
discourse and how the degree of consensus or divergence changed over time.   
Results demonstrate that there was little consensus between parties and branches of 
government in how force was justified against Iraq.  As the amount of discussion regarding Iraq 
increased in late 2002, this degree of consensus decreased.  Though Congress authorized 
President Bush to use force against Iraq in October 2002, Republicans and Democrats in 
Congress differed significantly in how they discussed the use of force.  These differences were 
smaller than the differences between Congress as a whole and the Executive branch.  
Nonetheless, the evidence collected here demonstrates that Congress was not acquiescent.  While 
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the prevailing interpretation in congressional-executive relations is that Congress passively 
supports the Executive branch in foreign military endeavors, this research demonstrates that 
Congress was involved in the debate about Iraq and increased that involvement as the time for 
the Iraq Resolution vote approached, increasingly growing more hawkish.  At the same time, the 
story of the Iraq war debate was more nuanced than the typical argument would suggest, namely 
that Congress tends to follow the Executive branch’s foreign policy.  While the Executive branch 
exhorted war with Iraq more so than the Legislative branch, there may have been some 
enablement of this message from congressional Democrats.   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... XIII 
1.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
2.  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE DECISION TO USE FORCE ................. 9 
2.1  CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE ................................................................... 11 
2.2  PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN  
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING ....................................................................... 16 
2.3  THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION ............................................................ 23 
2.4  RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITIES OF  
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS  
IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING .................................................................. 26 
2.5  GOVERNMENT DELIBERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING ... 31 
3.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET AND METHODOLOGY .............................. 35 
3.1  GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT ................................................. 35 
3.2  CONTENT ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 41 
3.3  THE CODING INSTRUMENT ....................................................................... 43 
3.4  CONTENT VARIABLES ................................................................................. 49 
3.5  REGARDING THE RELIABILITY OF 
THE CODING INSTRUMENT ....................................................................... 57 
3.6  THE IRAQ INDEX SCORE ............................................................................. 59 
4.  QUANTIFYING THE IRAQ WAR DEBATE: RESULTS BY  
POLITICAL PARTY AND BRANCH OVER TIME .................................................... 63 
4.1  TWO INDICATORS OF ATTENTION AND  SUPPORT  
FOR THE USE OF FORCE ............................................................................. 64 
4.2  DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE PERIODS PRIOR TO WAR ................ 68 
 vi 
4.3  MEASUREMENT OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION  
OVER SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS REGARDING  
WAR AGAINST IRAQ ..................................................................................... 81 
5.  CONFRONTING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH  
THE DESCRIPTIVE DATA .......................................................................................... 101 
5.1  LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOCUS ON IRAQ .......... 103 
5.2  IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS AND 
GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS .................................................................... 111 
5.3  EXAMINING IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS BY LEVEL OF 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY .............................................................. 117 
5.4  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................... 122 
6.  MEASURING ASPECTS OF THE IRAQ WAR DEBATE OVER TIME: 
INDIVIDUALS AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS .......................................................... 125 
6.1  ANALYZING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS ON 
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ .................................................................... 125 
6.2  ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE ....... 136 
6.3  ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE 
OF FORCE OVER TIME .............................................................................. 149 
6.4  INVOCATION OF 9/11 AND SUPPORT FOR  
THE USE OF FORCE .................................................................................... 154 
6.5  SUMMATION ON INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS AS THE 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 158 
7.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 161 
7.1  WHY UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE  
FROM 2001 TO 2003 MATTERS ................................................................. 161 
7.2  FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS .................................................................... 165 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 186 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 194 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Transcript-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument ................................................ 47 
Table 2: Speaker-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument ................................................... 48 
Table 3: Content Variables in the Coding Instrument .................................................................. 56 
Table 4: Content Variables Aggregated in the Iraq Index Score .................................................. 61 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Attention and Iraq Index Scores .............................................. 67 
Table 6: Group Means for References to Iraq .............................................................................. 76 
Table 7: Mean Iraq Index Scores .................................................................................................. 79 
Table 8: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican  
speakers in Three Periods ............................................................................................. 84 
Table 9: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican  
Legislators in Three Periods ......................................................................................... 86 
Table 10: Content Variable Frequencies for Executive and Legislative Branch  
Speakers in Three Periods ............................................................................................ 89 
Table 11: Content Variable Frequency Ratios over Three Periods .............................................. 90 
Table 12: Summary of Descriptive Findings .............................................................................. 102 
Table 13: Political Accountability Scales, Ordinal level ............................................................ 119 
Table 14: Correlating Iraq Index score with Political Accountability (1 to 7 scale) .................. 119 
 viii 
Table 15: Correlating Number of References to Iraq with Political  
Accountability (1 to 7 scale) ...................................................................................... 120 
Table 16: Correlating Iraq Index score with Political Accountability (1 to 3 scale) .................. 120 
Table 17: Correlating Number of References to Iraq with Political  
Accountability (1 to 3 scale) ...................................................................................... 120 
Table 18: Notable Speakers with Single & High Iraq Index Scores ........................................... 130 
Table 19: Observations Produced by the Most Active 202 Speakers According  
to Political Affiliation ................................................................................................. 134 
Table 20: Mean Iraq Index Scores of Most Active Speakers by Political Affiliation ................ 137 
Table 21: Iraq Index Scores of Active Speakers by Political Affiliation,  
Adjusted for Senator Lieberman ................................................................................ 139 
Table 22: Iraq Index Scores of the 30 Highest Scoring Democrats ............................................ 141 
Table 23: Iraq Index Scores of the 30 Highest Scoring Republicans ......................................... 142 
Table 24: Iraq Index Scores of the 7 Highest Scoring Speakers with  
Unknown Political Affiliations .................................................................................. 143 
Table 25: Disarmament of NBC weapons and Humanitarian Intervention Compared .............. 145 
Table 26: Speakers who argued Humanitarian Intervention More  
Frequently Than Disarmament ................................................................................... 147 
Table 27: Prominent Active Speakers and Threat-oriented Content Variables .......................... 148 
Table 28: Active Speakers that Often Refer to the 9/11 Attacks ................................................ 155 
Table 29: Regression of 9/11 References on Mean Iraq Index Scores ....................................... 156 
Table 30: Prominent Speakers who in the Same Appearance Frequently Mentioned  
Osama bin Laden and Iraq .......................................................................................... 157 
 ix 
Table 31: 2004 & 2008 Presidential Contenders and the Iraq War Debate ................................ 182 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Public References to Iraq, January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003 .................................. 38 
Figure 2: References to Iraq in Government Transcripts .............................................................. 65 
Figure 3: Mean Iraq Index scores of Government Officials ......................................................... 65 
Figure 4: Differences in Mean Iraq Index Scores Between Groups ............................................. 80 
Figure 5: Number of Public Appearances where the words Iraq  
or Iraqi were Used by Speakers .................................................................................. 104 
Figure 6: Mean Number of Uses of the Words Iraq or Iraqi in Public Appearances ................. 105 
Figure 7: Political branches' Mean Iraq Index Scores ................................................................ 107 
Figure 8: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republican and Democratic Legislators ........ 112 
Figure 9: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republicans and Democrats .......................... 114 
Figure 10: Iraq Index Score Differences between the Executive and Legislative Branches ...... 114 
Figure 11: Number of Observations (Appearances) for Government Speakers ......................... 127 
Figure 12: Most Active 202 Speakers by Branch of Government .............................................. 133 
Figure 13: Most Active 202 Speakers by Political Affiliation ................................................... 134 
Figure 14: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative Democrats ....... 150 
Figure 15: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Bush  
Administration Officials ............................................................................................. 151 
 xi 
Figure 16: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative  
Republicans and Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) ................................................. 151 
 xii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This dissertation grew out of research conducted in a graduate seminar led by Dr. Louise 
Comfort.  It was her idea to pursue my interest in content analysis of government officials as my 
dissertation.  I therefore owe her gratitude for this encouragement, because without her 
assignments and patience, it is most unlikely that I would have undertaken this project.  I am also 
deeply grateful for the friendship and assistance of Avishy Moshenberg, whose only reward after 
countless hours of reading and coding, was to then be used as a sounding board for my 
preliminary analysis.  Avishy, such skills will serve you well in a law firm someday.   
I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their assistance, 
advice, and collegial friendship.  Dr. William Keller and Dr. Gordon Mitchell, both of the 
Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, have been so helpful in my 
development—from providing a place to study for comprehensive examinations, to guiding me 
on how to approach serious academic study of the politics of U.S. national security, to bestowing 
advice regarding my research and the presentation of findings.  Dr. Lee Weinberg’s support took 
many forms, not the least of which was helping me to simplify the logic of my argument as well 
as to focus on the most important elements when presenting my findings.  Dr. Janne Nolan was a 
significant mentor for me, no doubt earning a sainthood for continuing to put up with me even in 
 xiii 
 xiv 
those difficult times when I was unable or unwilling to understand the valuable counsel she 
offered me.  I am deeply indebted to Dr. Nolan for shepherding me through this process.   
Finally, I cannot express enough gratitude to my family.  My wife, Pollyanna, was, and 
is, a frustratingly skillful editor as well as a significant motivator.  I must also credit my cat who 
would wait for me by my desk every morning to encourage me to start working.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consent of the governed takes form as deference, active or tacit, 
gained at least long enough for the war to proceed.  What comes to 
the surface later—including evidence of prewar deceptions and 
wartime distortions—may cause us to feel that we live in a society 
with freedoms sufficient to make sure the truth will shine through, 
sooner or later.  But war happens in the interim—after widely told 
lies are widely believed and before the emergence of some 
clarity…. 
Norman Solomon, 20061 
But the great lesson is that secrecy and surprise are the enemies of 
democracy; open and prolonged debate are the great power of 
democracy.  The policies that have failed have tended to be those 
adopted by presidents without meaningful debate…. 
Stephen E. Ambrose, 19912 
 
The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was the first preventative war in the history of U.S. military 
operations.  There is not likely to be policy and historical consensus regarding the decision to 
invade Iraq for many years to come.  Much of the central evidence detailing the decision is 
highly secret, or at least politically charged so as to be inaccessible to researchers for decades.  
Thus, much of the current research regarding the decision to invade Iraq relies on an incomplete 
evidentiary record that involves cherry-picking from available evidence.  Some critics of the 
Bush Administration have suggested that it settled on invasion before developing a strategy to 
                                                 
1 Norman Solomon, War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death (Indianapolis, IN: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 9. 
2 Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991): 138. 
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build political support for the invasion and develop an effective set of contingency plans.  
Others, generally supportive of the Bush Administration, have argued that the decision to invade 
took place as a last resort, that the important decision was not settled until months after the 
congressional authorization of the use of force.  There is another way to examine the decision to 
invade Iraq, however, one that does not require access to secret documents, insider 
retrospectives, or a narrow definition of when the decision to invade Iraq actually occurred.  
Content analysis of public discussion by government officials regarding Iraq is a useful 
analytical tool that can shed light on the deliberative process and the differences between what 
various government officials said publicly regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.   
Understanding the debate is the first step to being able to explain the decision to 
understanding the decision to invade Iraq.  The basic thrust of this research is a descriptive 
examination developed over a length of time regarding the debate on the use of force against 
Iraq.  The two theses examined by this dissertation is whether Congress was acquiescent in 
President Bush’s decision to use force against Iraq in March 2003 and whether or not there was a 
level of consensus between political parties and branches of government regarding this decision 
to use force against Iraq.  As will be demonstrated, the brief but significantly qualified answers 
are that both theses are incorrect.   
The debate regarding the use of force against Iraq occurred over a long period of time, 
long before and long after the Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq in 
October 2002.  During this lengthy debate, U.S. political figures and experts repeatedly made 
public statements concerning the propriety of using force against Iraq.  These statements 
regarding aspects of the potential use of force against Iraq comprise the “policy primeval soup” 
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from which the recourse to force policy emerged.3  Elite participants in government made their 
public announcements to justify policy positions to constituents, to educate interested 
participants inside government and external to the process, and to persuade fellow decision-
makers in government that the decision to use force against Iraq was the correct decision.  In this 
way, the public speech of policy-makers in the U.S. government regarding Iraq constitutes the 
best evidence for how government officials deliberated regarding the use of force against Iraq.  
This analysis examines how U.S. political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq 
during the entire twenty-seven months of the Bush Administration prior to the March 2003 
invasion of Iraq.  The goal of this research is to identify aspects of the debate over which groups 
of officials most disagreed in the public discourse as well as to identify how the debate changed 
over time.   
In October 2002, President Bush praised the passage of an authorization to use military 
force against Iraq saying, “America speaks with one voice.”4  When signing the Joint Resolution, 
President Bush thanked Congress for its “thorough debate and an overwhelming statement of 
support.”5  The U.S. House had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
on October 10, 2002 with a vote of 296 to 133; the Senate followed a day later with a 77 to 23 
vote.6  The 2002 Resolution was supported by Republican and Democratic leadership and passed 
both houses of Congress with margins much larger than the authorization to use force against 
Iraq in 1991.7  Some members of Congress, officers in the Executive branch, and many political 
                                                 
3 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed., Longman Classics in Political Science 
(New York: Longman, 2003), 116-44. 
4 George W. Bush, "President's Statement on Senate Vote,"  (Oct. 11, 2002). 
5 George W. Bush, "President Signs Iraq Resolution,"  (Oct. 16, 2002). 
6 H.J.Res.114, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, P.L. 107-243, 
(Oct. 16). 
7 The 1991 Resolution passed the House 150 to 83 and passed in the Senate by a margin of only 52 to 47.  
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, P.L. 102-1. 
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commentators initially touted the invasion itself to be evidence of a bipartisan foreign policy 
supported with a broad consensus.8  Examining the public statements of central U.S. policy 
makers of both political parties and the Executive and Legislative branches will enable an 
analysis to determine whether or not this degree of consensus changed during the 27 months 
prior to the invasion of Iraq.   
To support the study of public governmental deliberation on the use of force against Iraq, 
Chapter 2 examines the system of government officials who are involved in promulgating 
foreign policy and the decision to use military force.  The Constitution creates and constrains the 
Executive and Legislative branches, creating a basic framework for decisions to use military 
force.  National security policy-making in America is a complex process that involves a 
constellation of actors and interests.  As will be shown, both political branches of government 
have a share in the decision to use force, particularly with respect to justifying the use of force to 
other government actors in the system and the public at large.  The President, the highest levels 
of the Executive branch involved in policy development, and the Congress are the most central 
actors in the earlier stages of the national security policy-making process.  Together, the 
Executive branch and Congress wield near-plenary power in the formal enactment of foreign 
policy.  A content analysis of public governmental deliberation regarding Iraq should therefore 
include the speech of both Executive and Legislative actors.  Chapter 3 describes the source and 
methodology of the content analysis as well as the resultant data set while Chapter 4 provides the 
background for understanding the results of the content analysis and presents summaries of the 
descriptive data from the content analysis.  In this way, Chapter 4 demonstrates the significant 
                                                 
8 "Senate Approves Iraq War Resolution: Administration Applauds Vote,"  (CNN.com, Oct. 11, 2002). 
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differences between political parties and branches of government and how those cleavages 
increased over time as the March 2003 invasion approached.   
Chapter 5 addresses specific research questions regarding the public discussion of 
government officials where the unit of analysis is the group, namely political party or branch.  
There are three sets of research themes presented in this chapter.  The first two themes are both 
essentially descriptive in nature, as opposed to inferential.   The first theme compares Legislative 
and Executive branches in their focus on and attention to the problem of Iraq.  Did groups of 
Executive and Legislative branch officials have more or less focus on Iraq during the two years 
before the invasion?  Were there changes in group focus associated with significant events such 
as the 9/11 attacks or the passage of the October 2002 Iraq Resolution?  Did the Legislative and 
Executive branches differ in how speakers of the two branches supported the use of force against 
Iraq?  When and how did this level of support change?  How do these changes relate to events 
such as the 9/11 attacks and the October 2002 Iraq Resolution?  Was there a divergence or 
convergence in how much support for the use of force speakers of each group expressed 
publicly?  Was there a convergence or divergence in how and how frequently the two branches 
made their assertions?  Research in these areas allows for an examination of the notion that the 
Executive branch led the passive Congress toward war with Iraq using speech as an indirect 
measure for support for the invasion.  The implication of this research may challenge the notion 
that the Congress acquiesced to or “passed the buck” by authorizing President Bush’s war.   
The second theme repeats these inquiries with respect to the political parties.  Did 
Republicans and Democrats differ in how and how frequently government speakers of each party 
made assertions about the use of force against Iraq?  Did the parties, particularly Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress, converge or diverge in who and how frequently they supported the use 
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of force against Iraq?  Was one party more likely to discuss costs of the war or to make 
assertions about weapons of mass destruction and terrorism?  If significant differences are found 
between the parties regarding the use of force against Iraq, then this research theme may cast 
doubt upon the notion that Congress “spoke with one voice” when it authorized the President to 
use force against Iraq in October 2002.  Because the political parties can be shown to be different 
with respect to many aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq, this theme may also 
provide data that may partially explain why arguments that the use of force against Iraq was 
unwarranted did not prevent the Iraq Resolution from being passed.   
The third research theme examines the potential relationship between political 
accountability and justifications favoring the use of force.  Who spoke publicly about Iraq more, 
elected politicians or their appointees?  Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
strong, sustained public justifications for the use of force and the level of political accountability 
of the speaker?  In other words, was the decision to use force the product of a debate by elected 
political leaders or was more support for the war expressed by their appointed surrogates?  If 
those who were the most in favor of force were appointed officials serving the President, then 
there might exist some evidentiary basis to support a claim that the Executive branch ushered the 
Congress into supporting force against Iraq.   
In Chapter 6, the unit of analysis is changed from the aggregated unit of political party or 
branch of government to specific government officials who were most central to the public 
debate regarding the use of force against Iraq.  This analysis of individuals’ speech presents 
descriptive data regarding the most active government speakers.  Did certain individual speakers 
tend to refer to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the same public appearances where they discussed 
Iraq?  If so, were these speakers who mentioned 9/11 more likely to support the use of force 
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against Iraq?  This study’s conclusions, implications, and directions for further research are 
presented in the Conclusion.  It is hoped that this study might provide some empirical basis upon 
which arguments between the political parties and branches of government might be tested, as 
well as to buttress the notion that Legislative and Executive branch relations are more 
complicated and nuanced over micro-issues than simple, zero-sum theories of separation of 
powers suggest.   
This content analysis revealed increasing preoccupation with Iraq and increasing 
divergences between Democrats and Republicans and between Legislators and Executive branch 
officials in how the use of force against Iraq was justified.  The debate that occurred reflected 
less and less consensus on the use of force against Iraq.  Instead of coming together, political 
differences between the branches and the parties diverged.  This divergence along party lines, 
while regrettable in the gravest matters concerning war and peace, might be anticipated given 
increases in party polarization over the last decades.  What was unexpected is that the data also 
shows that there was a lack of consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches as 
well.  The divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches were greater than those 
between Republicans and Democrats.  Thus, while Republicans in Congress did generally tend to 
support the president in the use of force, they did not match the Executive branch in the 
frequency with which President Bush and other Executive branch officials made assertions 
favoring war.   
In addition to decreasing consensus, this analysis strongly suggests that Congress was not 
a passive or acquiescent bystander in the Iraq war debate.  Some commentators have argued that 
Congress deferred too much authority to the President and that the Iraq war was an example of 
how Congress, consistent with the trend of the past half-century, chooses to defer to the 
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President in national security matters.  To the contrary, this content analysis indicates that 
Congress was very much involved in the debate regarding policy toward Iraq.  While Congress 
as a whole was not as supportive of the use of force as was the Executive branch, Democratic 
and Republican legislators often made arguments that advocated the use of force against Iraq or 
reinforced the Bush Administration’s basic arguments.   
 8 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE DECISION TO USE FORCE 
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is 
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty 
than that…[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. 
James Madison, The Federalist No. 479 
History has shown that a country most effectively speaks with one 
voice.  To achieve this, Bush will need to form a close relationship 
with a divided Congress to build consensus on the critical foreign 
policy and national security issues facing our nation. 
Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE), Spring 200110 
 
This chapter presents an examination of the system of government officials involved in the 
promulgation of foreign policy and the decision to use military force.  National security policy-
making in America is a complex process that involves a constellation of elite government actors 
and interests.  There are many different government officials involved in making decisions, 
reporting on decisions, justifying decisions, and communicating facts, plans, and goals that 
impact decisions, whether those decisions are made or potential.  Such government elites 
obviously include the president, his closest advisors, and members of Congress.  Also included 
in the foreign policy decision-making system are appointed Executive Branch officials and 
                                                 
9 Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 301. 
10 Charles Hagel, "History's Lessons," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2001). 
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congressional witnesses, both groups that inform and influence deliberations as well.  The 
Constitution creates, assigns powers to, and constrains the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government, thereby creating the basic constitutional and political framework for decisions to 
use military force.  The first part of this chapter explains how both political branches of 
government have a share in the decision to use force.  The second part of this chapter examines 
academic literature on the politics of foreign policy decision-making, including party 
polarization.  Together, these two sections define public governmental deliberation regarding the 
use of force: what is it, who is involved, and how it relates to the legal and constitutional 
processes of legitimate foreign policy-making.   
Congress voted to authorize President Bush to exercise his own discretion on whether or 
not to use force against Iraq in October 2002.  The actual invasion did not begin until months 
later, in March 2003.  Congress’ involvement in the decision to use force extended beyond the 
House and Senate’s roll-call votes.  The content analysis of this dissertation analyzes expressed 
political differences that played a role in the decision to use force against Iraq, as well as how 
this political discourse changed during the Bush Administration prior to the actual U.S. invasion 
of Iraq.  This public discourse is expressed by government elites in order to inform and educate 
the public and other policy decision makers, but also to legitimate the government’s policy 
decision.  Thus, the public discourse that government elites publicly contribute in accordance 
with their constitutional roles may aptly be considered public government deliberation on policy 
decisions.  The examination of constitutional requirements and practices regarding the use of 
American military force in this chapter will serve to provide context for the content analysis of 
public government deliberation presented in chapters 4 and 5.   
 10 
2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
The Constitution itself does not assign foreign policy power to a single branch.  Instead, various 
aspects of foreign policy power are assigned to each of the political branches of government such 
that foreign policy decision-making is, at least theoretically, shared between the Executive and 
Legislative branches.  The Constitution sets forth the bulk of Legislative branch authority in 
Article I, § 8.  The Constitution assigns to Congress the power “To declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and to make Rules concerning captures on Land and Water….”  Congress 
is explicitly assigned the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a 
navy.”  The Congress also is given the power to tax, borrow, and spend “for the common 
Defence and general Welfare.”  All powers assigned to Congress, including war powers, have 
traditionally been construed broadly due to the last clause of Article I, § 8, a clause commonly 
referred to as the “Necessary and Proper Clause.”  The Necessary and Proper Clause gives to 
Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing powers….”   
Congress was designed to be a deliberative body, with congressional deliberations 
intended to produce policy outcomes through direct and indirect action.11  With one hundred 
Senators, four hundred thirty-five Representatives as well as several non-voting representatives, 
congressional structure and procedures exist to encourage communication among members for 
the debate of policy.  The Senate and House have vastly different procedures regarding the 
structure of debates, but this is a function of the number of individuals involved in congressional 
                                                 
11 Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System 
(New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 589. 
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activity.12  For practical reasons involving the amount of time available for discussion, the wide 
scope of Congress’ areas of responsibility, and the high number of participants, much discourse 
and deliberation occurs within congressional committees and subcommittees, including informal, 
private channels.  Congress informs itself through the calling of witnesses who by virtue of their 
positions or experience have access to information of which Congress may take notice.  
Congressional witnesses may be called from the ranks of the Executive branch, private industry, 
or academia.  Testimony is usually produced orally before committees, and often involves the 
incorporation of additional written reports.  These witnesses inform and advocate, advising, 
shaping, and contributing to the congressional debate of policy.  Congressional debate and the 
testimony of congressional witnesses may sometimes take place behind closed doors, but much 
of congressional deliberation, even on foreign policy matters, issues of national security, and the 
potential use of force, occurs in public.  Later sections in this chapter will support this assertion 
when the focus is on decision-making and public speech by government officials.   
The policy outcome of congressional deliberations may take several different forms, but 
the typical outcome involves the passage of legislation, an act for which the Constitution requires 
presidential signature or acquiescence.13  If presidential approval is not forthcoming, both houses 
of Congress can overcome a presidential veto with a two-thirds vote.14  All government spending 
takes the form of appropriations legislation, a power commonly referred to as the “power of the 
purse.”  In addition to legislation, Congress may pass concurrent resolutions.  Although 
concurrent resolutions are not binding, they serve an important communicative function.  
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Judy Schneider, "House and Senate Rules of Procedure: A Comparison,"  (Congressional Research 
Service, 2005). 
13 There is no substantive difference between the passage of a bill and the passage of a joint resolution—both may 
be properly referred to as legislation as both have the force of law under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 7 cl. 3.  U.S. Ex Rel. 
Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U.S. 470 (1889). 
14 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 7.   
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Concurrent resolutions communicate congressional will without Congress becoming responsible 
for the execution of that will.  Individual members of Congress may have more flexibility in 
supporting a mere statement for the record as opposed to legislation.   
Congressional work product also involves the oversight of other government entities and 
organizations, including the Executive branch.  Oversight is not a power granted explicitly by the 
Constitution but instead is implied through Congress’ ability to create and fund the institutions of 
government.  Oversight is as much consultative, involving the joint involvement of legislators 
and members of the executive branch, as it is an exercise of coercive and authoritative power.15  
Political pressure, non-binding legislative policy statements, restrictions on funding, and 
informal advice are also important ways that Congress participates in foreign policy-making.16   
Article II, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests “The executive Power” in the president.  The 
Constitution states in Article II, §§ 2 and 3 that the president “shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States….”  Additionally, the president is granted the power 
to make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of voting Senators, to “receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers,” as well as to nominate and appoint Ambassadors and other senior 
Officers “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate….”  In this way, the president 
nominates and the Senate confirms the most senior officials, officials who are likely to be 
involved in the most difficult foreign policy decisions.  The Secretaries of State, Treasury, and 
Defense, for example, go through this process, but Senate confirmation is not limited to 
Secretaries and other Cabinet-level officials.   
                                                 
15 Frederick M. Kaiser, "Congressional Oversight,"  (Congressional Research Service, 2001), 3. 
16 Richard F. Grimmett, "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,"  (Congressional Research Service, 
1999). 
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Many other subsidiary positions created by the president and/or Congress must have their 
nominees confirmed; such is the case with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  In 
all, more than 1000 of the highest-level Executive branch officials face some modicum of 
heightened political accountability from Senate confirmation.17  This includes Deputy and 
Assistant Secretaries and their highest deputies, including Deputy Secretaries and Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries.  Senate confirmation even extends to those of higher level military rank, 
such as majors, colonels, and generals, though the lower ranks are generally confirmed as a slate.  
Often Executive branch spokesmen have ranks into which they are confirmed, as was the case 
for Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, who was the State Department’s spokesman from May 
2000 through June 2005.  Presidential Spokesmen Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, active 
during the first two years of President Bush’s Administration, did not have rank that required 
confirmation.  Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, also held a post that did not require Senate confirmation.  All of these named 
senior government officials, whether or not they are confirmed by the Senate, played significant 
roles in the development, justification, and enactment of policy.18   
The few Constitutional clauses in Article II are the only textual basis upon which the 
president may rely when attempting to exercise legitimate foreign policy powers.  Relative to the 
                                                 
17 Henry B. Hogue, "The Appropriate Number of Advice and Consent Positions: An Analysis of the Issues and 
Proposals for Change,"  (Congressional Research Service, 2005), 7. 
18 With respect to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there are many books that describe the interaction of these elite 
government officials, in both private and public arenas.  See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. 
Trainor, Cobra Ii: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 
Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush, ed. 
Theodore A. Wilson, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), Michael Isikoff and 
David Corn, Hubris: The inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Three Rivers 
Press, 2006), Michael J. Mazarr, "The Iraq War and Agenda Setting," Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2007), Thomas E. 
Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
War and the American Presidency (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), Ron Suskind, The One Percent 
Doctrine: Deep inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), Bob 
Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). 
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foreign policy powers that the Constitution grants to Congress, presidential foreign policy 
powers are vague.  As has been pointed out by Professor Daniel Franklin, the ambiguity and 
imprecision of these few clauses regarding the president’s role in foreign affairs and war power, 
especially the Commander in Chief clause, has allowed the president to exercise a wide latitude 
of prerogative, often to a greater extent than Congress is able to exercise its authority.19  There is 
some evidence that the founders deliberately made this relationship ambiguous; the president 
should have the flexibility to protect the nation in cases of actual or impending attack, and yet in 
cases where the degree of choice to resort to armed conflict was higher, then the legislature 
would be involved in any decision to resort to force.20   
The U.S. Constitution does not grant any single branch of government sole authority over 
foreign affairs or war powers, the rhetoric of the “unitary” executive theorists and congressional 
supremacists notwithstanding.21  The Legislative and Executive branches are each assigned 
various aspects of the decision to use force in order to avoid a dangerous concentration of too 
much power within a single branch.  As James Madison explained in the Pacificus-Helvidius 
debate with Alexander Hamilton, war powers were distributed between the president and 
Congress in contrast to the power of the British monarch, whose Executive authority was broader 
than the American president’s:   
                                                 
19 Daniel P. Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of Prerogative Powers in the United States (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 1991), 41. 
20 Michael D. Ramsey, "Text and History in the War Powers Debate," University of Chicago Law Review 69 
(2002): 1698 - 99. 
21 The unitary executive theory is expounded in John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and 
Foreign Affairs after 9/11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  See also John Yoo, "Courts at War," 
Cornell Law Review 91 (2006).  For the opposite perspective, see John Hart Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War 
Powers Act That Worked," Columbia Law Review 88, no. 7 (1988), Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 2d ed. 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), Louis Fisher, "Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the 
War Power," Indiana Law Journal 81 (2005), David S. Friedman, "Waging War against Checks and Balances: The 
Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power," St. John's Law Review 57, no. 2 (1983).   
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Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be 
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, 
continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions 
by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which 
separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from 
the power of enacting laws.22 
 
Thus, with constitutional text and the original intent of the founders to ensure that 
decisions to resort to war include both Congress and the president, it would seem that both 
should be included in an inquiry into the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003.   
2.2 PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 
IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
This constitutional division of foreign policy and war powers has been the cause of much 
constitutional tension as various presidents and congressional leaders have tried to operationalize 
the requirement in ways that advantage their own political ends as well as enhance the institution 
of which they are a part.  The opinions offered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the rare foreign 
policy and constitutional law case are not easily reconciled.  The two lines of cases, following 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., seem to offer two contradictory 
explanations of congressional and Executive branch separation of powers in foreign policy.23  
Curtiss-Wright is generally interpreted as supporting expansive presidential authority in foreign 
affairs, while Youngstown Sheet & Tube stands for a more fettered president and a foreign policy 
power that involves both political branches of government.   
                                                 
22 Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols., vol. 6 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906), 148.   
23 Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation v. United States, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).   
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In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court upheld President Roosevelt’s proclamation 
forbidding the export of military use items to Bolivia and Paraguay with a vote of 8-1.  One of 
the arguments that the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation had made in opposition to its 
prosecution for the export of fifteen machine guns was that the prosecution was not made 
pursuant to law and therefore represented an unlawful presidential exercise of discretion.  
Congress had authorized FDR to outlaw the export of arms in a joint resolution if the president 
were to make a finding that cutting off arms exports to the area would assist in the establishment 
of peace in that area.  Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion upheld FDR’s presidential 
proclamation, but Sutherland did so with a broad rhetoric supportive of strong presidential 
discretion in foreign affairs.  Sutherland wrote:  
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone 
with an authority vested in the president by an exertion of 
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations—a 
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental 
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable 
provisions of the Constitution.24 
 
Citing a speech in the House of Representatives in 1800 by then Rep. James Marshall, 
Sutherland’s reference to the president as the “sole organ” in international affairs is often used to 
support expansive presidential authority.25  If this argument were pressed to the extreme, it 
would make no sense—the president could not have plenary or near-plenary power in foreign 
affairs, because the Constitution clearly assigns treaty ratification power to the Senate and the 
power to declare war to Congress as a whole.  Additionally, the “sole organ” portion of Justice 
                                                 
24 Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation v. United States, 319-20. 
25 See, e.g., John Yoo, "Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President,"  (Department of Justice, 
2001), 1. 
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Sutherland’s opinion may very well constitute dicta.26  The legal footing of Curtiss-Wright is 
more sound in the portion of the opinion where Sutherland disposes of Curtiss-Wright Export’s 
case by holding that Congress may delegate broader discretion in foreign affairs than in domestic 
affairs, and that by passing the joint resolution that authorized FDR’s proclamation, Congress 
had delegated just such a wide amount of discretion to FDR.  Nonetheless, Curtiss-Wright is 
usually cited as supportive of independent and inherent presidential authority in foreign affairs.27   
Youngstown Sheet & Tube presents a somewhat more circumscribed presidential power 
than does Curtiss-Wright.  The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recognized Congress’ significant 
role in policy-making in Youngstown, even in situations when the president has relied on the 
“Commander in Chief” clause to legitimate an action.  Justice Black’s 6-3 majority opinion held 
against President Truman, who had attempted to commandeer steel mills to avert a nation-wide 
strike of steel workers.  Truman had argued that the nation needed to continue steel production 
during the “national emergency” of war in Korea, and premised the legal legitimacy of his steel 
mill seizures “by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the 
United States.”28  In this way, the Youngstown decision directly concerns inherent presidential 
authority under the Constitution and its relationship to the enumerated and implied powers the 
Constitution provides to Congress.   
Justice Black’s majority opinion held that Truman’s seizure of private property could not 
be sustained because the president’s Commander in Chief authority meant control over day-to-
                                                 
26 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
27 Louis Fisher, "Presidential Inherent Power: The "Sole Organ" Doctrine," Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 
(2007): 151.  A close reading of Curtiss-Wright, however, would indicate that the case is more about the delegation 
of authority to the president through statute (joint resolution in this case) rather than the inherent authority of the 
president.  To Fisher, the passages that support broad presidential power are dicta.  See also Louis Fisher, 
"President's Game? History Refutes Claim to Unlimited Power over Foreign Affairs," Legal Times  (2006). 
28 Truman ordered the steel mills seizure in Executive Order 10340.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 
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day fighting in the theater of war.  Such power did not include the power to commandeer private 
property far from that theater.  Moreover, Black found that the president’s role is not a law 
maker, but someone whose primary power is “to see that laws are faithfully executed.”29  
Truman’s attempted seizure usurped Congress’ power to make laws.  Congress had enacted 
procedures via the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Defense Production Act 
1950 that might have facilitated the government’s ending the dispute and keeping the mills 
operating.  President Truman, however, had argued that the Act’s requirements were “much too 
cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”30  To Justice 
Black, Truman’s attempt to seize steel mills “does not direct that a congressional policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in 
a manner prescribed by the President.”31  Wartime necessity did not allow the Commander in 
Chief to substitute presidential policy for legislation.   
While much of Black’s majority opinion relied upon the traditional notion that the 
president and Congress have separate roles and legitimate powers, Justice Jackson’s concurring 
opinion sets forth a framework of integration.  Jackson characterized governmental action 
requiring interaction between branches as “separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.”32  The implication of this arrangement, which Justice Jackson pointed out 
explicitly, was that, “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”33  Jackson provides a framework for 
balancing presidential and congressional power:  presidential power is greatest when the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 587. 
30 Ibid., 586. 
31 Ibid., 588. 
32 Ibid., 635. 
33 Ibid. 
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president acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, “for it includes all 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”34  At the other end of the 
spectrum, presidential power is “at its lowest ebb” when the “President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress … for then he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”35  
In between these extremes is “a zone of twilight” when the president and Congress have 
“concurrent authority.”36  In these uncertain situations, “congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility….[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”37   
                                                
The Constitution makes foreign policy a concurrent power of both Congress and the 
president.  While there are certain foreign policy tasks that only Congress or the president can 
do—only Congress can “declare war” while the president “makes treaties” with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, for example—foreign policy as a whole fits comfortably into Justice 
Jackson’s “zone of twilight” where the president and Congress have concurrent power.  Jackson 
does not say so exactly, but legitimate resolution of such situations where power distribution 
between Congress and the president is uncertain is going to occur through legitimate political 
machinations, such that involves deliberation between the branches.   
The difficulty with foreign policy and war powers as allocated in the U.S. Constitution is 
that the text lacks the kind of specificity or bright-line rule that modern commentators would like 
to see in a fundamental document.  Jackson’s framework offers little specificity in resolving 
 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 637. 
36 Ibid., 636. 
37 Ibid. 
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“zone of twilight” issues involved with concurrent jurisdiction.  Can the president negotiate and 
the Senate ratify a treaty that changes the constitutionality of enacted foreign policy or future 
congressional decisions involving war and peace?  Are there limits upon the president to put 
American troops into situations where war is substantially likely to break out?  Can either branch 
initiate war, and in what circumstances (if any) is this power limited?  Having become embroiled 
in a war, what can happen when the political branches of government are at odds with each 
other?  How much congressional “meddling” in presidential Commander in Chief prerogative is 
too much?  How does constitutional theory comport with constitutional practice?  Since only 
Congress can declare war, is it significant that no wars since World War II have been explicitly 
“declared?”  Commentators have resolved these “zone of twilight” issues in various ways, 
though nearly all agree that the 1973 War Powers Resolution reflects the rare exception to the 
modern trend that the president operates at the center of U.S. foreign policy decision-making.   
Since World War II, foreign policy has been dominated by the president.38  In the Korean 
War, apprehension of a global and aggressive Communist subversion and the consequences of 
leaving that threat unchecked led to President Truman’s decision to engage U.S. forces there in 
late June 1950.39  While the U.S. did act within the United Nations Charter, the decision to take 
action was primarily a presidential one.  Truman did consult with congressional leaders, but he 
did not seek congressional authorization to use military force in Korea.  President Truman 
worried congressional debate would delay and possibly lead to political stalemate too close to 
                                                 
38 Cecil V. Crabb, Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes of 
Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), David A. Deese, "Making American 
Foreign Policy in the 1990s," in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David Deese (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994), Fisher, Presidential War Power, Fisher, "President's Game? History Refutes Claim to 
Unlimited Power over Foreign Affairs.", Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," Trans-Action 1966. 
39 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1986), 68 - 70, John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 6th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 
57 - 69. 
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congressional elections.40  Similarly, the Vietnam War also was initiated largely through 
presidential discretion.  Although Congress did authorize the use of force in Vietnam by way of 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,41 this activity was a mere fig leaf that served to cloak the 
presidential use of force with legality just as it served to obscure congressional deference to the 
president.  The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was premised on an attack on U.S. warships that 
likely did not take place, on a Manichean worldview toward the threat of Communist aggression, 
and on the perceived consequences of falling dominoes.42   
More contemporary presidents have also sought to establish themselves as the sole 
decider in decisions to use force.  President Clinton argued that as president he had the unilateral 
power to order air strikes on Baghdad in 1993 as well as to engage U.S. forces in Haiti in 1994.43  
In a 1994 press conference, Clinton argued, “Like my predecessors of both parties, I have not 
agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get [the congressional support].”44  Even when 
President George W. Bush signed the October 2002 authorization to use force against Iraq, Bush 
issued a signing statement in which he claimed that his signature did not reflect a change in “the 
President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or 
other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.”45  
President Bush gave an ultimatum in a nationally televised speech 48 hours prior to the invasion, 
                                                 
40 Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, 69. 
41 Tonkin Gulf Resolution; Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, August 7, 1964.   
42 George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 - 1975, 2nd ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986). 
43 Fisher, Presidential War Power, 156, Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential 
Power after Watergate (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 194. 
44 William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference,"  (Aug. 3, 1994). 
45 Bush, "President Signs Iraq Resolution." 
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in which he referred to the duty “to use force in assuring [U.S.] national security” that fell to 
him, as Commander in Chief.46   
2.3 THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
The high point of congressional attempts to regain political control over decisions to use force 
was the passage of the War Powers Resolution.  The War Powers Resolution47 was passed in 
1973 over the veto of President Nixon.  The Act seeks to “insure that the collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the President will apply” to the introduction of armed force into hostilities 
or situations where armed conflict is imminent.48  To accomplish this end, the War Powers 
Resolution describes the president’s constitutional Commander in Chief power as limited to 
allowing the introduction of U.S. forces only in situations where Congress has declared war, 
where Congress has given specific authorization, or in situations where an armed attack has 
occurred.49  The president “shall terminate” any use of force after 60 days unless Congress has 
declared war or has otherwise authorized the use of force continuing, or the Congress is unable 
to meet due to an attack upon the United States.50  The Act mandates regular consultation with 
Congress, including through the submission of periodic reports in cases where war was not 
specifically declared.51   
                                                 
46 George W. Bush, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours,"  (March 17, 2003). 
47 50 U.S.C. (Chapter 33) §§ 1541 -1548 (Pub. L. 93-148, November 7, 1973).   
48 Ibid., § 1541(a) 
49 Ibid., § 1541(c).  The Act does not contemplate any change to the constitutional status quo, holding explicitly that 
“Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the 
President….”  Ibid., § 1547(d)(1).   
50 Ibid., § 1544(b).  The 60 days may be extended to 90 if the President certifies in writing regarding the military 
necessity of continued action.   
51 Ibid., § 1543(a).   
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One significant problem with the War Powers Resolution is that the mechanism whereby 
Congress might mandate the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities after the passage of a 
concurrent resolution is constitutionally suspect.52  This procedure has never been tested in 
practice or before a court; nonetheless there exists widespread doubt whether or not the 
concurrent resolution procedure in the War Powers Resolution is constitutional.53  In 1983, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a similar “legislative veto” procedure 
whereby a single House of Congress claimed the power to invalidate an exercise of delegated 
executive authority in I.N.S. v. Chadha.  The Court’s holding rested on the notion that for 
legislation to be considered constitutional, it must pass through the procedure outlined in Article 
I of the Constitution—namely, that passage by both houses of Congress and presidential 
presentment is required for a bill to become a law.54  Dissenting Justice White explicitly referred 
to the concurrent resolution procedure in the War Powers Resolution in support of the legislative 
veto.55  Following Chadha, Congress amended the applicability of the concurrent resolution 
procedure by substituting a joint resolution, but Congress did so in a State Department 
Authorization bill without explicitly revising the Act.56  Regardless of the possible constitutional 
problem concerning the concurrent resolution procedure, the substantive provisions of the War 
Powers Resolution would not be invalidated as provisions in the act are separable.57   
                                                 
52 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) 
53 Joseph R. Biden and John B. Ritch, "The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A "Joint Decision" Solution," 
Georgetown Law Journal 77, no. 1 (1989): 388.  For contrasting legal opinions, see Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted 
a War Powers Act That Worked.", Fisher, Presidential War Power.  Ely concedes that the concurrent resolution 
procedure is likely unconstitutional and supports its repeal.  Ibid., 1396 - 97.   
54 I.N.S. V Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).   
55 Ibid., 970 - 71. 
56 Codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1546a.  This provision creates a separate procedure to mandate the withdrawal of troops 
through a joint resolution.  See also Fisher, Presidential War Power, 195, Richard F. Grimmett, "The War Powers 
Resolution: After Thirty Years,"  (Congressional Research Service, 2004), 10.  Note that a joint resolution requires 
presidential presentment and approval in order to become law.   
57 Ibid., § 1548.   
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The War Powers Resolution has done little to change the importance of the presidency in 
establishing foreign policy and determining when the use of force is appropriate.58  Since the 
War Powers Resolution came into force, over 100 reports have been issued to Congress 
regarding the introduction of troops into a potentially hostile situation, but only one has referred 
to the time limits imposed by the act, and many of these reports came well after U.S. forces had 
been introduced.59  Every president since Nixon has claimed that the War Powers Resolution is 
an unconstitutional infringement upon presidential prerogatives as Commander in Chief.60  The 
statute’s requirements are somewhat vague.  The statute provides no explicit mechanism for 
determining when the 60-day maximum clock begins, or how much consultation is enough to 
satisfy the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, or even with whom such consultation 
should occur.  These questions are generally not justiciable in the courts, because such questions 
are easily dismissed as being barred by the Political Questions doctrine, because individual 
members of Congress lack standing to bring suits, and because courts generally prefer to leave 
such questions to majorities of Congress.61  Thus, Congress must enforce the War Powers 
Resolution on its own, something that Congress as a whole has never attempted.  Congress has, 
however, funded operations where Congress could have made a plausible argument that the 
Executive branch had not complied with the Act.62  In practice, the War Powers Resolution has 
                                                 
58 Biden and Ritch, "The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A "Joint Decision" Solution.", Thomas E. Cronin 
and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
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59 Grimmett, "The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years," 11-12. 
60 Richard F. Grimmett, "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,"  (Congressional Research Service, 
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61 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked," 1407 - 16. 
62 See Appendix 2 in Grimmett, "The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years."  Such military operations 
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ended up entrenching the status quo of presidential and legislative relations, a situation that 
generally favors broad presidential discretion in foreign affairs.   
2.4 RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITIES OF PRESIDENTIAL AND 
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
Presidential dominance in foreign affairs was recognized as early as 1966, when Wildavsky 
wrote of two separate presidencies.  In domestic affairs, Wildavsky wrote, Congress and the 
president were co-equal, but in foreign affairs, “serious setbacks” to presidential policy were 
both “extraordinary and unusual.”63  Most scholars and commentators echo this characterization, 
though not all agree that this is desirable.  John Yoo argues that the modern president should 
have a freer hand in foreign and military affairs not just because Congress is too cumbersome 
and slow, but also because there is no guarantee that ex ante oversight would reduce the 
likelihood of errors in policy and strategy.64  Yoo argues for a wide scope of presidential power 
in foreign affairs and war powers, one where Congress can block presidential policy merely by 
refusing to fund an initiative.65  Judge Posner argues that Yoo’s theory of presidential supremacy 
in foreign affairs is perhaps too strong, but nonetheless it should be to the president where 
foreign policy decisions, even extraconstitutional decisions that the president bases solely on no 
                                                 
63 Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies." 
64 Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo, "Rational War and Constitutional Design," Yale Law Journal 115 (2006). 
65 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11, 22.  However, Yoo has 
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History in the War Powers Debate.", Michael D. Ramsey, "Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs," Columbia 
Law Review 106 (2006). 
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other authority than necessity, should fall.66  To some constitutional scholars, the shared foreign 
policy power enshrined in the Constitution “invites” highly charged policy warfare between 
Congress and the president, where ultimately the president must triumph because national 
security requires unusual discretionary executive authority.67  The president has initiative and 
capability stemming from speed, secrecy, and unity of dispatch.68  Not only is the president the 
Commander in Chief, but as civilian head of the bureaucracy that includes the diplomatic and 
intelligence services, the president has formidable capability.  At its worst, this situation of 
presidential dominance of foreign affairs has been characterized as the “Imperial Presidency.”69   
Crabb et al. have suggested a typology of modes or patterns of congressional involvement 
in foreign policy, identifying four basic modes or patterns of relationship: acquiescence, 
activism, bipartisanship or executive and legislative unity, and division of labor.70  During the 
periods between the world wars and just after Watergate at the end of Vietnam, congressional 
activity may be characterized as activist.  To Crabb et al., the norm in foreign policy is 
acquiescence, a mode that exists some 75 to 80 % of the time.71  Lowi characterizes 
congressional passivity as a voluntary renunciation of power—since the New Deal, Congress has 
repeatedly created institutions that deferred power to the presidency such that the president has 
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become the embodiment of government, thereby sacrificing traditional separation of power 
doctrine.72  Lowi calls this phenomenon “the personal president,” and Lowi argues that it 
reinforces the notion that the president should be the center of foreign policy.  Fisher echoes 
Lowi’s concern, characterizing congressional passivity in foreign affairs as an undermining of its 
own authority.  This self-undermining is assisted by an academic community and the media who 
fixate on the “zone of twilight” and presidential leadership.73  This puts the president in a 
position where communication with Congress justifies the president’s foreign policy vision in 
order to build a support in Congress for the specific legislation required to put it into practice.74   
Other scholars on the relationship between Congress and the president are less critical of 
Congress.  Where Crabbe et al., Lowi, and Fisher see congressional acquiescence, Lindsay 
identifies structural impediments to active congressional participation in foreign policy.75  
Lindsay argues that arguments of congressional timidity should not be taken too far.  Lindsay 
suggests that a president has the initiative in foreign affairs because of the widespread 
interpretation in favor of inherent presidential power such as the Commander in Chief power.  
Lindsay points out that broad presidential discretion is usually upheld in federal courts.76  While 
Congress can overturn the status quo established by the president, it can do so effectively only 
with enough votes to override a presidential veto.  The president also has the benefit of 
interaction with negotiating with other states and with administering secrecy rules, which 
administrations regularly use to manipulate the situation for political advantage as well as to 
avoid embarrassment or fallout.  Fisher points out that the characteristics of congressional 
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oversight power are not well suited to foreign policy.77  Congress does have subpoena power, but 
such authority only extends over Americans, not foreigners or foreign countries, and this power 
can often be disarmed by the president and executive branch officials relying on executive 
privilege.  Perhaps, more importantly to Fisher, the lack of clear and measurable goals in how 
foreign policy means and ends relate insulates the president from congressional criticism so that 
all criticism seems politically motivated.78  Thus, Fisher portrays Congress as dominated by the 
president in foreign policy, but due to real structural impediments rather than political 
acquiescence.79   
An analysis of presidential and congressional relations from 1946 to 1997 by Scott and 
Carter indicates that there is more nuance in the relationship than prior evidence had shown.80  
Scott and Carter analyzed legislative activity, specifically the passage of legislation, including 
foreign and defense appropriations bills, hearings, and the issuance of reports—thus, their 
conclusions are based on a broader source of evidence than the mere passage of bills.  Scott and 
Carter showed how, despite an increase in activity between 1967 and 1982, congressional 
activity has decreased since 1947.  However, Scott and Carter also demonstrate that Congress 
increased its assertiveness in opposing the presidency over the same period.  Scott and Carter 
therefore characterize the contemporary, post-1982 relationship between the president and 
Congress as either strategic, where Congress uses its power to challenge the president when 
interested, or supportive, where congressional activity is relatively higher, but less oppositional 
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to the president.  The dominant factor that influences the oppositional conflict between Congress 
and the presidency is divided government and partisanship—the control of the Senate, House, 
and the presidency by political parties that display significant ideological and political 
differences between them.81   
There is widespread agreement that partisanship is at an all-time high and is increasing.82  
Many studies use party unity votes to indicate polarization in Congress.  That is, when the 
majorities of both parties oppose each other on a roll call vote, that vote is characterized as 
polarized.83  While other measures for polarization exist, roll call results are favored because 
they are quantifiable, generally comprehensive, readily available, and well-tested through many 
overlapping studies.84  Roll call votes demonstrate that Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
are more polarized now than at any time in the past three decades.85  Theriault has demonstrated 
that the parties have been polarizing at measurably different rates.  Republicans have become 62 
% more polarized in the past 32 years while Democrats have become 33 % more polarized.86  
Relying on roll call data, most scholars agree that the notion suggested by Senator Vandenberg 
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during the Cold War that politics stops at the water’s edge is “more a political ploy than an 
empirical verity.”87   
Polarization is measured through party disagreements in roll call votes, but just as Scott 
and Carter examined the relationship between political branches in greater light by looking at 
indicators other than just roll call results, party polarization can be shown through other 
indicators.  This analysis examines differences between party and branch in the frequencies of 
the most common arguments by which Republicans and Democrats publicly justified the use of 
force against Iraq.88  Thus, this content analysis can serve to determine empirically what 
justifications were used most to justify an invasion of Iraq, but also whether or not there was a 
significant difference across groups of government elites along party lines or between branches 
of government.   
2.5 GOVERNMENT DELIBERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
Justifications supporting the use of force against Iraq, like all public statements made by 
government elites, have several underlying purposes.  Government elites make public statements 
to participate in government decision-making, to further governmental oversight, to persuade and 
build consensus, and to educate the public regarding the issue.  The decision-making aspects of 
public discussion refers to the public “weighing of substantive information and consideration[] in 
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making policy decisions.”89  In this sense, public statements represent the basis upon which 
government officials exercise collective judgment.90   
It is perhaps easier to recognize the congressional role in deliberation as Congress is the 
most obvious government institution “designed to filter public opinion through its internal 
procedures and deliver policy outcomes,”91 but both Executive and Legislative branches 
participate at least to some degree in accordance with their shared constitutional authority over 
foreign policy.  Even in cases where Congress delegates authority to the Executive branch, as 
was the case in the 2003 Iraq invasion, congressional activity and policy preferences continue to 
affect foreign policy.92  Congress also engages in public deliberation and discussion in 
furtherance of its oversight function.93   
Government elites also participate in discussion and deliberation in order to persuade 
others and build consensus.  This airing of various views in public is strategic, sometimes 
allowing supporters and potential allies of a would-be policy who operate outside government to 
force an opponent’s hand as well as to gauge public support for an action.94  Much of 
government decision-making involves compromise with other government elites—despite the 
president’s tendency to dominate foreign policy—due to the level of consensus required for a 
foreign policy to be enacted over the many veto points that exist in American government.95  
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Government officials also use public statements to appeal for public support—which has the 
benefit of increasing one’s own public support as well as the potential for attracting other 
government officials to join the appeal.96  This public education function may be achieved by 
members of Congress or the president.  While members of Congress may focus their remarks 
primarily upon their own constituencies, the president and vice president are the only 
government officials who are elected by the nation as a whole.  This gives the president a unique 
bully pulpit in addition to his central role in foreign policy-making.97  Nonetheless, public debate 
by all government officials contributes to how foreign policy issues are framed.98  In this way, 
public statements regarding the justification of the use of force against Iraq made by government 
officials is simultaneously part constitutional policy decision-making, part public education and 
justification, and part political wrangling.   
The purpose of this review of constitutional foreign policy power, polarization, and 
public deliberation is to demonstrate that the speech of government officials has both value and 
meaning beyond the mere words used.  The Constitution may seem ambiguous in assigning 
foreign policy power, but this is because the purpose of the Constitution was merely to set forth a 
framework for a decision-making process.  Despite the arguments discussed above, there is no 
right way to interpret the Constitution and resolve the ambiguities.99  The constitutional exercise 
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of war powers therefore involves political conflict and deliberation between both the president 
and Congress.100   
In practice, however, Congress cannot be expected to be an equal partner in the decision 
to use force against Iraq.  The president’s benefit of singleness of mind, secrecy, and inherent 
Commander in Chief authority combine to put the president at the center of foreign policy 
development.  As a result, presidential discretion has been given more and more weight by the 
Congress in recent history.  The president also has access to more information as well as direct 
access to the tools of government, enhancing congressional focus on enablement of federal 
powers.  Nonetheless, the basic constitutional framework has not changed.  Foreign policy 
power—at least in so far as that power is a broad strategy or a decision of whether or not to use 
force writ large—is shared.  The operational result of this sharing is discussion and deliberation 
between the government institutions that legitimately possess some aspect of that power.  
Although much of this deliberation occurs behind closed doors, there is, nonetheless, a 
significant amount of public deliberation between government actors and institutions.  This was 
certainly true with respect to the decision to invade Iraq, as the content analysis of Executive and 
Legislative branch speakers demonstrates in the next several chapters.   
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3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET AND METHODOLOGY 
Please have someone find precisely when I said the term “dead-
enders” and what the context was. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Sept. 5, 2006101 
3.1 GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the conception of the research study and the method by 
which the descriptive material was obtained and reviewed.  The initial impetus for this project 
arose from my own sense of disappointment in the quality of political debate in late 2002 
regarding the potential use of force against Iraq.  As the invasion began in March 2003 and 
important elements in the Bush Administration’s case for war began to unravel, I focused on 
congressional Democrats as opposed to higher-level Executive branch officials and Republican 
legislators.  I thought Republicans and Bush Administration officials would naturally support the 
Republican president, but I had expected Democrats to provide some alternative voice.  I 
suspected that if I could somehow detail and analyze public debate on potential war with Iraq in 
a systematic way, I would find that those making the most noise on the subject of Iraq would be 
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Republicans—that Democrats had generally been silent and therefore had acquiesced into the 
president’s war.   
During the summer of 2004, I read Richard Clark’s Against All Enemies and Bob 
Woodward’s Plan of Attack.  Both books suggested that the president had perhaps decided to 
invade Iraq much earlier than March 2003, and there was an insinuation that some members of 
the Bush Administration had urged an attack on Iraq just after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001.  I wondered whether there was a publicly available source of evidence that could 
corroborate or contradict this insinuation.  Was there a systematic way to measure government 
preoccupation with Iraq?  That fall, I discovered Federal News Service’s Washington Transcript 
Service.   
Federal News Service (FNS) is a private company that provides verbatim transcripts of 
government briefings, speeches, press conferences, and “other newsmaker events.”102  The FNS 
transcribes public appearances of government officials who are central to policy-making.  The 
speakers of the FNS transcripts include members of Congress as they participate in floor debates 
and committee hearings as well as Executive branch officials as they hold press conferences and 
hold briefings.  As a convenient shorthand, these officials will be referred throughout this 
analysis as government elites.  Their public statements will be denoted as public speech or public 
deliberation.  In December 2004, I downloaded every FNS transcript dated from January 19, 
2001 to March 19, 2003, where the word “Iraq” appeared at least once.  January 19, 2001 is the 
date when President Bush was sworn in as the 43rd President of the United States.  The end date, 
March 19, 2003, is the date the invasion of Iraq began.  In running my query, I did not select the 
option “Search whole word only.”  As a result, the FNS search engine included alternative forms 
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of the word Iraq, such as “Iraqi” or “Iraq’s.” 103  Thus, my search was more inclusive than a 
simple word search.  In this way, I obtained 158 mega-bytes of textual data containing well over 
34 million words—2,206 individual transcripts each containing the public speech of many 
different government officials.  Many of these transcripts were as long as 115 pages.  I wondered 
if these transcripts would reveal increasing references to Iraq, and that perhaps they might then 
indicate growing government preoccupation with Iraq.  I was also interested in whether the FNS 
transcript data would show that references to Iraq by government officials increased prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  If the transcripts showed an increase in government 
discussion of Iraq prior to September 11, 2001, then such evidence might indicate that the 
decision to go to war against Iraq might have occurred prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well.   
My earliest use of the FNS Iraq transcripts I obtained in December 2004 was in a doctoral 
seminar project.  My goal in this class project was to examine changes in government officials’ 
public references to Iraq in order to examine whether there had been any changes in government 
focus on the problem of Iraq at various times prior to the March 2003 invasion.  In this simple 
descriptive study, my method involved nothing more than simple word counts.  For each 
transcript, I recorded by hand the transcript number (ranging from 1 to 2206), the date of the 
meeting recorded by the transcript, and the number of times the word “Iraq” was used in the 
transcript as uttered by government officials.  This methodology may have been simple, but it 
was also exceedingly time-intensive.  I used Microsoft Word to open the electronic file of each 
FNS transcript.  Using MS Word’s Find and Replace tool, I manually counted the number of 
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times U.S. government speakers in the transcript referred to the word “Iraq.”104  I did these 
searches without the option “Find whole words only” selected so that my search would not 
preclude references to Iraq using other forms of the word.   
In this initial study, I considered any member of the Executive and Legislative branches 
as well as congressional witnesses testifying in a hearing to be government speakers.  My counts 
did not include references to Iraq made by reporters in press conferences or the leaders of foreign 
countries in joint press conferences with U.S. government officials.  After several weeks of 
work, I had completed a small dataset of government officials’ public references to Iraq in the 
FNS transcripts.  As the universe of government officials from which FNS creates its transcripts 
remains relatively constant, it is possible to compare the relative increase or decrease in the use 
of the term Iraq over time.  FNS transcripts are hardly exhaustive in including government 
speech, but they are representative enough of the government system described in Chapter 2.   
 
Figure 1: Public References to Iraq, January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003 
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The result of this initial inquiry, detailed in Figure 1, was surprising.  I had expected to 
find significant change in the number of times government speakers had publicly referred to Iraq 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Instead, the increase in references to Iraq did not 
begin until September 2002.  Although the references to Iraq by government elites illustrates 
nothing more than when Iraq began to be discussed publicly by government elites, the increase in 
references that begins in September 2002 reminded me of a New York Times “Quotation of the 
Week” of White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card.  Card had been quoted as saying, “From a 
marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in August.”105  This increase in the 
number of references to Iraq also coincided with President Bush’s address to the United Nations 
General Assembly on September 12, 2002.106  In this address, Bush laid out a case against Iraq 
and essentially put the problem of Iraq on the foreign policy agenda.  This small study piqued my 
interest in how the FNS transcripts might be used, but I determined that I needed a more 
sophisticated research strategy, one that would allow me to examine the Iraq war debate in a 
more extensive and complicated manner.   
I grew more interested in examining the decision-making that led up to the invasion of 
Iraq and wondered if the publicly available information might shed light on some aspects of this 
decision.  I initially conceived of the transcripts as a way to frame a future analysis of internal 
Bush Administration foreign policy development.  I knew that the bulk of my research would 
necessarily be limited to public information—with the war in Iraq ongoing, it was unlikely that I 
would have much access to private or internal governmental evidence such as secret policy 
memos.  These scattered pieces of evidence were unlikely to support a systematic approach, 
however.  I instead began to shift my focus from decision-making to how the war was justified 
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publicly.  This focus would make the most of the FNS transcripts and avoid the problem that 
existed due to lack of private and internal evidence.   
For good reason, several of my colleagues and professors were at first suspicious of my 
research interest, thinking that there would be no way to do any sort of objective analysis with 
my strong sense that the decision to invade Iraq was a grievous foreign policy error.  However, I 
felt that my bias would be minimized since my proposed interest would entail empirical analysis 
of what had been said prior to the invasion, not cherry picking of quotes out of context or finger 
pointing at politicians with whom I disagreed.  I sought to design my project as a descriptive 
study with a simple objective: to collect data on what government leaders publicly said regarding 
the invasion of Iraq.   
As I developed this research agenda, I consciously decided to focus on how those who 
were generally supportive of the use of force against Iraq justified that support and less on those 
who argued against invading Iraq for several reasons.  I recalled that only a few government 
officials argued explicitly against an invasion of Iraq, and thus as a practical matter, I doubted 
how much data I might be able to collect on those arguments against the use of force.  Many of 
those who argued against using force against Iraq were either arguing against the use of force 
generally, or, more often, disagreeing that the facts that proponents of force used to buttress their 
arguments warranted an attack of Iraq.  I did not want to code anti-war arguments for all 2,206 
transcripts when there were not many anti-war arguments made by government speakers.  After 
all, my interest was in how the invasion was justified.  Also, because I was new to the research 
design literature, I was unsure how to design a project that would incorporate both pro and con 
facets of the debate on Iraq in a systematic but efficient manner.  I did not want a coding 
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instrument that included so many content variables that might increase the likelihood that human 
error would be introduced during hand-coding.   
3.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS 
My research objective was to describe systematic changes in the public debate on U.S. policy 
toward Iraq between elite government policymakers in order to discover whether there existed 
differences in how various groups of officials justified the use of military force against Iraq.  I 
chose content analysis to achieve this end.  Content analysis refers to the process of mapping 
symbolic data into some form suitable for statistical analysis, and as such is properly 
characterized as measurement.107  The symbolic data for this research project is the public debate 
between U.S. government policy elites on Iraq, from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.  The 
mapping was accomplished through hand-coding of a series of variables comprising a single 
coding instrument for the entire pre-invasion of Iraq time period.  The output statistics concern 
the content variables and allow comparison over time across groups of government speakers, 
such as party affiliation and branch of government.  Analyzing the stated policy preferences of 
political actors in a common space allows for comparison of parties and to measure the extent to 
which parties are mutually congruent.108   
There is no complete record of government officials’ deliberation on policy toward Iraq 
during this or any other period.  Nonetheless, my collection of 2,206 FNS transcripts of public 
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discussions where the word Iraq was used by at least one speaker, dated from January 19, 2001 
to March 19, 2003 constitutes a substantial, though non-random, sample of the public debate 
between government elites regarding Iraq.  FNS includes in its Washington Transcript Service 
verbatim transcripts of congressional hearings, speeches, statements; press conferences of 
administration and congressional leaders; briefings and press conferences of the Departments of 
State, Defense, and Justice; political interviews on morning and weekend television shows; and 
speeches from political campaigns.109  FNS transcripts are not subject to ex post facto 
manipulation as is the Congressional Record.  The Congressional Record also does not include 
briefings and speeches by Bush Administration leaders and spokesmen.  Sampling validity in 
content analysis depends on how much, in “proportion, scale, or distribution,” the FNS 
transcripts correspond to all public government deliberation.110  For this reason, conclusions 
based upon analysis of these transcripts are likely to be more scientifically valid than conclusions 
based on an analysis of the Congressional Record.   
FNS transcripts record the public speech of important government elites in both the 
Legislative and Executive branches of government.  The collection of 2,206 FNS transcripts 
where the word Iraq was used provided a representative sample of public governmental 
deliberation on U.S. policy toward Iraq.  Content analysis requires issue “salience,” the idea that 
issues be important enough to be relevant within a common space.111  The fact that there were so 
many transcripts involved in this particular content analysis illustrates how salient the issue of 
using force against Iraq was, even in public discussion, as well as how representative of public 
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governmental deliberation on the subject of Iraq the collected FNS transcripts were.  As the 
target of this analysis was to determine how government officials publicly discussed the potential 
invasion of Iraq, the validity of conclusions drawn from a content analysis of FNS transcripts 
where the word Iraq appears was rather strong.   
3.3 THE CODING INSTRUMENT 
Content analysis requires a coding instrument that has been designed to ensure that the empirical 
analysis is scientifically reliable.  The content analysis is reliable to the extent that the coding 
instrument is 1) stable and invariant over the length of time under consideration; 2) reproducible 
and can be recreated under varying circumstances, such as through the use of different coders; 
and 3) accurate to an established standard.112  The base unit of this content analysis was each 
individual speaker in each transcript.  Each observation was independent, because the speaker 
per transcript base unit was unique.  Many FNS transcripts involved multiple government 
speakers, but the content of each individual speaker in a transcript was coded independently.  
Because of this, many transcripts yielded multiple observations.  There were 2,206 transcripts 
dated between January 19, 2001 and March 19, 2003 where the word Iraq appeared.  Because 37 
of these transcripts were verbatim duplicates of other transcripts, this analysis subsequently 
ignored them.  Even by ignoring these duplicates, the analysis drew data from 2,169 unique 
transcripts.113   
                                                 
112 Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, 130.   
113 FNS duplicated some of the transcripts in its records.  In only a few cases, this was due to exact matches between 
advance copies of a speech and the official transcript of that speech.  In those cases, it seems, FNS preserved both 
the advance copy and the official transcript in the Washington Transcript files.   
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These 2,169 transcripts generated a total of 4,279 observations.  The focus of this analysis was 
the speech of U.S. government officials as they made arguments concerning Iraq.  To eliminate 
the ambiguity of determining whether a given statement made by a U.S. government official 
concerned Iraq, an observation has been included in the analysis only if the U.S. government 
speaker or congressional witness used the word Iraq at least once during a public appearance.  In 
469 of these observations, the speaker was not a U.S. government speaker or a congressional 
witness in the process of giving testimony.  In 1,285 observations, the U.S. government speaker 
did not use the word Iraq, and so these observations were not considered.  Thus, this analysis was 
made using a dataset constructed from 2,525 observations of the speech of U.S. government 
speakers taken from 1,564 unique FNS transcripts.   
A few illustrations of the process by which this analysis made observations may be 
useful.  Imagine a joint press conference between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir 
Putin where each leader makes a brief statement and then reporters ask questions.  My search for 
transcripts would have returned this hypothetical press conference if the word Iraq or its forms 
were present in the transcript of this press conference.  If Putin or a reporter made the reference 
to Iraq, then this observation would not be coded.  If President Bush mentioned the word Iraq or 
used one of its forms, then this observation would be scored using the coding instrument.  Even 
if President Bush were to mention the word Iraq several times, this transcript would yield at most 
one single observation, because President Bush is the only U.S. government official in the 
transcript that has yielded an observation.  Similarly, in a transcript of a Senate committee 
hearing, each Senator who used the word Iraq or one of its forms will yield one observation.  
Each congressional witness who used the word Iraq would also yield an observation.  The speech 
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of Senators or witnesses who did not use the word Iraq or one of its forms would not be analyzed 
with the coding instrument.   
The initial coding instrument in this analysis consisted of 44 different variables.  
Nineteen of these variables described the transcript and the speaker, while the other 25 variables 
measured the content of each individual’s arguments about the use of force against Iraq.  The 25 
content variables represent narrowly defined aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq.  
The values for each of these content variables were coded as either present (the value is equal to 
1) or not present (the value is equal to 0) in order to maximize objectivity and stability of the 
variables’ definitions during the long hand-coding process.  A research assistant and I then 
manually applied the 44-variable coding instrument to all 2,206 FNS transcripts over a period of 
about eight months.  After the coding was complete and I began preliminary analysis of the data, 
I added seven variables to the coding instrument.  Of these seven, I manually coded four 
variables concerning references to the 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden, but I used the 
qualitative research software program MAXQDA 2.0114 to do text string searches in the 
transcripts for three additional codes.  In these two steps, I coded all 51 variables across all 2,525 
observations.   
My content analysis goes beyond word counts as it also measures the intended meaning 
of government officials’ public arguments regarding the use of force against Iraq.  This 
“representational” analytical approach is to be contrasted with other content analysis that is 
“instrumental.”  A representational approach is used when a researcher uses texts “to identify 
their sources’ intended meanings” while a researcher with an instrumental approach would 
                                                 
114 MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.   
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interpret texts in terms of his or her own theory.115  As with the analysis of any political speech, 
there is the problem that political officials may attempt to deceive, mislead, or misstate their own 
preferences.  Thus, some transcripts may reflect what politicians want to reflect rather than their 
actual preferences.  This might be a difficulty if the content analysis were to be used in an 
instrumental research design where the data would then be compared with decision-making 
models.  However, the target of this research project is what elite U.S. decision-makers are 
saying publicly about the use of force against Iraq: public governmental deliberation on Iraq.  
While the outcome of public discussion is often a decision made by government officials, the 
research here focuses on the content of public governmental speech itself.  When government 
officials make public speeches, the speech has meaning and effect beyond the mere expression of 
preferences.  Government deliberation informs the public, justifies and constrains the exercise of 
power by government actors, and affects the agenda of other government officials.  
Understanding the nature of government deliberations prior to a popular invasion that has since 
plummeted in support is important for trying to avoid such situations in the future.   
The 51 variables captured by the coding instrument may be divided into three types.  The 
first type of variable describes the specific FNS transcript, the second variable type depicts each 
individual speaker in each unique transcript, and the third variable type concerns the arguments 
for or against an invasion of Iraq put forward by a particular speaker in each transcript.  As each 
individual U.S. government speaker who used the word Iraq or its forms at least once constitutes 
a separate observation, the data can be aggregated in several ways, such as by party affiliation, 
governmental branch, or by individuals.   
                                                 
115 Gilbert Shapiro, "The Future of Coders: Human Judgments in a World of Sophisticated Software," in Text 
Analysis for the Social Sciences: Methods for Drawing Statistical Inferences from Texts and Transcripts, ed. Carl 
W. Roberts (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997).   
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Ten variables pertained to the transcript itself.  These ten variables included a unique 
identifier for each transcript (the transcripts were numbered from 1 to 2206), the date pertaining 
to the transcript’s contents, the total number of words for all speakers in a particular transcript (a 
number that was provided in the transcript itself by FNS), and the place or forum where the 
transcript’s contents were made.  In addition, the coding instrument included a series of six 
variables that captured whether the transcript covered Senate or House floor deliberation and 
which committee or subcommittee, if any, was involved.  Table 1 explains the variables in the 
coding instrument that denote the transcript.   
 
Table 1: Transcript-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument  
Variable 
Name Description 
Document 
Number 
The unique identifier for each transcript, ranging from 1 to 2206.  An observation consists of a 
speaker per transcript combination.  Some transcripts included multiple speakers and therefore 
yielded multiple observations.   
Date 
This refers to the date that the government speech occurred, not to the date the transcript was made 
or uploaded into the Washington Transcript Service’s database.  In this analysis, dates ranged from 
Jan. 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003. 
Total Words 
Total words in the transcript, as given by Federal News Service.  The word length of the transcripts 
ranged from 233 to 71,276 words; the mean number of words was 12,795 words while the mode 
number of words in the transcripts was 30,693.   
Forum The forum variable refers to the place where the transcript’s content was produced.  This value was usually given by Federal News Service.   
House 
Deliberation 
This binary variable was coded as a 1 if the observation concerned deliberation that took place in 
the House.  612 of 2,525 observations occurred in the House of Representatives. 
Senate 
Deliberation 
This binary variable was coded as a 1 if the observation concerned deliberation that took place in 
the Senate.  773 of 2,525 observations occurred in the Senate. 
Senate 
Committee The name of the Senate Committee before which a government actor spoke, if any.   
Senate 
Subcommittee The name of the Senate Subcommittee before which a government actor spoke, if any. 
House 
Committee The name of the House Committee before which a government actor spoke, if any. 
House 
Subcommittee The name of the House Subcommittee before which a government actor spoke, if any.   
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 Table 2: Speaker-centered Variables in the Coding Instrument 
Variable 
Name Description 
Name Name of the government speaker.  There were 416 different government speakers that each generated at least one observation.   
Civilian / 
Military Status 
Whether the speaker was military or civilian at the time the deliberation was made.  Speakers were 
overwhelmingly civilian, at 2,334 of the 2,525 observations.  Military speakers contributed only 
140 out of 2,525 observations.  An additional 51 observations were made by anonymous “Senior 
officials,” so whether the speaker civilian or military was not known.   
Iraq References 
The total number of times the word Iraq or any of its forms was used.  By definition, each 
observation has at least one reference to the word Iraq.  The maximum number of times a speaker 
mentioned Iraq per observation was 313.   
Role The role or title of each U.S. government speaker.   
Agency 
The agency of government to which the speaker belonged.  For Senators and Representatives, this 
is the Senate and House, respectively.  For congressional witnesses who were not government 
officials in their own right, the agency was denoted as “congressional witness.”   
Branch 
The branch of government to which the speaker belongs.  Several variants of this variable were 
created to allow for disaggregation of Executive branch speakers testifying before Congress and 
congressional witnesses who were not government officials in their own right.   
Elected Whether the speaker was an elected official.  Elected officials made 1,246 of 2,525 observations.   
Appointed with 
Senate 
Confirmation 
Whether this official is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Only 824 out of 2,525 
observations were made by government speakers who had been confirmed in their posts by the 
Senate.   
Party 
Affiliation 
The political party of each speaker, if known.  Of 2,525 observations, Republicans contributed 916, 
Democrats contributed 614, and one observation was made by an Independent.  The remaining 994 
observations were contributed by speakers whose political affiliation was unknown.   
 
The second type of variable included in the coding instrument collected information on 
each U.S. government speaker in each transcript who used the word Iraq at least once in the 
transcript.  There were nine variables in the coding instrument of this speaker-oriented type of 
variable.  These variables included the name of the speaker and the number of times the speaker 
used the word Iraq, whether the speaker was a civilian or military official, the speaker’s role and 
status in the U.S. government, and the political party affiliation of the speaker.  I coded the 
political party affiliation of government speakers only when that information could be obtained 
through publicly available and confirmed information.  If there was any ambiguity in 
determining the political party affiliation of the speaker, the party affiliation was not coded.  I 
could not verify the political party of two prominent presidential staff members, Deputy 
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Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz or Presidential Spokesman Ari Fleischer, for example, and 
thus their political party affiliation is missing data.  The political party of elected officials, on the 
other hand, was easily available and well confirmed.  Table 2 lists the coding instrument’s 
variables that pertained to the speaker.   
 
3.4 CONTENT VARIABLES 
The variables discussed in the previous section concern the attributes of the transcript and 
speaker.  The most meaningful variables in this analysis represent the content of government 
speech concerning war in Iraq.  These 32 variables will hereinafter be referred to as content 
variables.  I coded the first 25 variables with the help of my undergraduate research assistant 
Avishy Moshenberg over a period of about eight months.116  After I started an analysis of the 
data from this part of the coding process, members of my dissertation committee suggested that I 
look into the issue of whether government speakers were inclined to mention the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in support of the invasion of Iraq.  I therefore hand-coded an additional 
four content variables that measured references to 9/11 and Osama bin Laden.  I also used the 
text analysis software MAXQDA 2.0117 to do text string searches for three phrases that were 
used during the debate.  The three phrases were “second resolution,” “regime change,” and “fight 
to the enemy.”   
                                                 
116 Avishy Moshenberg and I worked together for nearly two years as he assisted me on this project and I advised 
him in his studies.  Avishy used part of the data to prepare a thesis in support of his B.Phil. degree from the 
University of Pittsburgh Honors College.   
117 MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.   
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I developed my coding instrument out of the initial study into references made to Iraq for 
a PhD seminar.  I was drawn to seeing whether public statements regarding Iraq might illustrate 
a growing focus on Iraq, and whether these statements might relate to the decision of how to 
confront the threat posed by Iraq.  Two articles from the first half of 2003 contributed to my 
defining of the content variables the way I did.  The first article was a Washington Post article 
published a few months before the invasion of Iraq.118  This article presented the decision to go 
to war against Iraq as “circumventing traditional policymaking channels” by connecting the 
cause against Iraq to the war on terrorism.  The article quotes Georgetown University Professor 
G. John Ikenberry, who argued that the Bush Administration’s preventative war represented an 
“extraordinary” development.  Ikenberry was then quoted, “the external presentation and the 
justification for it really seems to be lacking….  The external presentation appears to mirror the 
internal decision-making quite a bit.”  This supports my connection of public government speech 
with decision-making.119  Moreover, it suggested that I see whether different government 
speakers were more or less likely to publicly connect their case for war to the war on terror.  I 
also decided to look for other references to terrorism as well, both specific references to terrorists 
or terrorist groups and to more general references to the threat of terrorism.   
The second article that influenced my creation of the content variables in my coding 
instrument appeared in The New Republic three months into the Iraq war.  The authors of this 
article wrote how the Bush Administration ignored the lack of a consensus within the American 
                                                 
118 Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past; Opponents of War Wonder When, How Policy Was 
Set," The Washington Post, January 12, 2003. 
119 This is not to say that public words are a sufficient indicator of the decision-making surrounding U.S. policy 
toward Iraq.  The analysis here analyzed how the war was publicly justified.  A content analysis is no substitute for 
later historical analysis of the major players and the decision based on confidential and subsequently declassified 
information, interviews, and other such evidence.   
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intelligence community about the nature of the threat that Iraq represented.120  The article 
suggested that Bush had made the actual decision to invade Iraq shortly after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, but that the public debate over the war in Iraq did not start until the fall of 
2002 when the administration used the first anniversary of the attacks to “launch its public 
campaign for a congressional resolution endorsing war.”121  I attempted to define content 
variables that might measure differences in how government officials characterized the nature of 
the threat.  I created a code that would indicate that a speaker had characterized the Iraqi threat as 
imminent.  I also created codes that would distinguish between explicit and implicit references to 
national security to justify the invasion.  To keep the coding instrument from growing ungainly, I 
did not initially code for references to the 9/11 attacks, but after encouragement from my 
dissertation committee, I later added codes to measure references to 9/11, Osama bin Laden, and 
claims of responsibility to the coding instrument.   
The language used in the 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq122 also 
contributed to my development of the coding instrument’s content variables.  Before the 
substantive authorization, this statute included 23 “whereas” clauses that set forth background in 
support of the authorization.  The clauses stated that Iraq was “continuing to possess and develop 
a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons 
capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations....”123  The clauses referred to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and to the “gravity” of Iraq’s connections to terrorists groups, such as al 
Qaeda, and even linked the war against Iraq to the war on terror by acknowledging that the 
                                                 
120 Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The First Casualty," The New Republic, June 30, 2003. 
121 Ibid.  These same points were later echoed by Democrats in the House Judiciary Committee in their report, 
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff, George W. Bush Versus the U.S. Constitution: The Downing Street 
Memos and Deception, Manipulation, Torture, Retribution, Coverups in the Iraq War and Illegal Spying (Chicago: 
Academy Chicago Publishers, 2006). 
122 H.J.Res.114, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. 
123 Ibid. 
 51 
president had been authorized to take such necessary measures against international terrorists 
responsible for 9/11.124  In addition, the clauses referred to Iraq’s use of weapons of mass 
destruction on its own civilian population.125  By using these elements of the decision to use 
force against Iraq in my coding instrument, I was able to demonstrate how prevalent these 
justifications were in the public debate.  A 2005 CIA report concluded that Iraq had not 
possessed weapons of mass destruction at the time of the invasion—instead the Hussein regime 
maintained the strategy of maintaining enough technical capability to perhaps reconstitute 
capability once international sanctions were lifted.126  A 2007 Pentagon study using internal 
memos of the Hussein regime did find that Hussein had provided some support to terrorists for 
activity directed at enemies of his regime, but that the Hussein regime essentially did not trust 
religiously motivated terrorists.  The report concluded that there were few operation ties between 
Iraq and terrorism and no operational links between Saddam and al Qaeda.127  Those government 
speakers who made assertions that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or was connected 
to terrorism more frequently than there speakers were also wrong more of the time.   
Five content variables captured information regarding potential costs and benefits of the 
war.  During late 2002 and early 2003 the projected cost of the war was the matter of some 
debate in the media.  In September 2002, White House Economic Advisor Lawrence Lindsay 
projected the cost of the war to be about 1 % of U.S. GDP, between $100 and $200 billion.128  
Lindsay resigned only a few months after releasing this projection, a projection that was 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Charles Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,"  (Central 
Intelligence Agency, Sept. 23, 2004). 
127 Warren P. Strobel, "Exhaustive Review Finds No Link between Saddam and Al Qaida," McClatchy Newspapers, 
March 10, 2008. 
128 Bob Davis, "Bush Economic Aide Says Cost of Iraq War May Top $100 Billion," Wall Street Journal Sept. 16, 
2002. 
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criticized for being too high.129  The White House, through Office of Management and Budget 
Director Mitch McConnell soon afterwards argued that Lindsay’s figure was not so much a 
projection as an “historical benchmark,” and projected the cost of war with Iraq as being only 
$50 to $60 billion.130  Congressional Democrats projected the cost of war to be about $93 billion, 
while vocal opponents of the war used high cost projections in an effort to build support against 
the invasion of Iraq.131  With this controversy in mind, I decided to include a content variable in 
the coding instrument that would capture when a speaker made an explicit statement that the cost 
of the war would be less than $100 billion as well as a content variable that would stand for a 
speaker giving any explicit cost of the war.  I also created a content variable that captured when a 
speaker suggested that Iraqi oil revenues would lower the costs of the war.  These variables do 
not differentiate between costs of potential military actions and the costs of rebuilding.   
I chose and defined my content variables in the coding instrument as narrowly as possible 
in order to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible without reducing the content analysis to 
mere word counts.  It was tempting to develop codes for the assertion of facts that might later be 
proved true or false.  I did not do this, however.  When I started this project in late 2004, the 
verifiability of many claims was impossible to establish.  In early 2008, the Center for Public 
Integrity did release an analysis of the veracity of public statements of many prominent Bush 
Administration officials.132  This report concluded that Bush Administration officials 
“orchestrated” a case for the use of force against Iraq through the repeated assertion of 
                                                 
129 "West Wing Loyalty: A Fine Line (Editorial)," Christian Science Monitor  (Dec. 17, 2002). 
130 Elisabeth Bumiller, "White House Cuts Estimate of Cost of War with Iraq," The New York Times Dec. 31, 2002. 
131 Ibid.  As the Iraq war now approaches its fifth anniversary, the debate over the potential cost of the war may have 
been rekindled with the serious suggestion that the actual cost of the war may approach $3 trillion.  Joseph E. 
Stiglitz and Linda J. Blimes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 2008). 
132 Charles Lewis and Mark Reading-Smith, "The War Card: Orchestrated Deception on the Path to War,"  (Center 
for the Public Integrity, 2008). 
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misleading statements.  The press amplified these misstatements and failed to do an adequate job 
of independently investigating or verifying the administration’s misstatements.133  While truths 
and falsehoods are beyond the scope of my analysis of public statements, my analysis does share 
with the Center for Public Integrity’s project a common frame of reference—that public 
statements made by public officials in the course of their deliberations on using force against 
Iraq constitutes an important empirical basis for research on “how the war in Iraq came to 
pass.”134   
Each content variable represents various justifications for going to war in Iraq or some 
other aspect related to the debate on the use of force against Iraq.  All but one of the 32 content 
variables were coded as nominal-level variables with only two possible values, 0 and 1.  A value 
of 1 denoted positive meaning only—a value of 1 for “Speaker says Iraq possesses WMDs” 
means that a speaker expressed this precise meaning while a value of 0 meant that the speaker 
did not say this.  A value of 0 is not equivalent to a speaker expressing the opposite meaning to 
the content variable.  In other words, a value of 0 does not denote that the speaker said that Iraq 
does not possess WMDs.  The only content variable that I did not code with values of only 1 or 0 
was the number of times a speaker used the exact phrase “regime change” per observation.  I 
counted the number of times a speaker used this exact phrase.  By my capturing the data as an 
actual number, I was then able to convert this number into a binary variable that stood for the use 
of the phrase “regime change” in an observation.  As it turned out, the phrase was used in nearly 
13 % of observations.  This was often enough to justify the time spent identifying the individual 
speakers who used the phrase.  As I did so, I recoded the number of times the speaker used the 
phrase “regime change” into a binary content variable to denote that the phrase was used by the 
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speaker for each particular observation.  I also did exact phrase searches “second resolution” and 
“fight to the enemy,” but I did not identify and count the speakers who used each phrase because 
the phrases were not used often enough to justify the time to code the individual speakers’ use of 
the phrases.  “Fight to the enemy” was used by government speakers only eight times in 2,525 
observations.  “Second resolution” was used only a total of 45 times in the 2,206 transcripts by 
government speakers.  The exact phrase searches were accomplished using the MAXQDA 2.0135 
software package.   
Some of the content or justification variables contained qualifiers such as speaker 
“explicitly mentions” a certain condition or “alludes to” something.  Under my definitions of 
“explicit” and “general allusion,” any content variable coded as explicitly present will also be 
coded as denoting a general allusion.  The reverse, however, is not true.  I designed the codes to 
overlap this way intentionally, giving them closely related definitions in order to better separate 
statements that made general allusions and those that were more specific.  Mentioning a terrorist 
group or a specific terrorist name in connection with Iraq constituted an explicit statement under 
this definition.  Referring to Iraq’s connections or links with terrorism or unspecified terrorist 
activities was an allusion.  The table below describes the 32 content variables of the coding 
instrument.  An example of statements from actual transcripts that constituted values of 1 for 
each content variable may be found in Appendix A.   
                                                 
135 MaxQDA Ver. 2.0, distributed by VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany.   
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Table 3: Content Variables in the Coding Instrument 
Variable description 
1. Does the speaker have an identifiable position on Iraq policy (i.e., is at least one other content 
variable present)?   
2. Does the speaker implicitly assume U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq?   
3. Does the speaker explicitly refer to U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq?   
4. Does the speaker equate the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror?   
5. Does the speaker explicitly characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent?   
6. Does the speaker characterize the invasion of Iraq as a potential method to disarm Iraq?   
7. Does the speaker reference the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to 
justify invasion of Iraq?   
8. Does the speaker explicitly mention international law to justify invasion of Iraq?   
9. Does the speaker refer to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq?   
10. Does the speaker allude to a connection between Iraq and terrorism generally?   
11. Does the speaker explicitly refer to a specific terrorist or terrorist group operating in or cooperating 
with Iraq? 
12. Does the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international 
weapons inspections?   
13. Does the speaker say Iraq possesses WMDs?   
14. Does the speaker mention Iraq's past use of chemical weapons?   
15. Does the speaker characterize intelligence analysis as interpretive or ambiguous?   
16. Does the speaker give an explicit cost estimate for the war as less than $100 billion?   
17. Does the speaker call for further analysis of costs and benefits of the invasion or opine about 
unanswered questions? 
18. Does the speaker explicitly refer to any estimates of costs or benefits of an invasion of Iraq?   
19. Does the speaker give an explicit value for U.S. cost estimates of an invasion of Iraq?   
20. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available as a cost 
offset to the war or rebuilding costs?   
21. Does the speaker specifically mention post-war or Phase IV planning?   
22. Does the speaker mention the possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?   
23. Does the speaker urge a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?   
24. Does the speaker mention the possible multilateral invasion of Iraq?   
25. Does the speaker support multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN approval?   
26. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “second resolution”?   
27. Does the speaker use the exact phrase “fight to the enemy”?   
28. Number of times speaker uses the exact phrase "regime change" (an ordinal level variable) 
29. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the 9/11 terrorist attacks?   
30. Does the speaker explicitly mention Osama bin Laden?   
31. Does the speaker make an explicit assignment of blame to Osama bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for 
the 9/11 attacks? 
32. Does the speaker refer to any party other than bin Laden and/or al Qaeda for actual or potential 
involvement in planning or carrying out the 9/11 attacks? 
 
In some of the 2,525 observations, the values of all content variables in the coding 
instrument were 0.  In these observations, the speaker offered no identifiable position on Iraq, or 
at least no identifiable position regarding any of the other 31 content variables.  This was the 
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case, for example, if a Congressman mistakenly mentioned Iraq when they meant Iran.  In the 
case of Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), he repeatedly mentioned Iraq in arguments that 
the United States needed to develop its domestic oil production in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge.  Murkowski contributed 12 observations, but in 5 of those observations, his discussion 
had nothing to do with U.S. policy toward Iraq—he was arguing for drilling in Alaska.  After 
reviewing all 2,525 observations, 826 of them were excluded because the values of all content 
variables in the coding instrument were zero.  Thus, the analysis proceeded using 1,699 
observations where a government speaker mentioned the word Iraq and where at least one 
content variable had a positive value.   
3.5 REGARDING THE RELIABILITY OF THE CODING INSTRUMENT 
Subjectivity will be present in this analysis in one of two ways.  First, there is always a 
degree of interpretation of the meaning of speech.  My undergraduate research assistant, Avishy 
Moshenberg, and I met as often as several times a week to make sure that our definitions of each 
variable remained consistent and identical.  Additionally, I trained my research assistant to use 
the “objective person” standard used in law, approaching the transcripts with the question “What 
would the reasonable person think when reading the transcript?”  Despite my best efforts, this is 
not a perfectly reliable method.  Subjectivity can also be introduced by the coding process 
because the base unit of the analysis is each speaker per transcript.  As many of the transcripts 
were dialogues and therefore contained many speakers engaged in discussion, the research 
aggregated the meaning of each speaker’s statements over the course of the transcript and then 
coded those meanings.  There is going to be some degree of subjective interpretation introduced 
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by this aggregation.  In addition to potential subjectivity, in the construction of this dataset or any 
other large dataset, there are likely to be random errors—but there is no reason to worry that the 
rate random errors were made during the coding process changed.   
In content analysis, scientific reliability requires systematic application of a coding 
instrument that is itself reliable.136  The base unit of analysis of my coding instrument is the 
observation, which consists of each U.S. government speaker per transcript.  Each observation 
was coded by hand independent of other observations.  To maximize the reliability of my coding 
instrument, I designed the content variables to have a specific, fixed meaning with binary 
expression.  If a speaker expressed the meaning of a content variable in a transcript, then the 
value of that content variable was 1 for that observation; if not, the value of that content variable 
was 0.  My research assistant Avishy coded 478 of the FNS transcripts and I coded the remaining 
1,728 transcripts.  I tested the inter-rater reliability between us at two different times using two 
different methods.  To test inter-rater reliability early in the coding process, I recoded 105 
observations chosen at random from among my research assistant’s first 200 transcripts.  
Remarkably, we coded only two content variables differently out of a possible 1,875 for an inter-
rater reliability of 99.9 %.  Later in the process, I formally tested randomly selected 160 single-
observation transcripts from among all 478 of my research assistant’s transcripts.137  After 
recoding the original 25 content variables in these 160 transcripts, I calculated the Krippendorf’s 
α inter-rater reliability coefficient as .9847.138  The 95 % confidence interval for the 
Krippendorf’s α inter-rater reliability coefficient ranges from a lower limit of .9765 to an upper 
                                                 
136 Carl W. Roberts, "A Conceptual Framework for Quantitative Text Analysis," Quality and Quantity 34 (2000). 
137 I chose to use single-observation transcripts, i.e., transcripts of a single government speaker who used the word 
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published in Klaus Krippendorf and Andrew F. Hayes, "Answering the Call for a Standard Reliability Measure for 
Coding Data," Communication Methods and Measures 1, no. 1 (2007).   
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limit of .9918.  This high degree of reliability suggests that the definitions of the content 
variables were uniformly applied between the two coders.139  It may also be evidence that the 
codes have a high external validity.140  I did not formally test the inter-rater reliability for the 
added 7 content variables because my research assistant did not assist me in coding them.  I was 
the only coder for these 7 content variables, and thus there is no inter-rater reliability to examine.   
3.6 THE IRAQ INDEX SCORE 
To facilitate statistical computation involving the content variables aggregated by various 
factors such as political party or branch of government, I aggregated content variables into a 
single index variable that I will hereinafter refer to as the Iraq Index score.  The Iraq Index score 
is an ordinal level variable that has a range of 0 to 9.141  A score of 9 means that for a particular 
observation, the speaker’s message has included all nine content variables aggregated in the Iraq 
Index score.  I chose these nine content variables because of all the content variables in my 
coding instrument, these nine were the arguments that most unambiguously supported the use of 
force against Iraq.  Aggregating these variables into a single ordinal level index variable allowed 
a quick comparison between speakers, parties, and branches of government over the most typical 
                                                 
139 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text, and Interaction 2nd ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 229. 
140 Sandra K. Mitchell, "Inter-Observer Agreement, Reliability, and Generalizability of Data Collected in 
Observational Studies," Psychological Bulletin 86, no. 2 (1979). 
141 Originally, my Iraq Index score aggregation included 19 content variables.  However, not all of these variables 
were necessarily supportive of the use of force.  One of these 19 was whether the speaker asserted that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction.  Many people on both sides of the Iraq war debate made this assertion, a 
point originally made by Dr. Janne Nolan, referring to the Iraq Index score as perhaps likely to reveal what Dr. 
Nolan called potential “false positives”—those speakers with high Iraq Index scores and yet who were known in 
policy circles to have been against the war.  I therefore revised the Iraq Index score to reflect less ambiguous aspects 
of the debate.   
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arguments in favor of the use of force.  In this way, the Iraq Index score indirectly measured the 
strength of a speaker’s argument for the use of force for a given observation.  When a 
government speaker favored the use of force against Iraq and engaged in public deliberation 
about the potential use of force, he or she was more likely to bolster that support through 
argument and use of the content variables that were associated with the use of force.  The more 
observations that went into the calculation of mean Iraq Index scores increases the likelihood that 
a speaker’s or group of speakers’ true level of support for the use of force was reflected by 
calculated Iraq Index scores.  As the Iraq Index score for a particular group or individual may be 
averaged over a number of individual observations, a consistently high Iraq Index score can give 
a proxy measure of the level of support for the use of force against Iraq as expressed publicly.  
For the 1,699 observations included in this analysis, the actual measurements of Iraq Index 
scores ranged from 0 to 8, with a mean Iraq Index score of .95 and a mode score of 0.   
The nine content variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score included variables that 
captured government officials’ public statements regarding the nature of the threat.  I included 
both explicit and implicit references to the Iraqi threat to U.S. national security interests, 
including references to that threat as being imminent.  By including several variables that 
represented a speaker’s public statement regarding the nature of the Iraqi threat, the Iraq Index 
score not only reflected greater variability but will served as a better indicator of support for the 
use of force against Iraq.  The debate over the potential cost of the invasion and the repeated 
claim from many hawks on the Iraq war that the Iraqis themselves would help to fund the war 
effort through oil revenue led me to aggregate this variable in the Iraqi index score as well.   
The content variable that measured when government speakers called for a unilateral 
invasion of Iraq clearly expressed support for the use of force, so I included that in the Iraq Index 
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score.  Other content variables aggregated in the Iraq Index score included two others arguments 
often made to support the use of force: that the use of military force would disarm Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction as well as serve as a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the 
people of Iraq.  The remaining content variables aggregated into the Iraq Index score included 
whether action against Iraq was part of the war on terror, whether the speaker called for a 
unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq, and whether the speaker characterized international weapons 
inspections as ineffective or futile.  Table 4 lists the nine variables aggregated in the Iraq Index 
score.   
 
Table 4: Content Variables Aggregated in the Iraq Index Score 
Variable Descriptions 
1. Does the speaker implicitly assume U.S. national security interests support invasion of Iraq?   
2. Does the speaker explicitly refer to U.S. national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq?   
3. Does the speaker equate the invasion of Iraq with the war on terror?   
4. Does the speaker explicitly characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent?   
5. Does the speaker reference the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to 
justify invasion of Iraq?   
6. Does the speaker refer to humanitarian concerns to justify invasion of Iraq?   
7. Does the speaker cast doubt upon the efficacy or futility of additional or continued international 
weapons inspections?   
8. Does the speaker explicitly refer to the possibility that Iraqi oil production is available as a cost 
offset to the war or rebuilding costs?   
9. Does the speaker urge a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States?   
 
The highest Iraq Index score of an individual observation was made by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Rumsfeld’s January 20, 2003 remarks before the 2003 Mid-Winter 
Conference of the Reserve Officers Association scored an 8 out of 9.  Strictly speaking, the Iraq 
Index score variable is a ratio level variable, but it does have a slight tendency of an ordinal level 
variable.  The difference between ratio level and ordinal level variables has to do with the 
meaningfulness of the differences between measurements.  Clearly an Iraq Index score of 8 is 
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indicative of a stronger and more justified argument for the use of force against Iraq than a score 
of 2, and the difference is that the former observation’s score made 6 more justifications for the 
use of force than 2.  However, because it is unlikely that all 9 content variables were given equal 
weight by all contributing U.S. government speakers, the meaningfulness of a difference 
between Iraq Index scores of 9 may be difficult to define with any precision, certainly not the 
precision of 8 – 2  = 6.  The Iraq Index score makes the assumption that all 9 content variables 
are weighted equally.  This may be true on average for large numbers of observations, but is a 
dubious assumption when comparing specific observations.  Nonetheless, the Iraq Index score 
has tremendous value because it allows for a simple comparison between speakers and groups of 
speakers as well as the visual representation of the strength of hawkish arguments over time.   
Having explained the constitutional system in which government deliberation takes place 
in Chapter 2 and the methodology used to measure that deliberation in this chapter, the next two 
chapters present the results of this content analysis.  The unit of analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 is 
the group, both political party and branch of government.  In Chapter 6, the unit of analysis is the 
individual government speaker.   
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4. QUANTIFYING THE IRAQ WAR DEBATE: RESULTS BY POLITICAL PARTY AND 
BRANCH OVER TIME 
To me ‘bipartisan foreign policy’ means a mutual effort, under our 
indispensable two-party system, to unite our official voice at the 
water’s edge so that America speaks with maximum authority 
against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world.  
It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in 
determining our position.  On the contrary, frank cooperation and 
free debate are indispensable to ultimate unity.  In a word, it 
simply seeks national security ahead of partisan advantage.  Every 
foreign policy must be totally debated (and I think the record 
proves it has been) and the “loyal opposition” is under special 
obligation to see that this occurs.   
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., 1952142 
 
This analysis uses two key indicators to show changes in how government officials debated the 
Iraq war, the relative focus on Iraq and relative strength of arguments favoring the use of force 
against Iraq.  These two indicators demonstrate that government officials paid increasing 
attention to Iraq through their public deliberations and that justification of an invasion also 
increased over the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq.  One would certainly expect this to 
be the case—it seems logical that government officials increasingly would recognize the problem 
with Iraq, and then deliberate on the proper response to that problem, ultimately reaching a 
consensus.  In the case of Iraq, the response was a U.S. invasion of Iraq, carried out in March 
                                                 
142 Jr. Vandenberg, Arthur H., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952). 
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2003 after a prolonged period of national deliberation and international diplomacy.  This analysis 
concerns the public deliberation of government officials from the start of George W. Bush’s 
presidency to the invasion, from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.  It will be shown that there 
were significant differences between how government officials of the Legislative and Executive 
branches and of both political parties deliberated about U.S. policy toward Iraq.  Strikingly, these 
differences did not diminish over time as would be expected if government officials had reached 
a consensus—instead those differences regarding the use of force increased up to the time of the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  This description of government deliberation over time will 
serve as the foundation for Chapter 5, where specific research questions involving political party 
polarization, the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches, and the 
relationship between political accountability and discussing an invasion of Iraq will be 
addressed.   
4.1 TWO INDICATORS OF ATTENTION AND  
SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
Government officials paid more and more attention to Iraq over time, as the number of times Iraq 
was mentioned in the transcripts trended upwards.  Over time government officials also 
increased their justification of the use of force, as shown by a pronounced upward trend in mean 
Iraq Index scores.  The two figures below illustrate these general rising trends over the 27 
months prior to the 2003 invasion.  Figure 2 shows that government officials tended to refer to 
Iraq less than 500 times per month until late January 2002, when President Bush gave his State 
of the Union address in which he referred to the “axis of evil.”  Figure 3 shows that Iraq Index 
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scores indicate a slight increase in support for the use of force after September 11, 2001, but still 
low support for the use of force against Iraq until after July 28, 2002.  After July 28, 2002, the 
support for the use of force increased and remained high.   
 
Figure 2: References to Iraq in Government Transcripts 
 
Figure 3: Mean Iraq Index scores of Government Officials 
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The graph’s shape in figure 3 trends upwards, but there also seems to be three different 
plateaus of mean Iraq Index scores.  The period of the first step corresponded to the first nine 
months of President Bush’s first term, from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001.  The 
second period, with somewhat higher Iraq Index scores, runs from September 12, 2001 to July 
28, 2002.  The period with the highest Iraq Index scores runs from July 29, 2002 to the date of 
the invasion, March 19, 2003.  Dividing the time scale into three periods facilitates a closer look 
at the data.  The next three chapters will make use of this tripartite division to look for trends 
within each period.  The remainder of this section will describe trends in the dataset over all 
three periods for the entire period January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.   
Iraq increasingly became a subject for concern among government officials.  The number 
of unique government officials involved in the public deliberations increased over time, as did 
the numbers of observations involving Democrats, Republicans, and officials of both the 
Legislative and Executive branches.  In the analysis, a single observation represents an 
individual government official who used the word Iraq at least once in a single public 
appearance; the number of observations increased as more government officials began 
contributing to public deliberation concerning Iraq.  Nearly 70 % of the content analysis 
observations occur in the seven months prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  This figure, 
by itself, demonstrates that the bulk of government preoccupation with Iraq occurred only six to 
eight months before the invasion.  The total number of references to Iraq increased more 
dramatically than the number of observations, from 1,155 in the first period, doubling to 2,324 in 
the second period, and then increasing six-fold in the third period to 14,452.  Table 5 displays 
attention and Iraq Index scores for each of the three periods, as well as the party and branch 
affiliations for each observation.   
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Attention and Iraq Index Scores 
 
The average number of times a speaker used the word Iraq increased over time as well, 
from 15 references to Iraq per speaker’s appearance in the first period, to 15.09 in the second, to 
45.02 in the third.  There is, however, no significant difference between the distributions of the 
number of times speakers used the word Iraq in the first two periods.  Only the distributions of 
speakers’ attention in the third period were significantly different from the distributions in the 
two earlier periods (p<.000 using Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust test for equality of 
means, groups compared at the 95 % confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s 
C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests).  This means that while the general trend seems to be an 
increase in the amount of attention speakers paid to the problem of Iraq, it was not until after 
July 28, 2002 that speakers began to be more focused on Iraq in each public appearance in a 
statistically significant manner.   
In addition to an increase in the amount of attention paid to Iraq, there was an increase in 
support for the use of force against Iraq over the three periods, from a mean Iraq Index score of 
0.05 in the first period, to 0.39 in the second, and then to 1.25 in the third period, the final eight 
months before the invasion of Iraq.  The maximum Iraq Index score also increased, from 3 in the 
first period, to 5.  The high of 8 then occurred in the third period.  These figures represent an 
increase in the presence of arguments favoring the use of force against Iraq in public 
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governmental deliberation.  It should not be surprising to see how government officials’ support 
for the use of force grows prior to the actual use of that force.  The distributions of government 
speakers’ Iraq Index scores per observation were significantly different between each of the three 
periods (p<.000 using Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust test for equality of means, groups 
compared at the 95 % confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and 
Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests).  The statistical significance of the differences between the three 
periods underscores the significance of the rough stair-step shape of Iraq Index means in figure 
3—the changes in tendency with three different plateaus is real and not likely to be the result of 
chance.  The next section of this analysis will examine differences between groups of 
government officials within the three periods prior to the invasion of Iraq.   
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE PERIODS PRIOR TO WAR 
The first period begins January 19, 2001, when President Bush’s administration began, and ends 
on September 11, 2001, when al Qaeda’s attacks in New York and Washington, DC took place.  
As measured by the relatively low number of times the words Iraq or Iraqi is referred to in the 
entire transcript set and the relatively low number of times the word Iraq or Iraqi is repeated in a 
single transcript by a single speaker, the first period is characterized by relatively little 
government attention paid to Iraq.  There did not seem to be any statistically significant 
difference between Republicans and Democrats in the amount of attention they paid to Iraq (n= 
23 Democratic and 72 Republican observations; p=.156 using Student’s t-test as equal variances 
may be safely assumed; p=.031 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison 
with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution though Mann-Whitney is unreliable with unequal 
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group numbers).  On average, Republicans used the word Iraq a mean of 4.56 times per 
observation and Democrats used the word a mean of 3.47 times per appearance.  Executive 
branch speakers used the word Iraq an average of 7.49 times per public appearance while 
Legislators referred to Iraq an average of only 3.12 times.  The distributions of Executive and 
Legislative branch references to Iraq were statistically different (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test 
because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-
test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution).  There was no significant 
difference between the number of times the word Iraq was used between subgroups within the 
Executive branch, however (p=.015 ANOVA; p<.000 using Welch’s and p=.030 using Brown-
Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means because equal variances cannot be assumed;  
differences between groups confirmed by the Games-Howell, Tamhane, Dunnett T3, and 
Dunnett C post-hoc tests).  Executive branch officials and the subgroup of Executive branch 
officials testifying before Congress did not use the word Iraq a statistically significant different 
number of times per observation.   
With relatively little discussion on Iraq occurring in public government deliberation in 
the first nine months of President Bush’s first term, there was also very little public discussion 
regarding the use of force against Iraq during the same period.  Not a single Democratic speaker 
gave any public justification for the use of force in this first period.  Very few Republican 
speakers did so as well.  The mean Iraq Index for Republican speakers during this period was 
0.0278 while all Democratic speakers had Iraq Index scores of 0.00.  There was no statistical 
difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores for Republican and Democratic 
speakers in this first period.  At the 95 % confidence level, there is no significant difference 
between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Republican and Democratic legislators (p=.575 
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using Student’s t-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.572 using the nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Student’s due to non-normal distribution).  There was 
also no statistical difference between the Iraq Index scores of Legislative and Executive branch 
speakers (p=.380 using Student’s t-test because equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.353 
using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal 
distribution though with n=112 Executive branch observations and n=48 Legislative branch 
observations, Welch’s seems sufficient).  The highest Iraq Index score of any speakers during the 
first period was collected from an observation of Republican Richard Perle of the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Defense Policy Board.  Perle had an Iraq Index score of 2 when he 
testified before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 1, 2001.  Perle would later become chair of the Defense Policy 
Board in July 2001.  Out of 182 observations from the first period, only five observations had 
Iraq Index scores greater than 0.  Two of these five Iraq Index scores from the first period were 
generated by the Executive branch officials, including Perle, while the other three scores were 
contributed by congressional witnesses who were not from the Executive branch.   
The second period extended from September 12, 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks, 
to July 28, 2002.  This date is just prior to the beginning of Senate hearings on Iraq as well as 
when an influential article in the conservative Weekly Standard began a media campaign for war 
with Iraq.143  In addition, Iraq invited international weapons inspectors to resume their work in 
the country shortly on or around this date, news that became public August 1, 2002.144  More 
government speakers discussed Iraq in this period: the total number of references to Iraq 
                                                 
143 Stephen F. Hayes, "The Coming War with Saddam: Sooner Than You Think," The Weekly Standard, July 29, 
2002. 
144 Duncan Campbell and Patrick Wintour, "Iraq Invites Un Weapons Inspector to Talks," The Guardian, Aug. 2, 
2002. 
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increased from 1,155 in the first period to 2,324 in this period; the number of unique speakers 
involved in the public deliberations increased from 77 in the first period to 154 in this period; 
and the number of observations increased from 182 observations in the first period to 334 
observations.  This is an 82.4 % increase in the number of observations and a two-fold increase 
in the number of individual speakers involved.  The amount of attention the typical speaker 
devoted to the subject of Iraq remained essentially stable during this period, however—the 
number of references made by each speaker per public appearance did not increase much, from 
15 in the first period to only 15.09 in the second.  Indeed, there is not a statistically significant 
difference between distributions in the number of references to Iraq by government speakers in 
the first and second period (though the distributions of both periods are statistically different 
from that of the third period; p<.000 using both Welch’s and Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of 
equality of means; differences between groups ascertained at the 95 % confidence level through 
Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s post-hoc tests).   
With a mean of 4.57 uses of the word Iraq per public appearance, the average Democrat 
had a slightly higher number of references to Iraq in public appearances than did Republicans, 
who had a mean of only 3.74.  There was no significant difference between the two political 
parties’ distributions of public references to Iraq during the second period, however (n= 60 
Democratic and 157 Republican observations; p=.321 using Welch’s t-test because equal 
variances cannot be assumed; p=.971 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for 
comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distribution).  The Executive branch was only 
somewhat more active than the Legislative branch, discussing Iraq in 169 observations to the 
Legislative’s 119 observations.  However, Congress has 535 potential speakers and typically 
only the top echelon in the Executive branch participate in public discussions.  When these facts 
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are considered, the Executive branch was in actuality much more active in discussing Iraq during 
this period than the Legislative branch.  This level of activity in terms of public attention paid to 
Iraq was statistically different (n= 169 Executive branch officials’ and 119 Legislative officials; 
p=.002 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal 
distributions).  Executive branch officials used the word Iraq an average of 5.72 times per public 
appearance while Legislators used the word Iraq an average of only 3.55 times per appearance.   
Legislators were not statistically different from all other groups of government speakers, 
however.  This was due to a high number of Executive branch officials who testified before 
Congress and who had great variability in the number of times they referred to Iraq.  There were 
43 such Executive branch officials as congressional witnesses, with a mean number of Iraq 
references of 6.28 with a standard deviation of 6.974.  Only congressional witnesses referred to 
Iraq a statistically significant higher number of times than Legislators, Executive branch 
officials, and Executive officials testifying before Congress (p=.001 using both Welch’s and 
Brown-Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means; differences between groups ascertained at 
the 95 % confidence level through Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and Games-Howell’s 
post-hoc tests).   
The discussion of the use of force against Iraq did increase moderately in this second 
period, but this increase was largely due to increases in Iraq Index score by Executive branch 
speakers as opposed to Legislators.  More government speakers began to give more justifications 
for the use of force against Iraq, as the mean Iraq Index score for all speakers increased from 
0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in this second period, though as mentioned above, the second 
period’s distributions of Iraq Index scores are not statistically different from the first period.  
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Republicans and Democrats generally had similar Iraq Index scores in the second period.  The 
Republican mean Iraq Index score was 0.42 and the Democratic mean was 0.37.  There was no 
significant difference between the distributions of Republican and Democratic speakers’ Iraq 
Index scores (p=.645 using Student’s t-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.713 for 
Levene’s test statistic for equality of variances; p=.415 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney 
U-test for comparison with Student’s due to non-normal distributions).   
In the second period, the mean Iraq Index score of Executive branch officials was 0.37 
while the mean for Legislative branch speakers was 0.31.  Executive branch officials discussed 
the use of force only slightly more than Legislative branch officials, but there was no significant 
difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of these groups (p=.509 using Student’s 
t-test as equal variances may be safely assumed; p=.359 for Levene’s test statistic for equality of 
variances; p=.394 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Student’s 
due to non-normal distributions).  Aside from the significant difference between Iraq Index 
scores distributions of Legislative and Executive branch officials just mentioned, there was no 
difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores for groups of Executive branch 
officials, Legislative branch officials, Executive branch officials testifying before Congress, and 
other congressional witnesses (p=.087 ANOVA; p=.384 using Welch’s and p=.176 using Brown-
Forsythe’s robust tests of equality of means since the distributions’ equal variances cannot be 
assumed).   
Despite a lack of statistically significant differences in distributions, it is interesting that 
the number of references to Iraq and mean Iraq Index scores of Executive officials and 
congressional witnesses were so much higher than those of Legislators.  Legislators had a mean 
of only 3.55 references per public appearance during this period, but Executive branch officials 
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had a mean of 5.52.  Executive branch officials testifying before Congress had a mean of 6.28 
and other congressional witnesses had a mean of 20.33 references to Iraq per public appearance.  
Perhaps Congress was fact-gathering as opposed to making pronouncements in the second 
period, perhaps Congress did not consider Iraq to be a foreign policy problem that was worthy of 
significant public attention, or perhaps Congress was allowing the Executive branch to identify 
the foreign policy problems worthy of addressing by acquiescing to executive prerogative.  This 
data from public speech is incapable of identifying the reason.  Regardless of the reason behind 
these results, the results do indicate that the Executive branch was much more active and focused 
on Iraq during the second period.   
The third period covers July 29, 2002 to the date the invasion of Iraq began, March 19, 
2003.  This period is characterized by the highest amount of government attention to Iraq, as 
measured by three indicators.  First, there was a dramatic increase in the total number of 
references in the transcripts to Iraq.  In period I, the total number of references to Iraq for all 
speakers was 1,155 while in period II, the total had doubled to 2,324.  In this final period, the 
total was 14,452.  Second, this period has the highest number of observations.  In the third 
period, the total number of observations was 1,183, much more than the 182 observations in the 
first period and 334 observations in the second, even if the first two periods were to be 
combined.  Third, in this final period of analysis government speakers had the highest number of 
references to Iraq per each public appearance demonstrating focus on Iraq.  In the first and 
second periods, speakers discussing the subject of Iraq tended to mention the word Iraq 6.35 and 
6.96 times, respectively.  In the third period, the average speaker discussing Iraq used the word 
12.2 times per public appearance.   
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In the third period, the distributions of references to Iraq per public appearance made by 
Democrats and Republicans were statistically different (n= 557 Republicans and 349 Democrats; 
p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal 
distributions).  On average, Republican speakers used the word 11.91 times per public 
appearance.  This rate is nearly twice that of Democrats, who had an average of 5.83.  There was 
also a statistically significant difference between speakers in the Executive and Legislative 
branches (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using 
the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal 
distributions).  Within the Executive branch, there was no significant difference between the 
distributions of references to Iraq by those Executive officials who testified before Congress and 
other Executive branch officials (p<.000 ANOVA; p<.000 confirmed with Welch and Brown-
Forsythe robust tests for equality of means).   
There was, however, a statistically significant difference between Legislators and all 
other groups, and between congressional witnesses and all other groups (group differences 
confirmed at the 95 % confidence level using Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the 
Games-Howell post-hoc tests).  Congressional witnesses tended to refer to Iraq an average of 
31.18 times per appearance.  This seems reasonable, as congressional witnesses are experts and 
are likely to be focused on the subject of their expertise.  If a congressional witness mentions 
Iraq (and therefore will be included in the transcripts), he or she is likely to be testifying on the 
subject of Iraq.  Legislators are much less likely to refer to Iraq than any other group, with an 
average of only 5.30.  Executive branch officials mentioned Iraq an average of 16.55 times per 
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public appearance while Executive branch officials testifying before Congress referred to Iraq a 
total of 18.72 times per observation.  
Executive branch officials used the word Iraq an average of 16.83 times per public 
appearance while Legislators tended to mention Iraq only an average of 5.32 times per 
appearance.  Legislative officials increased their focus on Iraq from the first and second periods 
to the third period (3.12 and 3.55, respectively, but there is no significant difference between the 
two periods’ distributions of references to Iraq for Legislators).  For speakers in the Legislative 
branch, only the distribution of references to Iraq in the third period was statistically different 
from the other two (period III was statistically different with p=.008, confirmed with Welch and 
Brown-Forsythe robust test for equality of means; groups differences confirmed through 
Tamhane’s, Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the Games-Howell post-hoc tests).  Even though the 
mean increased in the third period, the Legislative mean of 5.32 is still less than the Executive 
branch mean over any period.  These facts indicate that the Executive branch was always much 
more focused on Iraq than was the Legislative branch—the Congress did not begin to increase its 
attention on Iraq until beginning around January of 2003, by which time the authorization to use 
force had already been granted—war was near, perhaps even a foregone conclusion.  Table 6 
displays the averages of references to Iraq for groups of officials over all three periods. 
Focus on Iraq (# of 
references to Iraq per 
observation) Period I Period II Period III
Republicans 4.61 3.74 11.91
Democrats 3.13 4.57 5.83
Republican Legislators 3.37 3.13 5.17
Democratic Legislators 2.81 3.9 5.43
Executive branch 7.49 5.72 16.83
Legislative branch 3.12 3.55 5.32  
Table 6: Group Means for References to Iraq 
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The third period also saw an upsurge in public deliberation supporting the use of force 
against Iraq.  Of course, some sort of a rise would be consistent with the expected, as 
government officials sought to inform the public of their reasoning and justify any impending 
actions with an increasing effort in the period in which government authorizes that use of force.  
The highest mean Iraq Index scores for any group or subgroup occur in the third period.  
Speakers in the Executive branch had a mean Iraq Index score of 1.93—each time someone in 
the Executive branch publicly used the word “Iraq,” he or she would also mention nearly two of 
nine different justifications in favor of using force against Iraq.  The mean Iraq Index score for 
Legislators during this same period was a mere 0.61.  In this third period, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Executive and Legislative 
branch speakers (p<.000 using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; 
p<.000 using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison purposes due to non-
normal distributions).   
Congressional witnesses had statistically significant distributions of Iraq Index scores 
higher than any other group, including Executive branch officials and Executive branch officials 
testifying before Congress (p<.000 ANOVA; group differences confirmed through Tamhane’s, 
Dunnett’s T3, Dunnett’s C, and the Games-Howell post-hoc tests).  At the same time, the mean 
Iraq Index scores of Legislators were statistically significant but far smaller than the means of 
the other groups.  From this, it can be inferred that during the third period, the Executive branch 
was much more outspoken in public support for the war than the Legislative branch, but the 
congressional witnesses tended to be the most pronounced in favor of the use of force against 
Iraq.   
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The mean Republican Iraq Index score was 1.79 and the mean Democratic Iraq Index 
score was only 0.40.  The difference in Iraq Index score distributions for Democrats and 
Republicans is also statistically significant (n= 557 Republicans and 349 Democrats; p<.000 
using Welch’s t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p<.000 using the nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions).  Much of 
this significant difference between Democrats and Republicans may be due to the inclusion of 
Executive branch speakers, who tended to have high Iraq Index scores.  In order to see whether 
the two parties in Congress were also statistically different, I repeated significance tests between 
distributions of Iraq Index means between Legislative Democrats and Legislative Republicans.  I 
did not test for significance between Republican and Democratic Legislators in the first period 
because there was no variation in mean Iraq Index score—the Iraq Index scores of all Legislators 
in the first period were 0.  In the second period, there was no statistical difference between the 
mean Iraq Index scores of Democratic and Republican Legislators (n=64 for Republican 
Legislators, n=55 for Democratic Legislators; p=.298 using Student’s t-test because equal 
variances may be safely assumed with a Levene’s statistic for equality of variances p=.056).  The 
mean Democratic score in the second period was actually slightly higher than the mean 
Republican Iraq Index score, 0.38 to 0.25.   
In the third period, the mean Legislative Republican Iraq Index score was 0.94 while the 
mean Legislative Democrat was 0.39.  The mean Iraq Index score for Democratic Legislators 
barely increased at all.  The distributions of Iraq Index scores across party lines are significantly 
different (n= 220 Legislative Republicans and 335 Legislative Democrats; p<.000 using Welch’s 
t-test because equal variances cannot be assumed; p=.001 using the nonparametric Mann-
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Whitney U-test for comparison with Welch’s due to non-normal distributions).  The table below 
displays the mean Iraq Index scores for groups of officials over all three periods.   
Mean                        Iraq 
Index scores Period I Period II Period III
Republicans 0.03 0.42 1.79
Democrats 0.00 0.37 0.40
Republican Legislators 0.00 0.25 0.94
Democratic Legislators 0.00 0.38 0.39
Executive branch 0.03 0.37 1.93
Legislative branch 0.00 0.31 0.61  
Table 7: Mean Iraq Index Scores 
 
This data demonstrates that during the third period, Republicans were much more 
outspoken in their public support for the war than were Democrats.  This was despite the notion 
that Congress had supposedly been unified in voting for the authorization that allowed the 
president to use force against Iraq in October 2002.  During the third period, Congress was much 
less active in advocating support for the use of force, especially Democrats in Congress.  Even 
Republicans in Congress did not support the use of force as much as did Executive branch 
officials.  The Executive branch was more active in participating in public discussions, more 
focused on the problem of Iraq, and more likely to advocate for the use of force throughout the 
third period.   
The differences between the mean Iraq Indexes of groups plotted over time is an effective 
way to illustrate the increasing degree of divergence on the intra-governmental debate regarding 
Iraq.  There is consensus between the groups in the first period because virtually no one 
discussed the use of force against Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The 
major splits between Democrats and Republicans and between officials of the Executive and 
Legislative branches occur at the beginning of the third period.  The divergence between 
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Democratic and Republican legislators occurs at about the same time, but grows significantly 
after October 2002, after the President Bush signed Congress’ Authorization to Use Military 
Force Against Iraq on October 16, 2002.   
 
Figure 4: Differences in Mean Iraq Index Scores Between Groups 
 
This section has focused on the use of general indicators, not on specific arguments.  Iraq 
Index scores and the number of uses of the word Iraq have served as rough measures of activity 
in participating in public discussions, focus on Iraq, and advocacy of using force against Iraq.  
The next subsection will examine the use of specific arguments and aspects of the decision to use 
force against Iraq to look for evidence of the same trend of political cleavages.  Using inferences 
from this section on general indicators and the next section regarding various groups of 
government officials’ use of specific arguments, Chapter 5 will then address specific research 
questions.   
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4.3 MEASUREMENT OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER SPECIFIC 
ARGUMENTS REGARDING WAR AGAINST IRAQ 
The Iraq Index score is only a general indicator of the content expressed by government speakers 
during the 27 months leading up to the invasion of Iraq.  Subtle differences between political 
parties and branches may be missed by an indirect measurement of focus or reliance on an 
aggregated index variable such as the Iraq Index score, particularly when the amount of time 
included in a given period of analysis was six to eight months.  It was demonstrated in the 
previous section that during the first two periods of analysis, from January 19, 2001 to 
September 11, 2001 and from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the distributions of Iraq Index scores of Republican and 
Democratic or Executive and Legislative branch government officials.  The only significant 
differences between such groups of government officials occurred in the last period of analysis, 
from July 29, 2002 to March 19, 2003.  This trend is suggestive of growing disagreement 
between political parties in the approach to U.S. policy with regard to Iraq.  In this section, this 
trend of growing divergence will be examined between groups of government officials across 
many other aspects of the public debate on Iraq as opposed to the single aggregated variable that 
is the Iraq Index score.   
There are not equal numbers of Democratic and Republican speakers in the transcripts.  It 
was previously shown that Republican speakers were more active with regard to making public 
appearances wherein they referred to Iraq, as well as the number of times they mentioned the 
word Iraq in each appearance.  This is understandable as Republicans controlled much of 
government during the 27 or so months of transcripts collected in this content analysis.  In order 
to compare Democratic and Republican speakers, it is reasonable to compare groups by using the 
 81 
frequency that an average speaker of either party makes a justification or refers to the content 
variables in the coding instrument, as opposed to the absolute number of times that a content 
variable is used.  For example, there are 60 observations of Democratic speakers in the second 
period.  For the second period, 29 of these observations of Democratic government officials 
included a reference to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  The frequency of Democratic references to 
9/11 in public appearances where Democrats also mentioned Iraq in the second period was 
therefore 29/60, or 48.3 %.  For the same period, 94 out of 157 Republicans also referred to the 
attacks of 9/11, a frequency of 59.9 %.  The frequencies that Democrats and Republicans 
referred to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 can then be compared on an equal footing.   
In table 8, grey shading identifies those content variables where the content variables 
frequencies expressed by Republican and Democratic speakers are numerically similar by being 
within 1 % in frequency.  Out of 26 content variables, Republicans and Democrats have similar 
frequencies across 16 content variables in the first period.  By the second period, Republicans 
and Democrats are similar across only 12 content variables.  In the third period, there is 
consensus between Democratic and Republican government officials with respect to only three 
content variables.   
Table 8 illustrates the major points of divergence between Democrats and Republicans.  
Because the frequencies are expressed in percentage terms, the differences between the 
frequencies that Republican and Democratic speakers expressed a content variable denotes the 
percentage additional likelihood that one political party favored a given content variable 
expression.  During the second period, Republicans were more likely to mention the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks (.115 difference), but Democrats were more likely to mention Osama 
bin Laden (.153 difference).  Republicans were more likely to allude to a general connection 
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between Iraq and terrorism (.163 difference).  Democrats were more likely to refer to Iraq’s past 
use of chemical weapons (.094 difference) and were also somewhat more likely to make calls for 
additional analysis of the costs and benefits of an invasion of Iraq (.081 difference).   
In the third period, there are ten content variables where the frequencies are most 
divergent between political parties where Republicans were more likely to assert those content 
variables.  They are: 1) assertions that Iraq possessed WMDs (.344 difference); 2) referring to 
international law to justify an invasion of Iraq (.335 difference); 3) referring to disarming Iraq’s 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (.307 difference); 4) alluding to general connections 
between Iraq and terrorism (.306 difference); 5) identifying efforts against Iraq with the war on 
terror (.284 difference); 6) considering an invasion of Iraq to be a method to disarm Iraq (.277 
difference); 7) assuming U.S. national security interests justified the invasion (.261 difference); 
8) mentioning a possible multilateral invasion of Iraq (.255 difference); 9) suggesting the 
inefficacy of international weapons inspections (.212 difference); and 10) referring to the 9/11 
attacks in the same appearance that they also mentioned Iraq (.191 difference).  For their part, 
Democrats were more likely than Republicans to call for a further analysis of the invasions costs 
and benefits (.236 difference).   
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E% (out of 112) L% (out of 48) E% (out of 169) L% (out of 119) E% (out of 555) L% (out of 556)
Policy Goals
Speaker says invasion of Iraq is a potential method to 
disarm Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.041 0.067 0.625 0.369
Speaker references the disarmament of nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapon to justify an invasion of 
Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.025 0.468 0.155
Speaker gives humanitarian justifications in order to 
justify the invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.008 0.148 0.027
Speaker uses the phrase "regime change" 0.045 0.000 0.118 0.042 0.133 0.146
Nature of the Threat
Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.420 0.474 0.261
Speaker refers to OBL 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.210 0.092 0.077
Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.016
Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to 
justify an invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.025 0.184 0.047
Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support 
invasion of Iraq 0.018 0.000 0.071 0.067 0.387 0.149
Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the "War on 
Terror" 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.168 0.378 0.144
Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq 
and terrorism generally 0.036 0.021 0.473 0.286 0.432 0.160
Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or 
terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq 0.000 0.021 0.136 0.050 0.178 0.038
Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons 0.071 0.000 0.178 0.034 0.268 0.050
Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs 0.071 0.000 0.237 0.109 0.688 0.309
Means to the End
Speaker mentions international law to support the 
invasion of Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.053 0.017 0.479 0.171
Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV 
operations 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.008 0.108 0.121
Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or 
continued) international weapons inspections 0.009 0.000 0.024 0.017 0.238 0.047
Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of 
Iraq by the U.S. 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.042 0.072 0.061
Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.009
Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.071 0.092 0.432 0.205
Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with 
UN approval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.081
Costs and Benefits
Speaker gives an explict value for US cost estimates of 
the invasion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.038
Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 
billion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.029
Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to 
the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding 
costs) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.014
Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of 
the (potential) invasion or opines about "unanswered 
questions" 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.067 0.007 0.189
Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of 
the (potential) invasion 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.070
Period I (1-19-01 to 9-11-01) Period II (9-12-01 to 7-28-02) Period III (7-29-02 to 3-19-03)
 
Table 8: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican speakers in Three Periods 
 
Data from the frequencies of individual content variables also shows a general lack of 
consensus between Republican and Democratic legislators and between the Executive and 
Legislative branches.  The two parties in Congress are not as far apart as Democrats and 
Republicans generally, or even between the Executive and Legislative branches.  Table 9 
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displays the differences between Democratic and Republican legislators and table 10 lists 
differences between the Executive and Legislative branches.  The grey shading indicates a 
consensus between the two groups as the frequencies speakers within each group expressed a 
content variable similar to the frequency of their counterpart.  As Table 9 shows, the six content 
variables where the frequencies are most divergent in the second period between political parties 
in the legislature are 1) considering an invasion of Iraq to be a method to disarm Iraq (.112 
difference); 2) alluding to connections between Iraq and terrorism generally (.092 difference); 3) 
calling for additional analysis of the costs and benefits of using force against Iraq; 4) referring to 
9/11 (.064 difference); 5) using the phrase “regime change” (.057 difference); and 6) explicitly 
mentioning U.S. national security to support the use of force against Iraq.  Surprisingly, 
legislative Democrats tended to express these content variables more than Republicans—of these 
six content variables, Republicans were more likely to express only one of them, namely to 
allude to general connections between Iraq and terrorism.   
In the third period, Republicans and Democrats generally moved farther apart on most 
aspects of the Iraq war debate—the two parties expressed only three content variables within 1 % 
frequency.  Whereas Democratic legislators had often expressed content variables more often 
than Republicans in the second period, Republican legislators surpassed Democrats on most 
indicators.  Republicans were more likely to 1) connect the effort against Iraq with the war on 
terror (.130 difference); 2) assert that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.112 
difference); 3) assert that an invasion would disarm Iraq (.112 difference); and 4) express an 
assumption that U.S. national security interests supported the use of force against Iraq (.106 
difference).  Democratic legislators, for their part, were .200 more likely to call for further 
analysis of the costs and benefits of an invasion of Iraq or to opine about unanswered questions.  
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Legislators of both parties moved closer to consensus on the use of humanitarian concerns to 
justify the invasion of Iraq.   
 
Rleg % (out of 27) Dleg % (out of 21) Rleg % (out of 64) Dleg % (out of 55) Rleg % (out of 220) Dleg % (out of 335)
Policy Goals
Speaker says invasion of Iraq is a potential method to 
disarm Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.127 0.441 0.322
Speaker references the disarmament of nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapon to justify an invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.036 0.223 0.110
Speaker gives humanitarian justifications in order to justify 
the invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.032 0.024
Speaker uses the phrase "regime change" 0.074 0.000 0.016 0.073 0.123 0.161
Nature of the Threat
Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks 0.000 0.000 0.391 0.455 0.291 0.242
Speaker refers to OBL 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.182 0.036 0.104
Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.003
Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to 
justify an invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.082 0.024
Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support 
invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.091 0.214 0.107
Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the "War on Terror" 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.182 0.223 0.093
Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq 
and terrorism generally 0.037 0.000 0.328 0.236 0.259 0.096
Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or 
terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq 0.037 0.000 0.063 0.036 0.068 0.018
Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.036 0.055 0.048
Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.109 0.377 0.266
Means to the End
Speaker mentions international law to support the invasion 
of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.214 0.143
Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV 
operations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.105 0.131
Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or 
continued) international weapons inspections 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.018 0.091 0.018
Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq 
by the U.S. 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.036 0.073 0.054
Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.006
Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.127 0.236 0.185
Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN 
approval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.128
Costs and Benefits
Speaker gives an explict value for US cost estimates of 
the invasion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.054
Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 
billion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.036
Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to 
the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding costs) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.006
Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of 
the (potential) invasion or opines about "unanswered 
questions" 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.109 0.068 0.269
Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of the 
(potential) invasion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.032 0.015
Period I (1-19-01 to 9-11-01) Period II (9-12-01 to 7-28-02) Period III (7-29-02 to 3-19-03)
 
Table 9: Content Variable Frequencies for Democratic and Republican Legislators in Three Periods 
 
The shaded cells in the period I columns of table 10 show that the Executive and 
Legislative branches tended to agree more than they disagreed in the first period.  Only six pairs 
of cells are not shaded, and those differences that do exist are rather small.  It should be noted 
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that even in the first period that the Executive branch was more likely to assert that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction or had used them (the differences for both content 
variables is .071).  Divergences began to appear between the two political branches of 
government in the second period, with differences increasing over 19 of the 26 content variables.  
By the third period, little consensus remained as the Executive and Legislative branches tended 
to agree over only 3 content variables of 26.   
In the second period, the five content variables that Executive branch speakers expressed 
more frequently than the Legislative branch all went to the nature of the threat posed by Iraq.  
The Executive branch tended to argue more than the Legislative branch by 1) referring to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks (.243 difference); 2) alluding to a connection between Iraq and terrorism 
(.188 difference); 3) mentioning Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons (.144 difference); 4) 
asserting that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.127 difference); and 5) making 
explicit connections between Iraq and terrorism (.086 difference).  Of these content variables, the 
reference to 9/11 is most noteworthy due to its magnitude.  In situations where government 
officials referred to Iraq, Executive branch officials were 24.3 % more likely than Legislative 
branch officials to refer to 9/11 in the eleven months after September 11, 2001.   
In the third period, the Executive branch increased the margin of its percentage frequency 
for ten content variables to greater than 20 % (though, it should be noted, the strong 24.3% 
margin for references to 9/11 would decrease by 3 %).  In the final period, the ten content 
variables that Executive branch speakers were more likely to assert than Legislators were: 1) 
claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (.379 difference); 2) justifying the 
invasion for the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (.314 difference); 3) 
justifying the invasion by reference to international law (.308 difference); 4) alluding to general 
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connections between Iraq and terrorism (.272 difference); 5) arguing that an invasion of Iraq 
would serve to disarm Iraq (.257 difference); 6) assuming that U.S. national security interests 
support an invasion of Iraq (.238 difference); 7) identifying the effort against Iraq with the war 
on terror (.234 difference); 8) mentioning the possibility of a multilateral invasion of Iraq (.227 
difference); 9) mention Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the past (.218 difference); and 10) 
referring to the 9/11 attacks (.213 difference).   
Legislators were more likely to 1) call for additional consideration of the costs and 
benefits of the invasion or Iraq (.182 difference); 2) support a multilateral invasion of Iraq only 
with UN approval (.076 difference); 3) refer to an explicit value for the potential cost of the 
invasion (.034 difference); 4) assert that the cost of the war might be less than $100 billion (.016 
difference); 5) refer to post war planning (.012); 6) use the exact phrase “regime change” (.012 
difference); and 7) urge a unilateral invasion (.004 difference).  However, because so few of 
these observations involved speakers that called for a unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 
extremely low frequency in both branches of government was very near to equivalent.  These 
results indicate that Congress considered the costs and benefits of the invasion of Iraq somewhat 
more than the Executive branch, but significantly underestimated those costs.  Congress was also 
significantly more interested in UN approval for the invasion of Iraq.   
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E% (out of 112) L% (out of 48) E% (out of 169) L% (out of 119) E% (out of 555) L% (out of 556)
Policy Goals
Speaker says invasion of Iraq is a potential method to 
disarm Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.041 0.067 0.625 0.369
Speaker references the disarmament of nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapon to justify an invasion of 
Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.025 0.468 0.155
Speaker gives humanitarian justifications in order to 
justify the invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.008 0.148 0.027
Speaker uses the phrase "regime change" 0.045 0.000 0.118 0.042 0.133 0.146
Nature of the Threat
Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.420 0.474 0.261
Speaker refers to OBL 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.210 0.092 0.077
Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.016
Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to 
justify an invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.025 0.184 0.047
Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support 
invasion of Iraq 0.018 0.000 0.071 0.067 0.387 0.149
Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the "War on 
Terror" 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.168 0.378 0.144
Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq 
and terrorism generally 0.036 0.021 0.473 0.286 0.432 0.160
Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or 
terrorist group operating in or cooperating with Iraq 0.000 0.021 0.136 0.050 0.178 0.038
Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons 0.071 0.000 0.178 0.034 0.268 0.050
Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs 0.071 0.000 0.237 0.109 0.688 0.309
Means to the End
Speaker mentions international law to support the 
invasion of Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.053 0.017 0.479 0.171
Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV 
operations 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.008 0.108 0.121
Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or 
continued) international weapons inspections 0.009 0.000 0.024 0.017 0.238 0.047
Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of 
Iraq by the U.S. 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.042 0.072 0.061
Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.009
Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq 0.009 0.000 0.071 0.092 0.432 0.205
Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with 
UN approval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.081
Costs and Benefits
Speaker gives an explict value for US cost estimates of 
the invasion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.038
Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 
billion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.029
Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to 
the war (direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding 
costs) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.014
Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of 
the (potential) invasion or opines about "unanswered 
questions" 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.067 0.007 0.189
Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of 
the (potential) invasion 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.070
Period I (1-19-01 to 9-11-01) Period II (9-12-01 to 7-28-02) Period III (7-29-02 to 3-19-03)
 
Table 10: Content Variable Frequencies for Executive and Legislative Branch Speakers in Three Periods 
 
Another way to express the differences of content variables’ frequencies between 
Republicans and Democrats is to give the ratio between them for each content variable.  When a 
ratio of the frequency that one party expresses a content variable is equal to the frequency that 
the other party expresses that same content variable, then the ratio between the two parties’ 
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frequencies will be equal to one.  In such a case, there would be a perfect consensus between the 
two groups for that content variable.  Obviously perfect consensus between various groups 
should not be expected, but increasing or decreasing ratios over time would indicate growing 
consensus or divergence.  Table 11 displays the ratios of expressed frequencies for content 
variables for Republican and Democrats.  To make this table easier to read, all frequencies have 
been rounded to the nearest hundredth.   
Period I Period II Period III Period I Period II Period III Period I Period II Period III
Policy Goals
Invasion of Iraq is a potential method to disarm Iraq .01/0 0.33 1.85 ≈0/0 0.12 1.37 .01/0 0.62 1.70
Disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 
justifies invasion ≈0/0 0.57 3.68 ≈0/0 0.43 2.02 ≈0/0 0.70 3.03
Humanitarian concerns justify invasion ≈0/0 .03/0 4.54 ≈0/0 .02/0 1.33 ≈0/0 2.82 5.48
Speaker uses the phrase "regime change" 3.06 1.24 0.84 .07/0 0.21 0.76 .04/0 2.82 0.92
Nature of the Threat
Speaker refers to the 9-11 attacks ≈0/0 1.24 1.72 ≈0/0 0.86 1.20 ≈0/0 1.58 1.82
Speaker refers to OBL ≈0/0 0.65 0.64 ≈0/0 1.29 0.35 ≈0/0 1.32 1.19
Speaker characterizes threat from Iraq as imminent ≈0/0 ≈0/0 18.17 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 12.18 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 2.78
Speaker explicitly uses U.S. national security interests to justify 
an invasion of Iraq ≈0/0 0.38 7.91 ≈0/0 0/.05 3.43 ≈0/0 0.70 3.93
Speaker assumes U.S. national security interests support 
invasion of Iraq .01/0 1.07 3.40 ≈0/0 0.52 1.99 .02/0 1.06 2.60
Speaker identifies invasion of Iraq with the "War on Terror" ≈0/0 1.29 4.09 ≈0/0 0.86 2.41 ≈0/0 1.27 2.63
Speaker makes an allusion to a connection between Iraq and 
terrorism generally .03/0 1.57 3.81 .04/0 1.39 2.71 1.71 1.66 2.70
Speaker makes an explicit reference to a terrorist or terrorist 
group operating in or cooperating with Iraq .01/0 1.02 5.58 .04/0 1.72 3.81 0/.02 2.78 4.72
Speaker mentioned Iraq's use of chemical weapons .08/0 3.82 1.07 ≈0/0 0.86 1.14 .07/0 5.28 5.33
Speaker said Iraq possesses WMDs .07/0 1.58 2.26 ≈0/0 1.00 1.42 .07/0 2.17 2.22
Means to the End
Speaker mentions international law to support the invasion of 
Iraq .01/0 .05/0 3.29 ≈0/0 .03/0 1.49 .01/0 3.17 2.81
Speaker mentions any post-war planning or Phase IV operations ≈0/0 1.15 0.80 ≈0/0 0/.02 0.80 ≈0/0 3.52 0.90
Speaker suggests the inefficacy or futility of (additional or 
continued) international weapons inspections .01/0 1.53 10.26 ≈0/0 0.86 5.08 .01/0 1.41 5.09
Speaker mentions possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by 
the U.S. ≈0/0 1.34 1.66 ≈0/0 1.29 1.35 ≈0/0 0.56 1.18
Speaker urges unilateral invasion of Iraq ≈0/0 ≈0/0 1.88 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 2.28 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.60
Speaker mentions possible multilateral invasion of Iraq .01/0 0.62 2.33 ≈0/0 0.49 1.28 .01/0 0.77 2.11
Speaker supports multilateral invasion of Iraq only with UN 
approval .01/0 ≈0/0 0.05 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.04 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.07
Costs and Benefits
Speaker gives an explict value for US cost estimates of the 
invasion ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.17 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.25 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.10
Speaker says cost of war against Iraq is less than $100 billion ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.57 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.51 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 0.44
Speaker mentions Iraqi oil production as a cost offset to the war 
(direct costs of the conflict and/or rebuilding costs) ≈0/0 ≈0/0 7.52 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 4.57 ≈0/0 ≈0/0 2.63
Speaker calls for further analysis of costs and benefits of the 
(potential) invasion or opines about "unanswered questions" ≈0/0 0.19 0.11 ≈0/0 0.29 0.25 ≈0/0 0.09 0.04
Speaker refers to any estimates of costs or benefits of the 
(potential) invasion ≈0/0 0.76 0.22 ≈0/0 0/.02 2.13 ≈0/0 1.41 0.31
Republicans / Democrats R / D Legislators Exec. / Legisl. Branches
 
Table 11: Content Variable Frequency Ratios over Three Periods 
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Ratios where the number zero appears as either the numerator or denominator (but not 
both) are not reduced to decimal form; ratios where the number zero is both the denominator and 
numerator appear as ≈0/0.  Because ratios are expressed as Republican frequencies of content 
variables divided by Democratic frequencies, cell values of less than one represent ratios where 
Democrats have a higher frequency for that ratio.  The same is true for ratios between 
Republican and Democratic legislators and those between the Executive and Legislative 
branches.  Many of the frequencies of content variables from the first period and several from the 
second period are so small that they round to zero and result in ratios of ≈0/0.  Despite the 
division by zero, in these instances the ratio is functionally equivalent to one, since the two 
groups’ frequencies involved in calculating the ratio are equally close to zero.   
Differences between the percentage frequency of content variables (tables 8, 9, and 10) 
and increases in the frequency ratios between groups’ content variables (table 11) when 
considered together generates a more detailed representation of the Iraq war debate.  While the 
debate on Iraq generally was characterized by increasing differences of opinion between groups 
of Democrats and Republicans and Executive branch officials and Legislators, changes in the 
frequency that a specific group expressed a given content variable allows for a more detailed 
analysis of the public debate.  Between September 11, 2001 and July 28, 2002, Democrats were 
more likely than Republicans to consider invasion as a potential method to disarm Iraq as well as 
to justify an invasion of Iraq through calling for the disarmament of nuclear, biological, or 
chemical weapons.  Likewise, Legislators were more likely than Executive branch officials to 
make both assertions (likely because nearly every Democratic government official in the sample 
served in Congress).  However, from July 29, 2002 to the start of the invasion, Republicans and 
Executive branch officials were much more likely to make these two arguments.  In fact, 
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Republicans were 3.68 times more likely than Democrats to justify an invasion of Iraq in order to 
disarm Iraq’s nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons between July 29, 2002 and March 19, 
2003.  As for the use of a humanitarian justification to invade Iraq, Democrats did not make such 
an argument until the third period, but in that period Republicans were more likely to do so by a 
factor of 4.54.  The Executive branch was more likely than the Legislative branch to argue for an 
invasion on humanitarian grounds by a factor of 5.48.  As for regime change, Republicans were 
3.06 times as likely as Democrats to use the phrase “regime change” when discussing Iraq during 
the first period and 1.24 times as likely in the second period.  In the third period, however, 
Democrats used the phrase more often, but only by a factor of 1.18.  This decrease in ratio is 
illustrative of a growing consensus on the concept of regime change as the date of invasion 
approached.  Of goal-oriented content variables, the content variable of regime change was the 
only variable to show increasing convergence as the time of invasion approached.   
Content variables that measure officials’ discussion of the Iraqi threat show a near-
consistent pattern of widening disagreement between groups.  The Executive branch was nearly 
always more likely to express content variables related to the threat.  The Executive branch was 
more likely than the Legislative branch to equate an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror, and 
became increasingly more so in the third period.  In the nine months after September 11, 2001, 
Executive branch officials were only 4.5 % more likely than Legislators to make this claim, but 
the Executive branch increased its margin to 23.4 % after July 28, 2002.  In the third period, the 
Executive branch was 2.63 times more likely than the Legislative branch to claim the invasion of 
Iraq to be part of the war on terror.  Executive branch speakers were also much more likely to 
refer to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the second and third periods than were Legislators, by a 
margin of over 20 % each period.  In other words, Executive branch officials were 1.58 times 
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more likely in the second period and 1.82 times more likely in the third period to mention 9/11 
than were legislators, regardless of party affiliation.   
The Executive branch was also more likely than the Legislative branch to portray 
connections between Iraq and terrorism in public appearances.  The difference between branches 
in the frequency of alluding to general connections between Iraq and terrorism seems slight in 
the first period at .015, but this rate was actually 1.71 times more than the frequency of the 
Legislative branch.  The Executive branch’s frequency grew to .473 in the second period, but the 
Legislative branch also began to make more allusions to connections between Iraq and terrorism 
because the ratio with the Legislative branch decreased somewhat, from 1.71 in the first period 
to 1.66 in the second.  In the third period, however, the Executive branch’s margin was .187 
giving a ratio with the Legislative branch of 2.70.   
While there was virtually no difference in likelihood between the frequencies that 
Executive and Legislative branches pointed to explicit links between terrorists and terrorist 
groups and Iraq in the first period (the Legislature was slightly more likely, but the difference 
was only .021).  The Executive branch increased its margin to .086 in the second period for a 
ratio of 1.72.  After September 11, Executive branch officials were much more likely than 
Legislative branch officials to name more specific connections between Iraq and terrorism by 
naming groups and individual terrorists.  The margin grew to.140 in the third period for a ratio of 
4.72.  Legislative officials were actually less likely to publicly refer to explicit links between Iraq 
and terrorism in the third period.   
Executive branch officials were also more likely to mention that Iraq possessed WMDs 
than were Legislative branch officials.  In the first period, no Legislator made such a charge, but 
7.1 % of the time Executive branch officials mentioned Iraq, Executive branch officials asserted 
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that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.  After September 11, 2001, Executive branch 
officials were even more likely to say that Iraq possessed WMDs, exceeding Legislative officials 
by a factor of 2.17 in the second period and 2.22 in the third.  These dramatic differences in 
percentage frequencies over several terror-related content variables suggest a high degree of 
disagreement between the Legislative and Executive branches of government, particularly for the 
issue of the nexus between Iraq and terrorism.  These results show that the Executive branch was 
much more involved than Legislators in laying out potential connections between Iraq and 
terrorism to the public.   
These divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches tend to be greater in 
magnitude than cleavages between Republicans and Democrats and between Republican and 
Democratic legislators, but divergences between the parties nonetheless do exist.  While 
Democratic legislators were more likely than Republican legislators to equate an invasion of Iraq 
with the war on terror in the second period by a factor of 1.16 (the multiplicative inverse of .86, 
the R/D ratio), Legislative branch Republicans were 2.41 times more likely than Democrats to 
make the same argument in the third period.  Republican legislators were also more likely than 
their Democratic counterparts to allude to both general and specific connections between Iraq 
and terrorism.  In the first period, no Democrat made either a general or specific connection 
between Iraq and terrorism; the ratio of Legislative branch Republicans to Democrats is .03/0 for 
general connections and .01/0 for specific connections between Iraq and terrorism.  After the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, i.e. in the second period, the Legislative Republican to Democrat 
ratio increased to 1.39 for general allusions and 1.72 for specific references.  These ratios 
increased in the third period to 2.71 for general allusions and 3.81 for specific references.  For 
Republican Legislative observations in the third period, 25.9 % of them alluded to general 
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connections between Iraq and terrorism, compared to only 9.6 % of Democratic Legislative 
observations.   
For the first two periods, there was a high degree of consensus in the legislature between 
Democrats and Republicans on Iraq’s possession of WMDs.  In the first period, no legislator of 
either party ever publicly said that Iraq possessed WMDs.  In the second period, legislators of 
both parties made the claim with essentially the same frequency.  Only in the third period did 
Republican legislators assert that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction more than 
Democratic legislators, with a ratio of 1.42 in the third period.  Also in the third period, 
Republican legislators described the threat posed by Iraq as imminent much more often than 
Democratic legislators, at a frequency of 12.18 to the frequency of Democratic legislators.  
These differences show that Legislative branch Republicans and Democrats made significantly 
different public cases for the use of force against Iraq.   
In the first period, there was little divergence between parties and branches for content 
variables associated with international law or weapons inspectors because so few government 
speakers had anything to say about those subjects.  Those few that did suggest that international 
law was supportive for an invasion of Iraq were in the Executive branch, and even then only 1.4 
% of Executive branch observations included this suggestion.  The same percentage of Executive 
branch observations also contained criticism of international weapons inspections.  These figures 
compare with 7 % of observations where the Executive branch official mentioned Iraq’s past use 
of chemical weapons.  Legislative branch Republicans and Democrats did not make such 
arguments in the first period.  In the second period, speakers of both political parties criticized 
weapons inspections, and Legislative Democrats were actually slightly more likely to be critical 
of inspectors than Legislative Republicans with a ratio of 1.16.  The Executive branch remained 
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more critical of weapons inspection by a frequency ratio of 1.45 more than the Legislative 
branch’s rate during the second period.  In the third period, Executive branch speakers were 
much more critical of weapons inspections than any other government group or subgroup—23.5 
% of Executive branch observations were critical of weapons inspections while only 2.3 % of 
Legislative branch observations were, a frequency ratio of 5.09.  Republicans in Congress joined 
the Executive branch in criticizing weapons inspections during the third period more than their 
Democratic colleagues, but they did so with a much lower rare.  Nine-point-one percent of 
Republican legislators’ observations were critical of international weapons inspections while 1.8 
% of Democratic legislators made such an argument.  The ratio between Republican and 
Democratic legislators’ frequency was 5.09 during the third period.  In spite of this significant 
Republican criticism during the second and third periods, weapons inspectors did resume 
inspections of Iraq on November 18, 2002, three months into the third period and only ten days 
after the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441.145   
Groups differed over the kind of invasion to mount against Iraq, and the divergences 
grew over the three periods.  No one mentioned the possibility, let alone advocated, using 
unilateral force against Iraq in the first period.  In the second period, however, government 
speakers began to mention possible multilateral and unilateral options for an invasion of Iraq.  
Democrats in the Legislative branch were twice as likely as Legislative Republicans to mention 
the potential use of multilateral force against Iraq as 12.7 % of observations of Democrats and 
only 6.3 % of Republicans mentioned this possibility.  The Legislative branch tended to mention 
the possibility of using multilateral force against Iraq slightly more than the Executive branch in 
the second period, with 9.2 % to 7.1 % of observations.  Few speakers mentioned the potential 
                                                 
145 Verification and Inspection Commission United Nations Monitoring, "Eleventh Quarterly Report of the 
Executive Chairman,"  (Nov. 27, 2002), 3, ¶ 9. 
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use of unilateral force against Iraq in the second period, though it was discussed somewhat more 
in Congress than by the Executive branch.  Of Legislative branch Republican observations, 4.7 
% mentioned the possibility of using unilateral force, 3.6 % of Legislative branch Democrats did 
so, and only 2.4% of Executive branch observations mentioned the possibility of unilateral force 
in the second period.   
In the third period, Republicans finally began to mention the possible use of multilateral 
force more than Democrats, 44.7 % to 13.2 % of observations, a frequency ratio of 2.11 to 1.  
The Executive branch mentioned the potential use of multilateral force 43.2 % of all 
observations during the third period, while only 20.5 % of Legislative branch observations did 
so.  Republicans in Congress were slightly more likely than their Democratic colleagues to 
mention a potential multilateral invasion, with 23.6 % and 18.5 % of each group’s observations 
mentioning multilateral force.  Possible unilateral force was more likely to be mentioned by a 
Republican Legislator than a Democratic one in the third period, at a frequency ratio of 1.35 to 1.  
The political branches of government were more evenly matched in frequency, with the 
Executive branch slightly more likely to mention the possibility of a unilateral invasion than the 
Legislative branch at a frequency ratio of 1.18 to 1.  Few observations involved speakers 
publicly advocating the use of unilateral force against Iraq, but those that did were somewhat 
more likely to be congressional Republicans.  The frequency of Legislative branch calls for the 
unilateral use of force to that of Executive branch speakers was 1.67 to 1 (the inverse of the R/L 
ratio of .60) and the frequency ratio of congressional Republicans advocating the unilateral 
invasion of Iraq to congressional Democrats was 2.28 to 1.  Democratic Legislators advocated 
the multilateral invasion of Iraq with United Nations approval by a frequency ratio of nearly 25 
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to 1.  Nearly 13 % of Legislative branch Democratic observations involved this argument, while 
only 0.5% of Legislative Republican observations did.   
Legislative branch Democrats were also more likely to refer to post-war planning than 
their Republican counterparts.  No speakers of either party mentioned post-war planning in the 
first period.  In the second and third periods, however, Democrats in Congress were more likely 
to refer to post-war planning than Republicans in Congress by frequency ratios of .02/0 to 1 and 
1.25 to 1.  Interestingly, the Executive branch discussed post-war planning more frequently than 
the Legislative branch in the second period by a ratio of 3.52 to 1, but in the third period as the 
debate began to become more prominent, Congress increased its discussion of post-war planning 
such that the ratio flipped toward Congress, 1.11 to 1.   
Potential costs and benefits associated with an invasion of Iraq were not discussed until 
the second period and then only in a general way.  In the second period, Executive branch 
officials were the most likely to make public references to estimates of costs and benefits of 
invading Iraq, but with only 1.2 % of observations.  Only 0.8 % of all Legislative observations 
during the second period referred to costs and benefits of the invasion, but all observations were 
from Democratic legislators.  During this same period, Democratic legislators were more likely 
than their Republican colleagues to call for more analysis of potential costs and benefits or to 
complain about too many unanswered questions, by a factor of 3.45.  These factors should not be 
blown out of proportion, because so few observations were involved, perhaps any potential 
invasion of Iraq still seemed too remote.  Ten-point-nine percent of observations from 
Democratic legislators called for more analysis and complained about too many unanswered 
questions, compared to 3.1 % of observations of Republican legislators.   
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Not until the third period did Congress begin to appreciably increase its calls for 
additional analysis of costs and benefits, and when Congress did so, each political party did so 
with vastly different frequencies.  In the third period, 26.9 % of observations from Democratic 
legislators wanted more analysis while only 3.2 % of Republican observations did so.  Congress 
was much more likely to want more analysis of costs and benefits by a factor of 14.3—only 0.7 
% of third period observations of Executive branch officials discussed the need for further 
analysis or suggested there were unanswered questions.   
No government speaker gave any explicit cost value for a potential invasion until the 
third period.  Democratic legislators were 4 times more likely to mention a cost value than were 
Republicans in Congress, who were themselves 3.5 times more likely to do so than Executive 
branch speakers: 5.4 % for Democratic legislators while only 1.4 % of Republican legislators and 
0.4 % of Executive branch speakers’ observations.  Somewhat unexpectedly, Democrats were 
more likely than Republicans to suggest that the potential cost of the war would be less than 
$100 billion.  Legislative Democrats did so by a factor of nearly 2 to 1 and the Legislative 
branch was more likely to do so than the Executive branch by a factor of 2.27.  References to a 
potential cost of the war being less than $100 billion were rare, however, with only 3.6 % of 
Democratic legislator’s observations, 1.8 % for Republican legislators, and 1.3 % for Executive 
branch officials.  While Democrats seemingly undervalued the cost of war, many Republicans 
tended to stress certain benefits.  During the third period, the Executive branch referred to Iraqi 
oil as a benefit that would help to offset the costs of the invasion or rebuilding efforts as 3.8 % of 
their observations regarding Iraq and 2.7 % of Republican legislative observations included this 
argument.  Only 0.6 % of Democratic legislators made this argument.  Republicans were more 
likely to refer to Iraqi oil as a cost offset than Democrats by a factor of 4.56.  These percentages 
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tended to be much lower than the percentage frequency that speakers discussed terrorism and the 
threat posed by Iraq.  This content analysis suggests that government discussion was primarily 
about the threat posed by Iraq, and only secondarily about how to invade Iraq or how much such 
an invasion might cost.   
These frequencies have told a descriptive story, a story where Democrats and 
Republicans, Legislators and Executive branch officials diverged more and more in how often 
they expressed ideas about the Iraqi threat and the potential use of force to confront that threat.  
In the next two chapters, this story and this descriptive data will be used to address specific 
research questions.  The examination in Chapter 5 involves the comparison of various groups of 
government officials, addressing specific research questions using the results of the content 
analysis with data aggregated at the level of political party and branch of government.  In 
Chapter 6, results from the content analysis will be presented with data aggregated by individual 
speakers.  This will enable a relative comparison of individual speakers involved in the debate 
regarding Iraq, at least for those government officials who contributed the most to the public 
debate.   
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5. CONFRONTING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH 
THE DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
Over all three periods of analysis, Republican speakers referred to Iraq a total number of times 
more than did Democrats.  This is to be expected as there were more Republicans in Congress 
and high-level Executive branch officials are nearly all well-known Republicans (DCIA Tenet a 
notable exception).  Democrats tended to discuss Iraq less often per public appearance than did 
Republicans, reinforcing the notion that Republicans were much more focused on Iraq—this 
disparity was greatest during the third time period.  In addition to focus, Iraq Index scores 
provide a measure to compare speakers in their support for the use of force against Iraq.  
Executive branch officials gave much more public justification than did Legislative officials.  
When Executive branch officials justified the use of force while testifying before Congress, they 
tended to produce Iraq Index scores that were higher and statistically significant than those of 
Legislators.  There was little partisan difference in both Iraq index scores and the focus that 
individual speakers paid to Iraq until the third period, that is, until after July 29, 2002.  Even 
during the third period, Democrats as a whole tended to have low Iraq Index scores.  These low 
scores show that Democrats were not nearly as engaged in public justification of the war as were 
Republicans, despite the fact that many Democrats did vote in favor of the authorization to use 
force against Iraq in the middle of the third period.  Table 6 summarizes these descriptive 
findings for each period.   
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  Period I:  
1/19/01 to 9/11/01 
Period II:  
9/12/01 to 7/28/02 
Period III:  
7/29/02 to 3/19/03 
Total Iraq References 1155 2324 14452 
Mean Iraq references 
(by speaker per 
appearance) 
6.35 6.96 12.2 
Number of 
Observations 
182 334 1183 
Attention paid to Iraq LOW LOW HIGH (for both Legislators & 
Executive branch officials, 
Period III is higher than other 
periods in a statistically 
significant manner) 
Mean Iraq Index score 
(per observation) 
0.05 0.39 1.25 
Maximum Iraq Index 
score (out of 9) 
3 5 8 
Public advocacy for the 
use of force against 
Iraq (attention to Iraq 
considered jointly with 
concomitant Iraq Index 
scores) 
LOW MIXED (low for 
Legislators, high for 
Executive branch officials 
and congressional 
witnesses) 
HIGH (higher for Republicans 
than Democrats as well as higher 
for Executive branch officials 
than Legislators) 
Table 12: Summary of Descriptive Findings 
 
This study posed three sets of research questions for the period of January 2001 to March 
2003—the first set deals with comparing Legislative and Executive branches in their attention to 
Iraq, the second focuses on potential consensus or divergence between groups of government 
elites, and the third examines the relationship between political accountability and justifications 
favoring the use of force.  To examine Executive/ Legislative branch relations on the subject of 
Iraq, the specific research questions are: Did Congress pay more or less attention to Iraq during 
the first two years of President Bush’s first term prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003?  
Were there external events associated with an increase (or decrease) in Legislators speaking 
about Iraq, or an increase in the congressional support for an invasion of Iraq?  If the high water 
mark of congressional activity was the lead-up to the passage of the October 2002 Authorization 
to Use Military Force Against Iraq, then this would be consistent with the hypothesis that 
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Congress was truly a passive partner in President Bush’s effort against Iraq.  The specific 
research question regarding consensus in government groups is: Were there changes in the level 
of consensus or divergence between political parties and government branches during the period 
January 2001 to March 2003?  The specific research question regarding political accountability 
is whether there exists a statistically significant relationship between and Iraq Index scores and 
two methods of ordering government officials’ political accountability.   
5.1 LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOCUS ON IRAQ 
The question of which branch of government addressed the subject of Iraq more during the two 
years prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 will be addressed by using the total number of 
observations made by both branches, the mean number of references to Iraq per observation 
made by both branches, and the mean Iraq Index scores of both branches.  These three 
measurements plotted over the twenty-seven months prior to the March 2003 invasion are 
displayed in figures 5, 6, and 7 below.  An observation denotes a single government speaker who 
mentions the words Iraq or Iraqi at least once in a single public appearance.  For most of the 
period of analysis, more Executive branch speakers than Legislative speakers mentioned Iraq.  
Out of 27 periods, there are only five exceptions to this trend—September 12 to October 11, 
2001; June 2002; August 29 to September 11, 2002; September 12 to October 9, 2002; and 
February 5 to March 4, 2003.   
The differences between the number of observations of Legislative and Executive branch 
speakers in the first two of these time periods is negligible.  The last three time periods during 
which the Legislative branch had a higher number of observations indicated intensified 
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legislative branch activity.  Former Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu testified 
regarding Iraq before the House Governmental Reform and Oversight Committee on September 
12, 2002, and many Congressmen joined in the discussion regarding Iraq.  Within the same 
month, the Joint Intelligence Committee, the armed services committees, and the Senate Foreign 
Relations and House International Relations committees all held hearings regarding policy 
toward Iraq.  In February and early March 2003, there were hearings in the armed services and 
budget committees, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Ways and Means 
Committee.  As one might expect, these periods of extensive hearings were accompanied by 
legislative branch news conferences, further increasing the number of public appearances where 
Legislators mentioned Iraq at least once.   
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Figure 5: Number of Public Appearances where the words Iraq or Iraqi were Used by Speakers 
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Figure 6: Mean Number of Uses of the Words Iraq or Iraqi in Public Appearances 
 
The number of Executive and legislative observations, however, is only part of the story.  
The use of the words Iraq or Iraqi a high number of times in each public appearance is indicative 
of a higher focus on the subject of Iraq.  While this definition may seem unsuitable for an 
individual speaker or a low number of observations, for a high number of observations for 
groups of individual speakers over a longer time frame, the definition is more convincing.  Under 
this definition of focus on Iraq, the Executive branch is more focused on Iraq than the Legislative 
branch for all periods save for the month just after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
and the first month of 2002.  This increase in Legislative focus on Iraq may have been influenced 
by several disproportionate observations.  During a House International Relations hearing 
concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq held on October 4, 2001, three Representatives each used the 
word Iraq more than 15 times during this single meeting, thereby driving up the average for this 
period.  The slightly higher legislative focus on Iraq during January 2002 was due to a period of 
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relatively little discussion on Iraq coupled with a speech given by Senator Joseph Lieberman at 
Georgetown University on January 14, 2002.  During Lieberman’s address, entitled “Winning 
the Wider War Against Terrorism,” Lieberman referred to Iraq 18 times in only 9,241 words that 
was focused primarily on global terrorism and al Qaeda.   
Executive branch officials tended, on the whole, to have higher mean Iraq Index scores 
than did Legislators.  The mean Iraq Index scores of Executive branch officials were higher than 
the scores of Legislators in 15 of 27 periods.  In six periods, both branches tied mean Iraq Index 
scores of 0.  Each of these six time periods occurred before September 11, 2001.  In another six 
periods, Legislators had higher mean Iraq Index scores—each of these periods occurred between 
October 12, 2001 and July 28, 2002.  Generally, when the Legislative branch’s mean Iraq Index 
was higher than the mean Iraq Index score for the Executive branch, the differences between 
means were slight.  One exception, however, was the period from December 12, 2001 to January 
28, 2002.  The highest Legislative score was contributed by Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) 
who gave a speech at Georgetown on January 14, 2002.  This appearance had an Iraq Index score 
of 3.0.  The highest Executive branch Iraq Index score during this same period was only 1, 
scored by President George Bush in a January 16, 2002 press conference held in the Oval Office 
during a visit with then Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.  The reason the mean Executive 
branch Iraq Index score is lower than that of the Legislative branch is due to the fact that during 
late 2001 and early 2002 period, more observations are of Executive branch speakers, and more 
of these speakers had Iraq Index scores of 0, reducing the calculated mean.  In short, Executive 
branch speakers tended to have higher Iraq Index scores than did Legislative branch speakers for 
virtually the entire pre-war period of analysis.  It is important to note, however, that this 
difference was not statistically significant until after July 29, 2002.  Iraq Index scores seem to 
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trend upwards for both branches after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and beginning 
in the late summer of 2002.   
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Figure 7: Political branches' Mean Iraq Index Scores 
 
This content analysis is a descriptive study, and it is only indirectly and with some 
difficulty that the number of observations, references to Iraq per observation, and Iraq Index 
scores can be used to examine the nature of Legislative and Executive relations prior to the 
invasion of Iraq.  It would seem that Congress was less active in the deliberations regarding the 
use of force against Iraq than the Executive branch.  Executive speakers made more appearances 
where Iraq was mentioned than did Legislative branch speakers.  Executive officials started the 
Bush Presidency with a high focus on Iraq, and while this focus decreased somewhat over 2001, 
it was usually higher than the focus that the Legislative branch had on Iraq.  Congress’ public 
support for the use of force increased after September 11, 2001, but after January 2002, this 
public advocacy by Congress was generally less than that given by Executive branch officials.  
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By late summer 2002, when Congress began hearings on how to confront Iraq, the Executive 
branch had statistically higher Iraq Index scores and continued to be more supportive of the use 
of force against Iraq than Congress.  Congressional activity and congressional focus on Iraq 
peaked in July-August-September 2002, which corresponds to the period just before Congress 
formally considered and then quickly passed the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  Despite the passage of 
the Iraq Resolution, support for the use of force in Congress was significantly lower than that 
publicly advocated by the Executive, a disparity that was significant during the last seven months 
prior to the invasion of Iraq.  And, as will be demonstrated in the next subsection, Democrats in 
Congress had statistically lower Iraq Index scores than congressional Republicans. 
These conclusions are based on the content analysis data, but each conclusion has serious 
qualifications.  Congressional support for the use of force against Iraq did increase in the period 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and after the late summer 2002 congressional 
hearings on Iraq, but these trends may be coincidental or due to spurious associations.  Congress 
did seem to increase its public support for the use of force just after the 9/11 attacks—
congressional focus on Iraq was high in the month following the attacks, the number of 
observations of Legislative speakers increased indicating more congressional attention on Iraq, 
and Iraq Index scores did increase after 9/11 to a level statistically higher than before 9/11.  
However, it is not clear that 9/11 was the external event responsible for this increase.  Perhaps 
congressional support for the use of force was increasing anyway, especially with the frustration 
of what seemed like collapsing international support for sanctions against Iraq and impasse on 
obtaining renewed weapons inspections of Iraq.   
Viewing congressional hearings as a threshold event for the increase in congressional 
support for the use of force in later summer 2002 may also be somewhat problematic.  It is true 
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that Congress’ mean Iraq index scores increased over two months before the final passage of the 
Iraq Resolution, but the mean Iraq Index scores then decreased after October 10, 2002.  President 
Bush signed the Iraq Resolution on October 16, 2002.  Perhaps Congress advocated less public 
support for the war because Congress moved on to other legislative priorities—such as the 
November 2002 midterm election campaign.  Alternatively, perhaps Congress waited to see what 
would happen now that the president’s hand had been strengthened through successful passage 
of the Iraq Resolution but actual support for the use of force amongst Legislators remained high.  
Or, perhaps Congress’ public support for the war actually decreased somewhat.  The most likely 
scenario is that Congress recessed shortly after the Iraq Resolution vote and therefore made 
fewer public appearances where legislators then mentioned Iraq in such a way that those 
appearances were transcripted by the FNS service.  Content analysis of public statements alone 
cannot eliminate these significant qualifications.  Nonetheless, the associations of congressional 
activity, focus, and support for the use of force seem strong enough to support the empirical 
conclusions of this analysis.   
While Congress may be said to have been “less active” than the Executive branch, the 
data here does not seem to suggest that Congress acquiesced in the decision to use force, or was 
passive.  While observed speakers tended to be in the Executive branch rather than the 
Legislative, this could be due to the “bully pulpit effect”—Federal News Service may have 
transcripted Executive speakers more often than Legislative speakers because what the Executive 
branch says is considered more newsworthy than what a mere Representative with less access to 
intelligence information and self-interested political ambitions might say on a subject.  It is true 
that the highest Iraq Index scores of all speakers tended to be from congressional witnesses, of 
whom some were Executive branch officials.  This does not mean that Congress was necessarily 
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goaded or misled into increasing public discussion of invasion, however.  Congress’ Iraq Index 
scores trend upwards over the entire period of analysis; thus Congress was likely moving in that 
direction anyway.  Congress, moreover, decides for itself which witnesses to invite and 
consider—thus even if the testimony congressional witnesses informed Congress in such a way 
as to increase Iraq Index scores, Congress had a significant role in this development.  The high 
water mark of congressional activity and focus on Iraq was prior to the formal consideration of 
the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  This is consistent with the idea that Congress increased its focus on 
Iraq consistent with its role of considering important national security matters and national 
policy.  Congress ultimately chose to pass the 2002 Iraq Resolution, an outcome clearly within 
its Constitutional powers.   
Some critics argue that Congress’ passage of the Iraq Resolution amounts to “passing the 
buck” or being “overly acquiescent” because the Resolution allowed the president to make the 
final decision to use force.  While it is true that the Resolution gave the president the final 
decision-making authority, the final decision to use force would likely be the president’s 
anyway, due to the president’s authority as Commander in Chief.  The data show dramatically 
increasing observations as well as increases in focus and public advocacy for the use of force 
over the entire period of analysis; this means Congress was involved in the process and was 
knowledgeable that the use of force was a likely outcome of the passage of the Resolution.  It is 
disingenuous to ignore congressional participation in the constitutional decision-making process 
and focus on the delegation of authority to use force.  After all, it is the president, and not 
Congress, that ultimately directs the military into battle.   
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5.2 IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS 
This study’s second set of research questions involves determining the level of consensus 
between Republicans and Democrats and between the Executive and Legislative branches.  A 
degree of consensus exists between two groups when those two groups publicly make a given 
argument with similar frequencies—the more similar the frequency, the greater the degree of 
consensus.  An increasing consensus over a given justification for war over a given time period 
is represented by a convergence of the frequencies that groups publicly express the content 
variable for that justification.  A divergence over time in frequencies is evidence of a weakening 
consensus.  In this study, Iraq Index scores were examined over time to look for possible 
evidence of a changing consensus between political parties and between branches of government 
during the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq.  The Iraq Index score is a construct variable 
that aggregates nine content variables associated with the supporting force against Iraq.   
The differences between Iraq Index scores for Republican and Democratic legislators are 
plotted over time in figure 8 below.  Differences were calculated by subtracting mean 
Democratic legislators’ Iraq Index scores from those scores of their Republican counterparts.  
Where the difference is positive, the mean Republican Iraq Index score exceeded the mean 
Democratic score; where the plotted difference is negative, the opposite is true.  There were few 
observations but no difference between the two groups in the first period, from January 19, 2001 
to September 11, 2001.  Over the second period from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002, the 
magnitude of differences between political parties in Congress increased.  This trend identified 
visually is consistent with results of means testing for the two political parties over the three 
periods.  There was no significant difference between the distributions of Republican and 
Democratic legislators’ Iraq Index scores until the third period.  The most extreme difference 
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between the parties in Congress came from the period December 12, 2001 and January 28, 2002.  
During this period, there were no observations of Republican legislators while at the same time, 
there was a high mean Iraq Index score for Democratic legislators.   
 
Figure 8: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republican and Democratic Legislators 
 
The trend of increasing divergences between Democratic and Republican legislators is 
evident between political parties and branches as well, but the differences are much more 
pronounced in figures 9 and 10.  Figure 9 shows the differences in mean Iraq Index scores 
between Republicans and Democrats and figure 10 displays the differences in mean Iraq Index 
scores between the Legislative and Executive branches.  Where the differences in these figures is 
positive, the mean Republican or Executive branch Iraq Index score exceeded the mean 
Democratic or Legislative branch score; where the plotted difference is negative, the opposite is 
true.  The figures show that the consensus on Iraq that had existed prior to the terrorist attacks of 
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September 11, 2001 weakened over time, particularly after Jul 28, 2002.  There is one outlier, a 
difference of -3 that occurred in the period that ran from December 12, 2001 to January 28, 2002.  
During this time period, Democrats had a high mean Iraq Index and there were no observations 
of Republican legislators.  Therefore, this value should most likely be ignored as 
unrepresentative.   
The major splits between Democrats and Republicans and between officials of the 
Executive and Legislative branches occurred essentially at the beginning of the third period.  The 
divergence between Democratic and Republican legislators was much slighter in magnitude, and 
this split occurred later than it did for the Executive and Legislative branches and between 
Democrats and Republicans generally.  For Democratic and Republican legislators, the small  
divergence occurred about mid-way in the third period, a month or so after President Bush 
signed the Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq on October 16, 2002.  The lack of 
consensus in the third period was substantially greater between the Executive and Legislative 
branches than between Legislative Republicans and Democrats.   
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Figure 9: Iraq Index Score Differences between Republicans and Democrats 
 
Figure 10: Iraq Index Score Differences between the Executive and Legislative Branches 
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There was consensus between Democratic and Republican Legislators on the decision to 
use force against Iraq, and this consensus weakened very little during 2002, lasting even through 
the debate and passage of the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  Not until January 2003 did Republican and 
Democratic legislators begin to diverge significantly, and even then this difference is much less 
than the differences between other groups.  There had been consensus between Democratic and 
Republican government officials on the decision to use force against Iraq, but this consensus 
weakened after September 11, 2001 and disappeared after September 2002.  The Executive 
branch produced significantly higher Iraq Index scores than any other group, a trend that began 
on January 19, 2001 when President Bush began his first term and which continued through all 
three periods.  Despite this statistical significance, there existed a weak consensus between 
Congress and the Executive branch on Iraq Index scores until September 11, 2001.  This 
consensus grew even weaker beginning in spring and summer 2002.  By August 2002, the 
consensus was gone.  Consensus would improve slightly between all groups in the month or so 
just prior to the use of force as war became imminent, but as this discussion of Iraq Index scores 
shows, it would be a stretch to say that America’s support for the use of force was spoken “with 
one voice.”   
When the construct variable Iraq Index is disaggregated and frequencies of individual 
content variables are examined, the story of weakening consensus is somewhat more troubling.  
Content variables that measure officials’ discussion on the nature of the Iraqi threat show a near-
consistent pattern of widening disagreement between groups.  The Executive branch was nearly 
always more likely than the Legislative branch to express content variables related to the threat, 
often by factors greater than 2.  Generally, Republicans discussed the potential threat from Iraq 
more than Democrats, and the divergences between how often the political parties mentioned 
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those threats grew over the entire period of analysis.  This includes making allusions between 
Iraq and terrorism generally, explicitly referring to individual terrorists or groups of terrorists 
operating in Iraq, Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, and considering the possible 
invasion of Iraq as part of the war on terror.  The most frequent focus on the threat was from the 
Executive branch and, to a much lesser extent, from Republican legislators.  Democrats were 
more likely to discuss the potential costs of the war, but also to value those costs less than $100 
billion.  Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, few government officials discussed terrorist 
links with Iraq, either general or specific, and few argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction or even mentioned Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons.  After 9/11, the Executive 
branch began to repeatedly express these ideas, stressing the threat posed by Iraq.  It would seem 
that the attack of 9/11 was in many ways the beginning of the end for consensus on policy 
toward Iraq.   
Going to war takes the yea vote of only 218 Representatives, 51 Senators, and one 
president.  There is no legal requirement that the consensus for war be any wider than that.  
While it would be nice to have a war supported by a broad coalition of politicians with similar 
understandings of the situation and justifications favoring force—if there was little consensus on 
a decision to go to war, this does not make the war itself illegitimate, just contested.  The 
invasion of Iraq was not politically illegitimate, merely politically contested.  However, when 
certain groups of politicians are much more likely to repeatedly and consistently discuss the 
nature of the threat posed by the enemy, a threat that the Select Senate Committee on 
Intelligence unanimously considered to be “overstated” or “not supported by” secret intelligence 
 116 
regarding the threat146, then the lack of consensus on the decision to go to war against Iraq is 
more ominous.   
5.3 EXAMINING IRAQ WAR DELIBERATIONS BY LEVEL OF POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The sections above demonstrate statistically significant and dramatic increases in party 
polarization and a growing disconnect between the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government over the 27 months prior to the invasion of Iraq.  This section examines whether 
government speakers who were more accountable tended to make arguments favoring war more 
or less than government speakers who were less politically accountable.  Political accountability 
here refers to the directness with which an individual government elite faces pressures from the 
American public.  Under this definition, private sector experts who testify before a congressional 
committee are less accountable than a Senator who is elected to a 6 year term, who in turn is less 
accountable than a Representative, who must run for office every two years.   
I constructed two scales of political accountability for the types of government speakers 
who appear in the Iraq transcript data set.  The first accountability scale is an ordinal level 
variable that ranges from 1 to 7, with 7 denoting those government elites who have the greatest 
political accountability and 1 denoting those who have the least.  The group of government 
speakers with the highest level of political accountability are Representatives, who face election 
                                                 
146 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, at 14, available at 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/13jul20041400/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/s108-
301/sec1.pdf.   
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every two years.  The second highest group of government officials refers to the president and 
vice president, who face election every four years.  Senators have the lowest level of political 
accountability of all elected officials as they face election only every six years.  Groups of 
government elites who are not elected to their posts have much less political accountability than 
elected officials, but there are still differences amongst them.  Senate confirmation is an indirect 
way of holding political appointments accountable and those officials so vetted represent the 
most accountable of unelected government officials.  Notoriety can also lead to greater 
accountability.  Thus, the three groups with the lowest accountability are, in order of decreasing 
accountability, cabinet-level Executive branch staff who are appointed but do not undergo Senate 
confirmation, other appointed by unconfirmed Executive branch staff and congressional 
witnesses, and anonymous “senior officials.”  The second accountability scale collapses the 
seven categories of the first scale into three levels: elected officials, Executive branch officials, 
congressional witnesses & anonymous officials.  The table below summarizes these two political 
accountability scales.  Both accountability scales are ordinal level because higher level 
categories denote groups of more political accountable officials, but it is not known how much 
greater each group is in terms of accountability nor whether each step in accountability 
represents a consistent increase in accountability.   
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Accountability 
Scale (1 – 7)   
Accountability 
Scale (1 – 3)   
Description (Example) 
1 Anonymous “senior officials” 
2 
1 Congressional witnesses (former Israeli PM Benyamin 
Netanyahu) 
3 Executive branch staff who are not Senate confirmed (National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice) 
4 
2 Executive branch staff who are Senate confirmed (DCI George 
Tenet) 
5 Senators 
6 President & Vice-president 
7 
3 
Representatives 
  
Table 13: Political Accountability Scales, Ordinal level 
 
In examining the relationship between political accountability and the discussion of U.S. 
policy toward Iraq, I calculated correlation coefficients between political accountability using 
both the 3-tier and 7-tier scales and two other variables: the number of times a speaker used Iraq 
per observation as well as the Iraq Index score for each observation.  These correlation 
coefficients were first calculated using the set of those 1,699 observations where speakers had an 
identifiable position on policy toward Iraq.  I then repeated these calculations for a subset of 701 
observations where the speaker’s Iraq Index score was equal to or greater than one.  These two 
different calculations are given in tables 15 through 18.   
 
Pearson's Correlation 
Coefficient Kendall's Tau-b Spearman's Rho
Only those observations where the 
speaker had an identifiable position 
on the use of force against Iraq
-.106* -.099* -.118*
Only those observations where the 
speaker's Iraq Index score is ≥1 -.085* -.063* -.080*  
*Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 14: Correlating Iraq Index score with Political Accountability (1 to 7 scale) 
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Pearson's Correlation 
Coefficient Kendall's Tau-b Spearman's Rho
Only those observations where the 
speaker had an identifiable position 
on the use of force against Iraq
-.302* -.297* -.382*
Only those observations where the 
speaker's Iraq Index score is ≥1 -.355* -.369* -.488*  
*Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 15: Correlating Number of References to Iraq with Political Accountability (1 to 7 scale) 
 
Pearson's Correlation 
Coefficient Kendall's Tau-b Spearman's Rho
Only those observations where the 
speaker had an identifiable position 
on the use of force against Iraq
-.079* -.085* -.095*
Only those observations where the 
speaker's Iraq Index score is ≥1 -.067 -.046 -.053  
*Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 16: Correlating Iraq Index score with Political Accountability (1 to 3 scale) 
 
Pearson's Correlation 
Coefficient Kendall's Tau-b Spearman's Rho
Only those observations where the 
speaker had an identifiable position 
on the use of force against Iraq
-.326* -.310* -.372*
Only those observations where the 
speaker's Iraq Index score is ≥1 -.392* -.401* -.487*  
*Correlation significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 17: Correlating Number of References to Iraq with Political Accountability (1 to 3 scale) 
 
The calculated correlations between political accountability (on both scales) and Iraq 
Index score given in Table 15 and 17 are relatively small negative values with statistically 
significant results.  Government speakers with higher political accountability tended to be 
associated with slightly lower Iraq Index scores.  The calculated correlations between a speaker’s 
political accountability (on both scales) and the number of times that speaker used of the word 
Iraq is much stronger though still negative and also statistically significant.  Thus, government 
speakers with higher political accountability tended to be somewhat more make somewhat fewer 
 120 
mentions of the word Iraq per observation.  Said another way, those who spoke most about Iraq 
per observation tended to be speakers with the lowest political accountability.  This moderate 
linear relationship was stronger for those speakers who expressed some support for the use of 
force such that their observed Iraq Index score was one or greater.   
On the whole, the strength of the linear relationship between political accountability and 
Iraq Index scores appears to be weak at best.  The highest Pearson’s correlation coefficient for 
the linear relationship between political accountability and Iraq Index scores is -.106, which is 
low.  It would seem as if those government speakers with the lowest political accountability, 
anonymous government officials and congressional witnesses, were only weakly associated with 
higher Iraq Index scores.   
The strength of the linear relationship between political accountability and the number of 
times a speaker tended to refer to Iraq per observation was stronger than the correlation between 
political accountability and Iraq Index score, but was still only moderate.  The highest Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient for the linear relationship between political accountability and the number 
of times speaker referred to Iraq is -.392, which indicates a linear relationship of low to medium 
strength.  Higher numbers of references to Iraq per observation may be indicative of a higher 
focus on the problem of Iraq, and thus those speakers who were of the lowest political 
accountability may be said to be moderately associated with a somewhat higher focus on the 
problem of Iraq.   
While this examination of the relationship between political accountability, Iraq Index 
scores, and the number of references to Iraq has proved little, the findings do seem inconsistent 
with the notion that politically unaccountable political elites were more involved in the public 
case for the war against Iraq than were the elected political leaders.  While those with lower 
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political accountability tended to be more focused on the problem of Iraq and therefore mention 
Iraq more per observation and also tended to have slightly higher Iraq index scores, though this 
latter correlation tends to be very small.  Stronger linear associations between political 
accountability, Iraq Index scores, and references to Iraq per observation would have been more 
consistent with strong support for the use of force made by those of the least political 
accountability.   
5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This analysis has generated a more detailed description of differences in approach toward Iraq 
publicly expressed between the political parties and branches over the 27 months prior the 
invasion of Iraq.  As expected, government speakers generally increase their focus on Iraq and 
support for the use of force against Iraq over the 27 months of this content analysis.  The number 
of times government speakers public refer to Iraq per public appearance trends upwards, as do 
Iraq Index scores.  A more detailed look at the data illustrates that the Executive and Legislative 
branches and the political parties grew farther and farther apart from each other regarding the 
U.S. use of force against Iraq, especially in the final six months prior to the March 2003 
invasion.  This lack of consensus between the parties and branches belies the overwhelming 
congressional support for the Iraq Resolution, passed in October 2002, and the notion that 
Congress united behind the president to authorize the Iraq invasion.   
In the Senate, 98 % of Republicans joined 58 % of Democrats in supporting the Iraq 
Resolution.  In the House, Democrats were more divided, but 39 % of Democrats still joined 96 
% of Republicans to support the bill.  Oddly, the divergence between Republicans and 
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Democrats in supporting the use of force does not grow significantly until after the Iraq 
Resolution vote.  The consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches experienced 
steady by slight declines but peaked in the few months prior to the Resolution vote.  From July 
29, 2002 until the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, Executive branch speakers had 
significantly higher mean Iraq Index scores and were therefore much more supportive of war in 
their public statements than were legislators of both parties.  It would seem that president and 
Congress had very different perceptions of the circumstances surrounding the potential use of 
force against Iraq.   
For the entire 27 months analyzed, Democrats were less active than Republicans in 
mentioning Iraq in public appearances and usually had lower Iraq Index scores than their 
Republican counterparts.  In the last six months before the invasion, Republican speakers had 
Iraq Index scores 4.5 times higher than Democratic speakers.  In the same final six months, 
Republicans were 34.4% more likely to assert that Iraq possessed WMDs; 30.6 % more likely to 
allude to general links between Iraq and terrorism; 27.6 % more likely to mention that invasion 
was a method to disarm Iraq; 19.2 % more likely to mention 9/11 in the same public appearances 
where they mentioned Iraq; but only 1.3 % more likely to mention that Iraq had used chemical 
weapons in its past.  Although the percentages of frequency are somewhat lower for Republican 
legislators, generally they were more likely than Democratic legislators to make these same 
arguments, though the disparity between legislators of both parties tended to be much smaller 
than the divergence between Republicans and Democrats generally.  For their part, Democrats 
were 23.5 % more likely to call for further consideration of the costs and benefits of a potential 
invasion and 12.5 % more likely to advocate explicit authorization for the use of force from the 
United Nations Security Council.  Those government speakers with lower levels of political 
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accountability tended to generate slightly higher Iraq Index scores, though these higher Iraq 
Index scores were slight at best.  At the same time, those who mentioned Iraq the most per public 
appearance tended to be among the least political accountable.   
The picture that emerges from this data is hardly one of a war-mongering president and 
an acquiescent Congress.  While the Executive branch was more active than the Congress in 
making statements regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq, this is as likely due to the intense focus on 
the Presidency for leadership and the concomitant bully pulpit of the office.  Congress was 
certainly active and contained a diversity of opinions captured by this content analysis.  
However, Congress did seem to subject itself to witnesses with rather extreme views on the use 
of force against Iraq.  Congress’ overall support for the use of force trended upwards over the 
period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches, 
between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both branches 
increased greatly.  Nonetheless, Republican legislators were much less likely to make public 
statements supportive of the use of force against Iraq, and Democratic legislators were less likely 
still.  A few months before the debate the differences between Republicans and Democrats in 
both focus on Iraq and support for the use of force was statistically significant while the 
differences between the Executive and Legislative branches in both focus and support for the use 
of force was statistically significant.  The result was a breakdown in consensus regarding the use 
of force against Iraq, where Democrats can fairly blame the Republicans for their support of the 
president who was supportive of the invasion of Iraq and the president can rightly point out that 
Republicans were more supportive of his effort against Iraq and enough Democrats participated 
enough to enable the president’s policy.   
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6. MEASURING ASPECTS OF THE IRAQ WAR DEBATE OVER TIME: INDIVIDUALS 
AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Every member of Congress must make their own decision on the 
level of threat posed by Iraq and what to do to respond to that 
threat. I've said many times to my caucus that each member should 
be guided by his or her own conscience, free from others trying to 
politicize the issue or questioning others' motives…. You all know 
that we have a lot of differences on many issues. We disagree on 
many domestic issues. But this is the most important thing that we 
do. This should not be about politics. We have to do what is right 
for the security of our nation and the safety of all Americans. 
Representative Richard Gephardt, Oct. 2, 2002147  
We're having a very good, thoughtful debate as befits a matter of 
life and death, literally.   
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Oct. 8, 2002148 
 
6.1 ANALYZING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 
Recall that this analysis codes the content of transcripts of public governmental speech in order 
to identify potential differences in how political parties and the Executive and Legislative 
branches justified and debated the use of force against Iraq.  The evidence used by this analysis 
                                                 
147 George W. Bush, Dennis Hastert, and Richard Gephardt, "President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq 
Resolution,"  (Press Conference: The White House Rose Garden, Oct. 2, 2002). 
148 "Press Availability with Secretary of State Colin Powell Following His Meeting with U.S. Senate Leaders Re: 
Congressional Resolution on Iraq,"  (Washington, DC: Press Conference, Oct. 8, 2002). 
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consists of all Federal News Washington Transcripts of public speech, dated January 19, 2001 to 
March 19, 2003, where the words “Iraq” or “Iraqi” appears.  The electronic files of these 2,206 
transcripts consist of 158 MB of textual data.  It is difficult to estimate the equivalency of this 
data to pages, but estimates using standard conversion this is equivalent to between 16 and 72 
thousand pages of single-spaced, 12-point text.   
Clearly, these transcripts do not constitute exhaustive or bias-free evidence—there were 
no doubt many times where many important government speakers engaged in public deliberation 
but did not have their discussions recorded and transcripted by the Federal News Service.  
Moreover, it is without a doubt that much deliberation occurred behind closed doors and little if 
any public record can preserve this important element in the decision-making prior to the use of 
force against Iraq.  Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data in Chapters 4 and 5 must remain 
tentative.  This is particularly so if the implications drawn from this research are cross-referenced 
with an attempt to gauge public reaction or trying to determine why government decided to take 
the policy it did toward Iraq.   
Observations that were aggregated by party affiliation or branch of government can also 
be aggregated by individual government speakers’ identities.  This evidence can, in some cases, 
give an adequate basis for comparing individual speakers that participated in deliberations 
regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq over an extended period of time.  When the set of 1,699 
observations is aggregated by the identity of individual government speakers, the resultant 
aggregation consists of data drawn from 416 different individuals.  The average number of 
observations for each individual speaker was 4.08 while the median number of observations per 
speaker was only 1.  This means that half of the speakers in the dataset spoke about Iraq on only 
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a single occasion during the period from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003.  The histogram 
below graphically represents the distribution of the number of observations per speaker.   
 
Figure 11: Number of Observations (Appearances) for Government Speakers 
 
Many of the 416 individual government speakers spoke about Iraq in only a single 
appearance—211 of the speakers in the dataset have only a single observation.  The mean 
number of observations per speaker is 4.08, meaning that the average speaker appeared in about 
four separate transcripts, each of which preserved the speech of a single public appearance or 
occasions.  Those individuals who spoke about Iraq in the most number of observations were 
State Department spokesman and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher (131 
observations); White House spokesman Ari Fleischer (100 observations); President George Bush 
(99 observations); Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (85 observations); and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell (76 observations).  All other individuals had no more than 40 observations 
each.  Individual legislative speakers were well represented in the dataset, as thirty of the fifty 
most active speakers, i.e., those fifty individuals with the most total number of observations from 
the transcripts, were legislators.   
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The two most active speakers were White House spokesman Ari Fleischer and State 
Department spokesman Richard Boucher.  These two individuals will not be included in this 
analysis where the individual is the unit of analysis.  Fleischer and Boucher presented the official 
message in regularly-held press conferences.  As spokesmen, it was their role to present the 
message of others as consistently as possible.  During these press conferences, journalists 
peppered the two with questions and attempt to uncover nuance and changes in that official 
message.  As a result, Fleischer and Boucher were qualitatively different from other individual 
speakers in this analysis.  Even witnesses testifying before Congress had more discretion over 
the message and the degree of repetition with which they present it to the public.  Fleischer and 
Boucher were outliers for the purposes of the focus on individuals and were subsequently 
dropped from this analysis.149   
The number of observations that each individual speaker had is likely to have an impact 
on this analysis.  Not all speakers had high numbers of observations.  If a speaker with only a 
single observation had a high Iraq Index score, it was impossible to say with any reasonable 
certainty that this high score was the result of a consistent pro-war stance or was the result of 
chance.  Perhaps that single observation happened to involve the speaker making several 
arguments in favor of the use of force against Iraq, arguments that the speaker later softened or 
modified.  On the basis of a single such observation with a high Iraq Index score, one might 
                                                 
149 Observations from both Boucher and Fleischer were included with Executive branch where the unit of analysis 
was branch of government, however.  The observations of the two speakers were not outliers when compared with 
other Executive branch speakers.  Although Fleischer and Boucher were still bound by their role in the Executive 
branch hierarchy to present the official message, their Iraq Index scores and the frequencies of the content variables 
were not disproportionate and therefore did not skew the results for the group.  If anything, the data shows how 
remarkably good Fleischer and Boucher were at staying with their message regarding Iraq as both Fleischer and 
Boucher have similar mean Iraq Index scores with their bosses.  Richard Boucher had 131 observations and a mean 
Iraq Index score of 0.81 while Secretary of State Colin Powell had 76 observations and a mean Iraq Index score of 
1.38.  Ari Fleischer had 100 observations and a mean Iraq Index of 1.96 while President Bush had 99 observations 
and a mean Iraq Index score of 2.46.   
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conclude that that speaker was more supportive of the use of force than they might have actually 
been.  Similarly, a government speaker with a disproportionately large number of observations 
might have their mean Iraq Index score reduced by a high number of observations where the 
speaker mentioned Iraq but did not actually discuss the potential use of force.  The strength of 
conclusions is to a large degree drawn from comparisons among the most active government 
speakers, and therefore it is necessary to refer to both an individual’s mean Iraq Index as well as 
the number of observations of that particular speaker.  Thus, this analysis focused only on those 
individuals with two or more observations.   
Eleven individuals are noteworthy because while they represent only a single observation 
each, their support for the use of force in Iraq was disproportionately substantial.  While these 11 
observations represent only 0.6 % of all 1,699 total number of observations, each of these 11 
speakers had a disproportionately high Iraq Index score.  While these individuals did not 
contribute much to the debate on Iraq in terms of repeated appearances in the public debate 
advocating the use of force, they robustly supported the use of force those few appearance that 
they did have.  The average Iraq Index score for all observations was only 0.95 and the 
maximum Iraq Index score was eight.  These 11 noteworthy individuals’ average scores range 
from a low of 3 to a high of 7, much higher than the norm of any grouping of government 
speakers.  While a score of 3 out of 9 might seem low, the mean for all observations was only 
0.95.  Each of these 11 speakers with only one observation was in the 84.6 percentile, over three 
times the mean.  Table 19 lists these 11 speakers, their Iraq Index scores, and three other content 
variables associated with support for the use of force against Iraq and portrayal of the threat 
posed by Iraq.   
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Speaker's 
mean Iraq 
Index 
score  
Did the 
speaker 
support a 
unilateral use 
of force by the 
United States 
Against Iraq? 
Did the 
speaker 
equate the 
(potential) 
invasion of 
Iraq with the 
war on terror? 
Did the 
speaker 
allude to a 
connection 
between Iraq 
and terrorism 
generally? 
Did the 
speaker 
explicitly 
mention the 
September 11, 
2001 terrorist 
attacks? 
Eliot Cohen (Johns Hopkins University) 1 7.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) 1 5.00 Yes Yes No No 
Elliott Abrams (NSC Senior Director for 
Near East and North Africa) 1 4.00 No No No No 
Kim Holmes (Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Organization Affairs) 1 4.00 No No No No 
Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) 1 3.00 No Yes Yes Yes 
Richard Butler (former Executive 
Chairman, UNSCOMM) 1 3.00 No Yes Yes Yes 
Henry Kissinger (former Secretary of 
State and National Security advisor) 1 3.00 No Yes Yes Yes 
William Kristol (Editor, The Weekly 
Standard, former Chief of Staff, to VP 
Dan Quayle, and cofounder of the Project 
for the New American Century) 
1 3.00 No Yes Yes Yes 
Robert McFarlane (former National 
Security Advisor) 1 3.00 No Yes Yes No 
Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) 1 3.00 No No Yes No 
Jon Pistole (Deputy Assistant Director of 
Counterintelligence Unit, FBI) 1 3.00 No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 18: Notable Speakers with Single & High Iraq Index Scores 
 
Dr. Elliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee on October 2, 2002.  In this single appearance (i.e., a single observation), Dr. Cohen 
made a strong case in favor of the use of force against Iraq, including through a unilateral U.S. 
invasion, if necessary.  Cohen’s Iraq Index score was 7, a value that ties for the second highest 
Iraq Index score for all 1,699 observations.  Moreover, though Cohen appeared in only a single 
observation, his Iraq Index score of 13 was the highest mean Iraq Index for all individual 
speakers.  To be intellectually fair, it makes no sense to consider taking a mean from only a 
single observation even if the observation does entail a significant amount of advocacy for the 
use of force against Iraq.   
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Three of these 11 single-observations high Iraq Index score government speakers were 
legislators.  Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) was elected in November 2002 and therefore did 
not have much opportunity to contribute to the debate until after he assumed office on January 7, 
2003.  Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) chaired the House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee on September 12, 2002 when former Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu 
testified.  Netanyahu argued that the threat posed by Iraq was imminent, while Burton likened 
Netanyahu to Churchill warning of fascism’s rise during the 1930s.  Burtons Iraq Index score for 
this observation was only 3.  Netanyahu’s observation at this hearing had an Iraq Index score of 
6.  Senator Don Nickles R-OK) chaired the Senate Budget Committee and held a hearing 
February 11, 2003 where Secretary of State Powell testified.  Both Powell and Nickles had an 
Iraq Index score of 3 for their speech in this hearing.   
Another three of the 11 noteworthy speakers with high Iraq Index scores and only a 
single observation during the period January 2001 to March 2003 from the Executive branch.  
Elliott Abrams of the National Security Council spoke about Iraqi reconstruction and 
humanitarian issues at a White House special briefing held on February 24, 2003.  Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Kim Holmes held a briefing for foreign 
media on February 27, 2003 in which he discussed U.S. efforts before the United Nations 
Security Council.  Holmes argued in favor of the passage of a resolution that would explicitly 
hold Iraq to not be in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1441 as well as arguing that failure to 
pass a resolution would demonstrate that the UN lacked resolve and credibility in 
nonproliferation.  Holmes’ observation scored an Iraq Index score of 3.  The third Executive 
branch official, FBI Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Jon Pistole, testified before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 18, 2003, one day before the outbreak of war 
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with Iraq.  Pistole’s testimony was directed at the readiness of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Unit 
in the event that Iraq attempted retaliation on U.S. soil either directly or by enlisting “people 
sympathetic to the Hussein regime.”  In the course of his testimony, Pistole scored an Iraq Index 
score of 3.   
The remaining four individual speakers with high Iraq Index scores in only a single 
observation were not part of government but nonetheless contributed to the debate on Iraq as 
congressional witnesses.  Each of these four congressional witnesses’ had Iraq Index scores of 3.  
William Kristol testified before the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the House 
international Relations Committee on May 22, 2002.  Richard Butler, Henry Kissinger, and 
Robert McFarlane each testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Butler testified 
on July 31, 2002 while Kissinger and McFarlane testified on September 25 and 26, 2002, 
respectively.  That so many low-observation high-Index-score-speakers were congressional 
witnesses raises the possibility that pro-invasion congressional witnesses were an important 
element in encouraging government’s hawkish stance toward Iraq.  Although an assessment of 
the strength of this decidedly pro-war testimony in affecting Congress’ decision-making is 
beyond the scope of this analysis, it may nonetheless constitute a useful starting point for a future 
research project on how congressional witnesses impact government decision-making.  This 
might include research into the politics behind determining which potential witnesses to invite 
before a congressional committee and how such decisions affect policy debate.   
By limiting the analysis of individual speakers to those with two or more observations, 
the number of individuals drops from 416 to 202.  As the median and mode number of 
observations is only 1, by focusing on observations with two or more observations, the analysis 
will minimize the likelihood of including those least active government speakers who might 
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score disproportionately high Iraq Index scores.  At the same time, it does not reduce the number 
of individuals to such a small number that the sample is no longer representative of the public 
debate regarding Iraq.  Thus, this analysis confined itself to the 202 individuals with 2 or more 
observations—this subset of individuals is hereinafter referred to as the most active individuals 
for these individuals’ participation in the public debate regarding the war in Iraq.   
The large majority of the 202 speakers most involved in the public deliberation regarding 
U.S. policy toward Iraq were legislators.  This is to be expected, as there are 535 legislators, 
many of whom are active in public discourse.  Although the Executive branch consists of a large 
number of potential speakers, only the relatively few officials near the top of Executive branch 
hierarchy are able or willing to participate in public deliberation.  Simply put, many more 
members of Congress talked about Iraq than did officials of the Executive branch, but this is due 
to obvious sample bias.  Figure 12 illustrates the relative proportions of legislators, Executive 
branch officials, and congressional witnesses.   
 
Figure 12: Most Active 202 Speakers by Branch of Government 
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The political affiliations of these 202 speakers are generally known—nearly three-
quarters of the speakers have a generally-known and verifiable political party membership.  Of 
the 27 % unknown political affiliation group, a few speakers are congressional witnesses such as 
academics or area experts who do not have publicly disclosed party affiliations, but most of the 
“unknown” group consists of mid- to high-level Executive branch officials whose party 
affiliation could not be verified.  Most of these Executive officials might easily be presumed to 
be Republicans because they were appointed to political positions by the Republican President 
George Bush.  In such cases where party affiliation could not be verified, individual speakers 
were coded as “unknown party affiliation,” however.   
 
Figure 13: Most Active 202 Speakers by Political Affiliation 
Party 
Affiliation
Observations
% of total 
Observations
Number of 
active 
individuals
Average 
Observations per 
individuals
Republican 629 50.2% 69 9.1
Democrat 382 30.5% 78 4.9
Unknown 243 19.4% 55 4.4
Totals 1254 202  
Table 19: Observations Produced by the Most Active 202 Speakers According to Political Affiliation  
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Figure 13 displays the party affiliations of the most active government speakers on the 
topic of Iraq.  Considering the most active 202 individual speakers, Democrats are slightly more 
represented in the total number of speakers with 78 speakers who contributed to the public 
debate as opposed to 69 Republican speakers.  However, approximately half of these individuals 
who had unknown political party affiliations served in government within the Executive branch.  
These 69 individual Republicans contributed many more total observations than did the 78 
Democrats, however, as table 19 shows.  In fact, Republican active speakers contributed almost 
twice the number of observations than did Democrats.  Some of this may be due to sample bias.  
Republicans held the Executive branch as well as majorities in Congress during much of the 
period of analysis.  President Bush and his closest advisors were nearly all Republicans.  
Republicans dominated the House throughout 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Republicans also 
controlled the Senate during most of this same period, except for seven months from May 2002 
to January 2003, where the Democratic majority was handed control due to the defection of a 
Republican Senator.  However, outlier Republicans such as White House Spokesman Ari 
Fleischer who contributed 100 observations were removed from this analysis to minimize the 
bias.  With this in mind, it may also be indicative that Democrats were not as active publicly as 
were Republicans in discussing Iraq.  In chapters 4 and 5, this analysis demonstrated how 
Democrats tended not to support the use of force against Iraq nor discuss the threat from Iraq and 
possible connections between Iraq and terrorism as much as did Republicans.  Democrats did, 
however, tend to discuss the potential costs of the war as well as to stress that those costs would 
likely be less than $100 billion.  As shown here, Democrats may have made these arguments 
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more often than Republicans but individual Democratic government officials were not nearly as 
active as were individual Republican government officials.150   
6.2 ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
The Iraq Index score is a construct variable that measures the number of public justifications in 
favor of the use of force against Iraq.  A higher Iraq Index score indicates stronger support for 
the use of force against Iraq.  Theoretically, the value of an Iraq Index score can range as high as 
9.  In practice, the mean Iraq Index score tends to be much lower because the scores of many 
observations of the same speaker were averaged to calculate this variable and most government 
speakers had variability in their public discussion on Iraq.  The highest mean Iraq Index score of 
any speaker was only 4.5, a score that belonged to Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.  Einhorn’s two observations, in which his Iraq Index scores per 
observation were 5 and 4, come from testimony he gave before the Senate in March 2002.  The 
second highest mean Iraq Index score of 4.0 belonged Richard Spertzel, a former UNSCOM 
biological weapons inspector who testified before Congress three times in March and September 
2002.  Spertzel’s Iraq Index scores for his three observations were 3, 4, and 5.   
Summary statistics for the 202 most active government speakers are displayed in table 20 
below.  The table demonstrates that more individual Democrats participated in the public debate 
regarding Iraq than did individual Republicans.  However, Republicans contributed nearly twice 
                                                 
150 This suggests to me that even if my coding instrument had been designed to include some anti-war content 
variables, I would not have found those arguments much in the public debate.  Democrats were not active enough 
and anti-war Democrats were even more rare to have made inclusion of anti-war content variables worth the time 
necessary to code them.   
 136 
as many observations as did Democrats.  The average Republican Iraq Index score was over 
three times as high as the average Democratic speaker’s score.  The typical score of both parties 
was zero, but Republicans still tended to make the coding instrument’s arguments supporting the 
use of force much more frequently than did Democrats.  Republican speakers also had more 
variation in their Iraq Index scores than did Democrats.  Testing for statistical significance 
between the parties was not done here, as the focus in this chapter is on the individual speaker.   
Political 
affiliation
Number 
of 
speakers
Number of 
observations
Mean Median St. Dev. Mode Min Max
Republican 69 629 1.33 1 1.71 0 0 8
Democrat 78 383 0.4 0 0.88 0 0 4
Unknown 55 242 1 0 1.49 0 0
Total 202 1254 0.98 0 1.52 0 0 8
Iraq Index Score calculated from Observations
6
 
Table 20: Mean Iraq Index Scores of Most Active Speakers by Political Affiliation 
 
On average, Democrats had lower mean Iraq Index scores than their Republican 
counterparts in government.  The Democrat with the highest mean Iraq Index score as well as the 
highest maximum Iraq Index score for a single observation was Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-
CT).  Lieberman generated a total of 11 observations, each of which involved a public 
appearance between January 14, 2002 and March 17, 2003.  Only one of these 11 observations 
had an Iraq Index score of 0.  Lieberman had a consistently high Iraq Index score—as early as 
January 14, 2002, Lieberman gave a speech at Georgetown University with an Iraq Index score 
of 3.  In his Georgetown speech, Lieberman asserted explicitly that U.S. national security 
interests supported an invasion of Iraq and argued that efforts against Iraq were part of the war 
against terrorism, saying, “…this war against terrorism will not be over until Saddam Hussein is 
removed from power in Iraq.”  Lieberman’s index scores range from 0 to 4 with a mean of 2.45.  
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The next highest Democrat has a mean Iraq Index score of only 1.5.  Lieberman’s strong support 
for the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq was a major factor which led to Lieberman’s 
defeat in the 2006 Connecticut primaries.151  After losing the Democratic primary, Lieberman 
won reelection to his Senate seat as an independent.   
Lieberman’s Iraq Index scores were so consistently high and were unlike any other 
Democratic speaker.  They were, however, very similar to the means and distributions of 
President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney Iraq Index scores.  Vice President Cheney 
contributed 13 observations, with Iraq Index scores ranging from 0 to 6, and a mean Iraq Index 
score of 2.62.  Only two of Cheney’s Iraq Index scores were 0.  Bush’s scores also ranged from 0 
to 6.  President Bush had 99 observations, many more than Cheney and Lieberman, and a mean 
Iraq Index score of 2.46.  President Bush’s mean was lowered slightly due to 18 observations 
where Bush had Iraq Index scores of 0.  To indicate how similar Lieberman’s support for the war 
in Iraq was to that of senior Republican government officials, table 21 displays recalculated 
descriptive statistics if all 11 of Lieberman’s observations were subtracted from other Democrats 
and added to that of Republicans—the mean Iraq Index scores of both parties increased from 
those means reported in table 20.   
                                                 
151 Dan Balz, Lamont Leads Lieberman by 13 Points in New Poll: Democratic Senator Shifts Strategy for Tuesday's 
Primary as Antiwar Foe Soars (Aug. 4, 2006), at A5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/03/AR2006080300597.html.  Also, see 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/ctexitpoll.pdf.   
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Political 
affiliation
Number 
of 
speakers
Number of 
obs
Mean Median St. Dev. Mode Min Max
Republican 70 640 1.35 1 1.71 0 0 8
Democrat 77 372 0.34 0 0.8 0 0 4
Iraq Index Score calculated from Individuals' observations
What happens if you remove Lieberman's 11 observations of Iraq Index scores                                          (3, 0, 
2, 3, 2, 3, 3,3, 3, 1, 4) and add them to the set of Republican scores?
 
Table 21: Iraq Index Scores of Active Speakers by Political Affiliation, Adjusted for Senator Lieberman 
 
Three Democrats among the top thirty Democrats’ mean Iraq Index scores are 
particularly noteworthy.  As candidates for the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination, they 
have faced inquiries into their early support for the Iraq war.  As the war has become unpopular 
amongst the Democrat party faithful, Senators Joe Biden (D-DE), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), and 
John Edwards (D-NC) all faced criticism during the campaign for voting in favor of the 2002 
authorization to use military force against Iraq, as well as their initial support for the war.  Some 
anti-war activists tried to pressure Biden and Clinton into “apologizing” for their early support 
for the war.  Edwards did repeatedly apologize for his support for the war since a November 13, 
2005 op-ed in the Washington Post.152  Both Biden and Clinton grew critical of the war as the 
war became increasingly unpopular amongst Democratic primary voters, but both initially 
limited their criticism to how the Bush Administration has handled the war.  Clinton did say in 
2007 that had she known that intelligence reports were going to be proven false, she would not 
have voted to authorize the war in October 2002, and has even introduced legislation to repeal 
the 2002 Iraq war Resolution.153   
                                                 
152 John Edwards, "The Right Way in Iraq," The Washington Post Nov. 13, 2005. 
153 Carl Hulse and Patrick Healy, "Clinton Proposes Vote to Reverse Authorizing War," The New York Times May 4, 
2007. 
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The Democrats with the top thirty mean Iraq Index scores are listed in table 22.  Senator 
Hillary Clinton’s mean Iraq Index score is the second highest mean Iraq Index score of all 
Democratic speakers with two or more observations.  Other candidates for the 2008 Democratic 
presidential nomination have lower mean Iraq index scores.  Senator John Edwards’ mean score 
was 1.0 while the mean scores of Senators Biden and Dodd were 0.48 and 0.38, respectively.  
However, Biden and Dodd each spoke about Iraq much more often than Senator’s Clinton and 
Edwards, who each only had two observations.  Biden had 29 and Dodd had 8 observations.  
While Biden’s and Dodd’s average are less than Clinton’s, these averages are disproportionately 
low due to a higher number of public appearances where Biden and Dodd discussed Iraq but did 
not make arguments where they advocated the use of force.  Dodd had only a single appearance 
where his Iraq Index was greater than 0, and for that observation, his score was 3.  Biden had 18 
observations where he had Iraq Index scores of 0.  Dodd and Biden’s maximum Iraq Index 
scores of 3 are higher than the highest scores of both Clinton and Edwards.   
Moreover, Clinton and Dodd are the only of the two who did not mention 9/11 in their 
public appearances where they mentioned Iraq while Senator Edwards mentioned the 9/11 
attacks in both observations.  With this in mind, Clinton may have less support for the war to 
“repudiate” or reverse, and may therefore have less support for the invasion for which she needs 
to apologize.  Biden, Dodd, and Edwards withdrew from the campaign, 154 but Clinton has 
continued to face serious criticism from challenger Senator Barak Obama (D-IL) for her decision 
to vote for the 2002 Resolution that authorized the Iraq war.   
 
                                                 
154 Biden and Dodd dropped out of the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination campaign on January 4, 2008.  
Shailagh Murray, "Biden, Dodd Withdraw from Race," Washington Post Jan. 4, 2008.  John Edwards dropped out 
on January 30, 2008.  Elisabeth Bumiller et al., "Edwards Is Out," The New York Times Jan. 31, 2008. 
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Observations Speaker Role
Total number of 
references to Iraq Mean Min Max
11 Lieberman, Joseph (CT) Senator 138 2.45 0 4
2 Clinton, Hillary (NY) Senator 3 1.50 1 2
7 Lantos, Tom (CA) Representative 43 1.29 0 3
11 Gephardt, Richard (MO) Representative 32 1.27 0 4
4 Andrews, Robert (NJ) Representative 13 1.25 0 4
3 Schumer, Charles (NY) Senator 26 1.00 0 3
2 Edwards, John (NC) Senator 30 1.00 0 2
2 Pomeroy, Earl (ND) Representative 5 1.00 0 2
6 Kerry, John (MA) Senator 13 0.83 0 4
8 Tenet, George
Director of Central Intelligence 
testifying before Congress 122 0.75 0 3
4 Bayh, Evan (IN) Senator 12 0.75 0 3
3 Allen, Thomas (ME) Representative 12 0.67 0 2
3 Sherman, Brad (CA) Representative 12 0.67 0 2
18 Levin, Carl (MI) Senator 128 0.61 0 4
7 Corzine, Jon (NJ) Senator 9 0.57 0 3
4 Engel, Eliot (NY) Representative 25 0.50 0 2
4 Wyden, Ron (OR) Senator 9 0.50 0 1
2 Carnahan, Jean (MO) Senator 7 0.50 0 1
2 Deutsch, Peter (FL) Representative 4 0.50 0 1
2 Larson, John (CT) Representative 4 0.50 0 1
2 Sanchez, Loretta (CA) Representative 10 0.50 0 1
2 Schiff, Adam (CA) Representative 4 0.50 0 1
2 Snyder, Vic (AR) Representative 10 0.50 0 1
29 Biden, Joseph (DE) Senator 288 0.48 0 3
5 Byrd, Robert (WV) Senator 42 0.40 0 1
8 Dodd, Christopher (CT) Senator 43 0.38 0 3
34 Daschle, Tom (SD) Senator 175 0.35 0 3
6 Akaka, Daniel (HI) Senator 63 0.33 0 2
6 Skelton, Ike (MO) Representative 32 0.33 0 1
3 Berger, Samuel
former National Security Advisor 
testifying before Congress 63 0.33 0 1  
Table 22: Iraq Index Scores of the 30 Highest Scoring Democrats  
 
Republican Iraq Index scores were generally higher than those of Democrats.  Table 23 
displays the Republicans with the top 30 Iraq Index scores.  While the highest mean Iraq Index 
score belonged to Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN), he contributed only 3 observations.  
President Bush and Vice President Cheney have very high mean Iraq Indexes, particularly when 
the number of observations is taken into account.  Cheney’s mean Iraq Index is 2.62 while 
President Bush’s is 2.46.  Many of the highest Republican Iraq Index score means are senior 
Bush Administration officials with relatively few appearances but significant maximum Iraq 
Index scores, such as Ambassador Negroponte and notable neoconservatives Richard Perle and 
Douglas Feith.  Senator John McCain had a high mean Iraq Index score, particular for a 
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congressional Republican.  McCain is currently the 2008 Republican Presidential Nominee.  On 
McCain’s campaign website, he has stressed his role in criticizing post-invasion plans—more 
troops and more counterinsurgency—but is conspicuously silent as to just how supportive of the 
invasion of Iraq he was in 2002 and early 2003.155   
Observations Speaker Role
Total number of 
references to Iraq Mean Min Max
3 Coleman, Norm (MN) Senator 7 3.00 1 6
13 Cheney, Richard Vice President 67 2.62 0 6
2 Chambliss, Saxby (GA) Representative & Senator 4 2.50 2 3
99 Bush, George President 690 2.46 0 6
5 Frist, Bill (TN) Senator 8 2.00 1 3
3 Crouch, J.D.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Int'l Security 
Policy 16 2.00 1 4
25 Wolfowitz, Paul Deputy Secretary of Defense 530 1.84 0 7
6 Perle, Richard
Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory 
Committee testifying before Congress 101 1.83 0 4
6 Feith, Douglas
Nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
testifying beofre Congress 166 1.67 0 6
4 Hyde, Henry (IL) Representative 16 1.50 1 3
2 Graham, Lindsey (SC) Representative 8 1.50 0 3
85 Rumsfeld, Donald Secretary of Defense 1013 1.47 0 8
9 McCain, John (AZ) Senator 76 1.44 0 3
15 Negroponte, John Ambassador to the United Nations 160 1.40 0 5
76 Powell, Colin Secretary of State 1382 1.38 0 6
24 Lott, Trent (MS) Senator 130 1.33 0 6
3 Bolton, John
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security 21 1.33 1 2
3 Specter, Arlen (PA) Senator 5 1.33 0 3
12 Rice, Condoleezza National Security Advisor 161 1.25 0 6
4 Saxton, James (NJ) Representative 19 1.25 0 4
8 Brownback, Sam (KS) Senator 73 1.00 0 5
7 Sessions, Jeff (AL) Senator 20 1.00 0 4
5 Allen, George (VA) Senator 24 1.00 0 3
5 Roberts, Pat (KS) Senator 26 1.00 0 3
2 Black, Cofer
Department of State Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism 2 1.00 1 1
2 Royce, Edward (CA) Representative 12 1.00 0 2
2 Schlesinger, James
former Secretary of Defense and Energy and CIA 
Director testifying before Congress 39 1.00 0 2
28 Lugar, Richard (IN) Senator 316 0.96 0 4
16 Warner, John (VA) Senator 76 0.94 0 4
10 Shays, Christopher (CT) Senator 44 0.90 0 6  
Table 23: Iraq Index Scores of the 30 Highest Scoring Republicans  
 
The speakers whose party affiliation is unknown have the highest mean Iraq Index scores, 
as well as the highest variation in those averages.  These speakers were typically Assistant 
Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, military leaders, and congressional witnesses.  Table 
                                                 
155 "On the Issues: Strategy for Victory in Iraq,"  (JohnMcCain.com, 2008).  For a view of McCain that is more in 
line with the data shown in this analysis, see Mark Benjamin, "John McCain's Real War Record," Salon.com Jan. 17, 
2008. 
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24 lists seven individuals who had the highest mean Iraq Index scores.  These seven individuals 
all have the distinction of having only a relatively few number of observations, but have high 
Iraq Index scores.  All of these individuals testified before Congress.  Each of these individuals 
contributed to Congress strong advocacy for the use of force in the few appearances they had.  
Thus, Congress was the recipient of strong advocacy for the use of force against Iraq by the 
experts.   
The most active speaker of unknown party affiliation was General Dick Myers, who 
became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 2001.  General Myers contributed 14 
observations, and had a mean Iraq Index of 1.07.  Although Myers’ highest Iraq Index score was 
4, most of his observations’ scores were 0.  Myers had a regular habit of appearing with 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at press conferences and Defense briefings.  Although 
Myers mentioned Iraq at several of these press conferences, he rarely made arguments regarding 
the use of force against Iraq.   
 
Observations Speaker Role
Total number of 
references to Iraq Mean Min Max
2 Einhorn, Robert
Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies testifying before Congress 203 4.50 4 5
3 Spertzel, Richard
Former Head of UNSCOM Bio-Weapons 
Inspection testifying before Congress 292 4.00 3 5
6 Wolf, John
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation 
testifying before Congress 82 3.67 2 5
3 Kay, David
former Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector for 
UNSCOM testifying before Congress 225 3.67 2 5
2 McInerney, Thomas
retired general and former Assistant Vice Chief of 
Staff testifying before Congress 66 3.50 3 4
2 Netanyahu, Benjamin
former Israeli Prime Minister testifying before 
Congress 51 3.00 0 6
2 Collins, Joseph
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Stability 
Operations testifying before Congress 26 2.50 2 3  
Table 24: Iraq Index Scores of the 7 Highest Scoring Speakers with Unknown Political Affiliations 
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Speakers of unknown party affiliation argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction (nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons) and tended to justify the use of force 
against Iraq for the purposes of disarming the country of those weapons.  Nearly a quarter of 
these speakers mentioned international law to bolster this argument.  Such speakers also tended 
to argue that the use of multilateral force would be the preferred means of disarming the regime.  
These speakers also frequently mentioned that Iraq had shown the willingness to use chemical 
weapons in its past and also to argue that U.S. security interests were threatened by Iraq’s 
continued possession of such weapons.   
When deliberating policy toward Iraq, government speakers discussed several policy 
goals to be achieved through an invasion of Iraq.  Disarmament was by far the most expressed 
policy goal of government speakers when they publicly deliberated regarding Iraq policy.  
Speakers were likely to mention the disarmament of Iraq 5.6 times more than speakers were 
likely to use humanitarian justifications to support the war.  Speakers were also 2.8 times more 
likely to mention disarmament of Iraq than they were to use the phrase “regime change.”  The 
five individual speakers who used the justification of disarmament the most number of times 
were President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Senator Trent Lott (R-MS).  Together, these five speakers accounted 
for 37 % of all uses of the disarmament justification during the entire 27 months of analysis.   
Table 25 displays the percentage frequencies that individual speakers presented several 
arguments in favor of the use of force against Iraq.  The upper portion of the table concerns the 
argument that that invasion of Iraq would serve the goal of disarming Iraq while the lower 
portion concerns the justification that invading Iraq would serve humanitarian goals.  President 
Bush uses disarmament to justify the use of force against Iraq almost three-quarters of the time 
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he mentions Iraq (74.7 %).  The frequencies that government speakers make justifications in 
favor of force can be ranked, allowing for comparison between speakers.  For example, President 
Bush made the argument that force would disarm Iraq’s WMDs slightly more than every other 
public appearance, a rate higher than 91.5 % of all government speakers.  While a few other 
speakers in this dataset make the disarmament justification more often per number of 
observations than President Bush, each of those persons had much fewer observations.  With 
such a few number of appearances, such speakers were not nearly as active as President Bush 
was in making the disarmament argument regarding Iraq.  Similarly, several speakers make the 
humanitarian intervention argument more often in percentage terms than President Bush, but 
such speakers had many fewer observations.   
Number of uses of 
the disarmament of 
NBC weapons 
justification Number of observations
% Use of 
disarmament 
justification per 
observation
Percent rank within all 
speakers for the 
disarmament 
justification
Wolf, John (Assistant Secretary of State for Nonprolifer 6 6 100.0% tied for 100th percentile
Bush, George 74 99 74.7% 91.5%
Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT) 7 11 63.6% 86.0%
Lugar, Richard (IN) 15 28 53.6% 83.0%
Negroponte, John (Ambassador to the U.N.) 8 15 53.3% 82.5%
Levin, Carl (MI) 9 18 50.0% 66.1%
Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense) 11 25 44.0% 64.6%
Cheney, Richard 5 13 38.5% 60.7%
Rice, Condoleezza 4 12 33.3% 49.2%
Number of uses of 
the humanitarian 
intervention 
justification Number of observations
% Use of 
humanitarian 
intervention 
justification per 
observation
Percent rank within all 
speakers for the 
humanitarian 
intervention justification
Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of Defense) 6 25 24.0% 94.5%
Armitage, Richard (Deputy Secretary of State) 2 9 22.2% 93.5%
Bush, George 24 112 21.4% 93.3%
Gephardt, Richard (MO) 1 11 9.1% 8850.0%
Hagel, Chuck (NE) 1 11 9.1% 88.5%
Rice, Condoleezza 1 12 8.3% 87.0%
Negroponte, John (Ambassador to the U.N.) 1 15 6.7% 85.6%
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 5 85 6% 84.5%  
Table 25: Disarmament of NBC weapons and Humanitarian Intervention Compared 
 
Considering these two tables together allows enables a researcher to compare the relative 
weights that various speakers put on the goals of disarmament over humanitarian intervention.  
President Bush was more likely to argue for invasion for the goal of disarmament than 
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humanitarian intervention by a factor of 74 to 24, or 3.1.  Secretary of State Colin Powell was 
more likely to mention disarmament as a goal than humanitarian intervention by a factor of 27 to 
3, or 9.  Of the speakers listed on table 25, Paul Wolfowitz had the lowest disarmament to 
humanitarian intervention justification ratio, 11 to 6, or 1.83.  President Bush used the 
justification of humanitarian intervention more than any other government speaker, but this was 
only 21.4 % of his appearances while he gave the disarmament justification 74.7 % of his 
appearances.  For all individual government speakers, humanitarian intervention does not as 
significant a policy goal as the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as the 
arguments used the public debate demonstrate.   
The transcripts indicate that government speakers were generally supportive of the policy 
goal of disarmament and were less supportive of humanitarian intervention is mentioned as a 
justification much less often.  Only seven out of 202 speakers used the humanitarian intervention 
justification more often than they gave the specific justification of disarming Iraq’s nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapons.  Though two of these seven speakers did mention the goal of 
disarmament generally, only four of them ever mentioned that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction.  None of these six speakers were nearly as heavily involved in the public debate as 
were the individual speakers given in the tables above.  While Bush, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the 
others discussed above generated dozens of public appearances in this dataset, the seven speakers 
who gave the humanitarian justification more had no more than 2 public appearances, as the 
table below shows.   
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Speaker Observations
Number of uses of the 
humanitarian justification
Number of uses of the 
disarmament justification
Collins, Joseph (Deputy Secretary of Defense 
for Stability Operations) 2 2 1
Beers, Charlotte (Undersecretary of State for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs) 2 2 1
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) 3 2 0
Pomeroy, Earl (ND) 2 1 0
Larson, John (CT) 2 1 0
Sanchez, Loretta (CA) 2 1 0
Einhorn, Robert (Senior Advisor, CSIS) 2 1 0  
Table 26: Speakers who argued Humanitarian Intervention More Frequently Than Disarmament 
 
In addition to arguing about what goals that an invasion of Iraq might further, U.S. 
government officials’ public statements showed differences in how they characterized the level 
of threat posed by Iraq.  The speakers in the table below are examples of important government 
leaders take from the 202 most active speakers with the greatest number of observations.  To 
illustrate these government leaders’ activity in the public debate, the table lists the frequency that 
these leaders produced public speech with six content variables that coded the nature of the 
threat posed by Iraq.  Many government officials mentioned the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 in the same public appearances where they mentioned Iraq, but some speakers tended to 
do so much more frequently than others.  For example, Vice President Cheney mentioned 9/11 
and Iraq together 12 of 13 times, putting him in the near-93rd percentile of all active speakers in 
the likelihood of doing so.  In any given public appearance, Cheney and Deputy Secretary of 
State Armitage were more likely to characterize the threat from Iraq as imminent than 95 % of 
all other speakers, even though President Bush made this assertion an absolute number of times 
more than any other speaker.   
 147 
# % % Rank # % % Rank # % % Rank # % % Rank # % % Rank # % % Rank
Armitage, Richard (Deputy 
Secretary of State) 9 4 44.44% 59.70% 2 22.22% 97.00% 6 66.67% 85.50% 4 44.44% 93.50% 3 33.33% 94.00% 2 22.22% 67.10%
Biden, Joseph (D-DE) 29 8 27.59% 42.20% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 13 44.83% 61.60% 2 6.90% 74.60% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 79% 4 13.79% 59.70%
Bush, George 99 58 58.59% 81.20% 6 6.06% 93.00% 78 78.79% 90.00% 49 49.49% 94.00% 26 26.26% 92.00% 56 56.57% 95.50%
Cheney, Richard 13 12 92.31% 92.90% 2 15.38% 95.50% 11 84.62% 90.50% 10 76.92% 99.50% 4 30.77% 93.50% 10 76.92% 97.50%
Daschle, Tom (D-SD) 34 8 23.53% 36.60% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 8 23.53% 41.70% 1 2.94% 73.60% 2 5.88% 82.00% 4 11.76% 58.20%
Dodd, Christopher (D-CT) 8 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 
31.7%
1 12.50% 94.50% 3 37.50% 56.20% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 70% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 79% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 56%
Gephardt, Richard (D-MO) 11 7 63.64% 82.90% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 1 9.09% 36.30% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 70% 2 18.18% 90.00% 4 36.36% 82.50%
Kennedy, Edward (D-MA) 10 5 50.00% 60.30% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 6 60.00% 83.00% 1 10.00% 76.60% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 79% 1 10.00% 57.20%
Levin, Carl (D-MI) 18 1 5.56% 32.10% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 4 22.22% 40.70% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 70% 2 11.11% 84.50% 3 16.67% 62.10%
Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT) 11 7 63.64% 82.90% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 8 72.73% 88.50% 2 18.18% 82.50% 4 36.36% 97.30% 5 45.45% 86.00%
Lott, Trent (R-MS) 24 13 54.17% 79.80% 1 4.17% 92.50% 15 62.50% 85.00% 4 16.67% 80.50% 7 29.17% 93.00% 5 20.83% 66.60%
Lugar, Richard (R-IN) 28 11 39.29% 55.20% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 7 25.00% 42.20% 1 3.57% 74.10% 2 7.14% 83.00% 5 17.86% 63.60%
McCain, John (R-AZ) 9 2 22.22% 36.10% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 5 55.56% 80.50% 2 22.22% 84.50% 1 11.11% 84.50% 1 11.11% 57.70%
Powell, Colin 76 31 40.79% 58.20% 3 3.95% 92.00% 40 52.63% 80.00% 8 10.53% 77.60% 8 10.53% 84.00% 21 27.63% 72.10%
Rice, Condoleezza 12 8 66.67% 84.40% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 5 41.67% 58.70% 1 8.33% 75.60% 2 16.67% 88.50% 4 33.33% 75.10%
Rumsfeld, Donald 85 53 62.35% 82.40% 3 3.53% 91.50% 48 56.47% 81.50% 26 30.59% 87.00% 10 11.76% 86.00% 3 3.53% 56.80%
Tenet, George (DCI) 8 7 87.50% 92.40% 0 0.00% tied with lowest 90% 3 37.50% 56.20% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 70% 0 0.00%
tied with 
lowest 79% 2 25.00% 68.10%
Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary 
of Defense) 25 16 64.00% 83.90% 2 8.00% 93.50% 14 56.00% 81.00% 2 8.00% 75.10% 7 28.00% 92.50% 11 44.00% 85.00%
Equates the (potential) 
invasion of Iraq with the war 
on terror
Explicitly mentions U.S. 
national security interests to 
justify invasion of Iraq
Mentions Iraq's past use of 
chemical weapons
Asserts that Iraq possesses 
WMDs
Number of 
observations
References the              
9-11 attacks
Characterizes Iraqi threat as 
imminent
 
Table 27: Prominent Active Speakers and Threat-oriented Content Variables 
 
The government speakers in table 27 also show great variability in the tendency to equate 
an attack upon Iraq with the “war on terrorism.”  Generally speaking, members of the Executive 
branch tended to more frequently equate an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror, though this 
was not true for State Department officials.  Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman is also an 
interesting example of a rare Democrat who equates an invasion of Iraq with the war on terror 
nearly as often as the most ardent pro-war Executive branch Republicans such as President Bush 
or Vice President Cheney.  Moderate Republican Richard Lugar and Democrats Tom Daschle 
and Joe Biden were much less likely to suggest that an attack on Iraq would be part of the war on 
terror—what is more, Lugar, Daschle, and Biden were less likely to mention Iraq actually 
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possessed WMDs or that Iraq had used chemical weapons while they never once asserted that 
Iraq posed an imminent threat.   
6.3 ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE OVER TIME 
This chapter has been focused on individual speakers as the unit of analysis.  Clearly speakers 
did not participate equally in the deliberations regarding the use of force against Iraq.  There are 
more observations of prominent political leaders in the executive branch, such as President 
George Bush and the most senior members of his administration, than there are of congressional 
leaders of both parties.  With speakers that had a certain level of activity, it is possible to chart 
changes in an active individual speaker’s Iraq Index score for public appearances over time.  
This approach is only suitable for those speakers a relatively high number of total observations 
over a long length of time, implying a sustained and relatively high level of public participation 
from January 2001 to March 2003.  Graphing an individual’s Iraq Index score from January 2001 
to March 2003 shows change in the level of support in favor of the use of force in Iraq as 
measured by public statements.   
Democratic Senators Joseph Biden, Tom Daschle, Carl Levin, and Joseph Lieberman and 
Democratic Representative Richard Gephardt had a sustained level of public deliberation.  So too 
did President George Bush and other administration officials such as Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Secretaries Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice, Ambassador John Negroponte, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.  
Republican Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE), 
Richard Lugar (R-IN), Trent Lott (R-S), John McCain (R-AZ), and John Warner (R-VA).  I 
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focused on these individuals because they all had a high enough number of observations to 
demonstrate changes in the Iraq Index score over the 27 time periods.  Each of these periods is 
roughly one month.  Figures 14, 15, and 16 are graphs that show changes in a speaker’s mean 
Iraq Index score over each public appearance from when President Bush took office to the time 
of the March 19, 2003 invasion of Iraq.  The figures illustrate that speakers generally increased 
their level of public support for the use of force against Iraq, somewhat so after September 11, 
2001 but particularly just prior to the October 2002 congressional authorization for the president 
to invade Iraq.   
 
Figure 14: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative Democrats 
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Figure 15: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Bush Administration Officials 
 
Figure 16: Changes over time in Iraq Index Scores for Prominent Legislative Republicans and Senator 
Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) 
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In Chapters 4 and 5, the government’s pre-war public deliberations were divided into 
three periods.  The first period corresponded to January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001 and was 
characterized by relatively little government attention paid to Iraq (as measured by the number of 
times the word Iraq or Iraqi is referred to in the transcripts) and very little public discussion 
regarding the use force against Iraq.  Although 5 observations made during this first period 
involved some advocacy of the use of force, none of the prominent administration officials or 
legislators in the above tables made any public advocacy for the use of force.156  Nonetheless, 
several administration officials, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed the policy of 
regime change in Iraq and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mentioned Iraq’s past use of 
chemical weapons several times.  The Iraq Index scores for several speakers, notably Senators 
Chuck Hagel and Carl Levin appear to undergo increases during the later months of this period, 
but this is the misleading result of the extrapolated trend line—both Hagel and Levin generated 
consistent Iraq Index scores of zero during this first period.   
The second period of analysis covered September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002.  More 
government speakers discussed Iraq as the total number unique speakers, observations, and the 
number of references to Iraq increased in this period.  However, the amount of attention the 
typical speaker devoted to the subject of Iraq remained relatively stable during this period—the 
number of references made by each speaker per public appearance did not increase much, from 
6.35 to only 6.96.  In this second period, some speakers began to advocate for the use of force.  
                                                 
156 During the first period, only 5 observations had an Iraq Index score of greater than 0.  Four of these observations 
were made by four witnesses in a March 1, 2001 hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  The four witnesses were Anthony Cordesman from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey, Richard Perle of the American Enterprise 
Institute and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, and Morton Halperin, a Senior Fellow at 
the Council on Foreign Relations.  Department of Defense Spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley made the fifth 
observation on June 26, 2001 during a Pentagon Briefing.  These five Iraq Index scores ranged from 1 to 3.   
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More government speakers began to give more justifications for the use of force against Iraq, 
raising the mean Iraq Index score from 0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in this period.  Republicans 
and Democrats generally had identical Iraq Index scores in this period because speakers of both 
parties tended to have low Iraq Index scores.  One noteworthy speaker, Senator Joseph 
Lieberman, tended to generate Iraq Index scores much higher than his colleagues of either party 
fairly consistently for all of his observations.  This is made evident when Senator Lieberman’s 
mean Iraq Index scores displayed in Figure 14 are compared with the scores of Bush 
administration officials in Figure 15.  To facilitate easier comparison, Senator Lieberman’s line 
was reproduced with Republican Legislators in Figure 16.  Only a spike in the Iraq index score 
of Senator Carl Levin (who had a single observation with a score of 4 on October 22, 2001—thus 
his average during this period is uncharacteristically high) exceeded Lieberman’s scores.  From 
December 2001 onward, Senator Lieberman’s Iraq Index score never went below three.  At the 
same time, Lieberman’s Iraq Index score averaged 2.45, a remarkably consistent and high level 
of support for the invasion of Iraq—the fourth highest of any elected official.  In the third period, 
Lieberman’s Iraq Index scores were more similar to those of Republican speakers such as 
President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld than to Democratic speakers, as figure 16 
demonstrates.   
The third period covers July 29, 2002 to the date the invasion of Iraq began, March 19, 
2003.  This period was characterized by a high amount of government attention to Iraq, as 
measured by the dramatic increase in the total number of references in the transcripts to Iraq, the 
high mean number of references to Iraq by each speaker in each public appearance, as well as a 
high level of public justification for the use of force by each speaker.  Donald Rumsfeld had 4 of 
the 10 highest Iraq Index scores per observations during this period, with an Iraq Index score of 
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2.02 for this period alone.  Senator Lieberman had the eighth highest Iraq Index score during this 
period, which helped keep his average high—as high as Bush Administration officials.  
Republican Senators Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar generated scores much more like those of 
the typical Democrat, as figure 16 shows.  Hagel’s highest mean Iraq Index score during the third 
period was only 1.0, which he repeated several times shortly after the congressional votes that 
authorized the use of military force against Iraq.  Lugar’s mean scores peaked twice, shortly after 
the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and again at the beginning of the third period, but 
Lugar’s highest mean Iraq Index scores were no higher than 1 for any time period.  Other 
Republicans, such as President Bush and his spokesman and the Secretaries of Defense and State 
generated disproportionately high Iraq Index scores during the third period, illustrated by the 
trend lines in Figure 15.   
6.4 INVOCATION OF 9/11 AND SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
Some speakers were more likely to invoke the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in their public 
deliberations regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq.  The government transcripts on Iraq allow 
analysis of those speakers who referred to the terrorist attacks when discussing Iraq.  It is 
important to note that reverse is not true—because the transcripts that were collected and coded 
referred to Iraq, it is not possible to see whether government speakers who referred to 9/11 were 
more or less likely to discuss Iraq.  This is simply because all of the coded transcripts by 
definition of the coding instrument include a government speaker that used the word Iraq or one 
of its forms at least once per transcript.  Table 28 lists ten speakers who have a high number of 
observations as well as are more likely most other speakers to mention the attacks of 9/11.  Vice 
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President Richard Cheney mentioned the September 11th attacks in 12 of his 13 appearances—
only speakers with two or fewer observations mention 9/11 in the same appearances that they 
also discussed Iraq with a higher frequency rate as Vice President Cheney.   
# % % Rank
Cheney, Dick 13 12 92.31% 92.90% 2.62
Tenet, George (DCI) 8 7 87.50% 92.20% 0.75
Rice, Condoleeza 12 8 66.67% 84.80% 1.25
Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense) 25 16 64.00% 84.30% 1.84
Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT) 11 7 63.64% 83.30% 2.45
Gephardt, Richard (D-MO) 11 7 63.64% 82.90% 1.27
Rumsfeld, Donald 85 53 62.35% 83.20% 1.47
Bush, George 99 56 56.57% 80.80% 2.46
Gilman, Benjamin (R-NY) 9 5 55.56% 80.80% 0.78
Lott, Trent (R-MS) 24 13 54.17% 79.80% 1.33
Mean 
Iraq 
Index 
Score
Number of 
observations
References to the 9-11 
attacks
 
Table 28: Active Speakers that Often Refer to the 9/11 Attacks 
 
As table 28 shows, those active government speakers who were most likely to refer to the 9/11 
attacks in public appearances where they discussed Iraq were Vice President Cheney and 
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.  One might expect Tenet to discuss Iraq and 9/11 
within the same congressional hearing as Tenet’s supervisory role over the intelligence 
community enabled him to inform Congress on many subjects.  It is unclear why the Vice 
President so often discussed 9/11 and Iraq in the same public appearances.  However, so many 
other Bush Administration officials were also likely to do the same that it may be an indication 
that doing so was intentional—as part of demonstrating to the American people that an attack on 
Iraq was part of the war on terror.   
A casual glance at the above table might lead one to conclude that invocation of the 
attacks September 11 and support for the use of force against Iraq are linearly related.  Indeed, 
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there is a positive correlation between the percentage of time that a speaker mentions September 
11 and that speaker’s mean Iraq Index score, albeit only a slight one.  The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is 0.153 (p = .03) while Spearman’s ρ is 0.143 (p = .041) and Kendall’s τb is 0.112 (p  
.35).  In a model that assumes that the percentage a speaker mentions 9/11 is linearly related to 
overall mean Iraq Index score, the effect of percentage frequency of mentioning 9/11 on a 
speaker’s mean Iraq Index score for the period January 2001 to March 2003 is fairly weak.  The 
coefficient of determination for the equation below is so low as to be almost negligible (R2 = 
.23).  This level of explanatory weakness in the model is likely due to the fact that the dependent 
variable is an average that varies in precision depending on the number of observations each 
speaker has.  This regression still has some value, however, as it demonstrates that mentioning 
9/11 and mean Iraq Index score do have a small positive relationship.  In other words, if a 
speaker mentioned 9/11 often, they were likely to have a slightly higher Iraq Index mean.   
Estimated mean Iraq Index Score = 0.427 x (% frequency speaker mentions 9/11) + .535 
 
Table 29: Regression of 9/11 References on Mean Iraq Index Scores 
 
Government speakers mentioned Osama bin Laden between January 2001 and March 
2003 in government transcripts where the word Iraq appeared much less frequently than they 
mentioned the terrorist attacks of September 11.  67.5 % of government speakers never 
mentioned Osama bin Laden in any of the public appearances where they mentioned Iraq.  Only 
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65 different government speakers in this database mentioned bin Laden at least once in the Iraq 
transcripts; those speakers who did mention bin Laden the most frequent percentage of their 
public appearances were not usually the most active speakers, nor were they typically speakers 
with the highest Iraq Index scores, as Table 11 indicates.  Vice President Cheney and Senator 
Kennedy are the most active of these speakers with 13 and 10 appearances, respectively.   
# % % Rank
Edwards, John (D-NC)
2 2 100.00% tied with top 2% 1.00
Tenet, George (DCI) 8 6 75.00% 96.90% 0.75
James Woolsey (former DCI) 3 2 66.67% 95.40% 3.00
Cheney, Richard 13 8 61.54% 94.90% 2.62
Kennedy, Edward (D-MA) 10 4 40.00% 88.40% 0.10
Perle, Richard (Chairman of the 
Defense Policy Board Advisory 
Committee)
6 2 33.33% 82.90% 1.83
Wolfowitz, Paul (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense) 25 7 28.00% 81.90% 1.84
Lieberman, Joseph (D-CT) 11 3 27.27% 81.40% 2.45
Biden, Joseph (D-DE) 29 6 20.69% 78.80% 0.48
Lugar, Richard (R-IN) 28 5 17.86% 76.80% 0.96
Rumsfeld, Donald 85 15 17.65% 76.30% 1.47
Number of 
observations
References to        
Osama bin Laden
Mean 
Iraq 
Index 
Score
 
Table 30: Prominent Speakers who in the Same Appearance Frequently Mentioned Osama bin Laden and 
Iraq 
 
It is worth noting that many of those government speakers who mentioned bin Laden most often 
were intelligence professionals and Democrats.  Twelve of the top 25 speakers with the highest 
percentage references to bin Laden were Democrats, while only five were Republicans (the last 
eight were of unknown political affiliation).  It could be that some Democrats might have 
mentioned Osama bin Laden in an effort to try and focus foreign policy efforts against al Qaeda 
rather than to include Iraq as a possible target for military force.  This is mere speculation, 
however, as no arguments against the use of force were included in the coding instrument.   
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More active speakers, such as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or Secretary of State 
Powell, did mention bin Laden a greater number of times than other speakers, 15 and 11 times 
respectively, but because they had so many other public appearances, the percentage appearances 
in which they mentioned bin Laden were comparatively much lower.  For example, President 
Bush mentioned Osama bin Laden only once out of 99 observations, a percentage of only 
slightly better than 1 %.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did so in 15 of 85 observations, but this 
is only 17.6 % of his public appearances.   
There is not a statistically significant relationship between speakers’ mean Iraq Index 
scores and the percentage frequency of references to bin Laden at the 95 % confidence level.  
Bivariate regression analysis performed on the percentage references to bin Laden and mean Iraq 
Index scores also failed to identify a statistically significant relationship.  It is therefore 
impossible to conclude that those speakers who mentioned bin Laden more also made more 
public justifications for the use of force against Iraq.  This is not terribly surprising because most 
of the speakers did not mention Osama bin laden when they mentioned Iraq, or if they did, they 
generally did so infrequently.   
6.5 SUMMATION ON INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Prior to September 11, 2001, few government officials even mentioned the possibility of using 
force against Iraq.  Those few who did give public justifications for the use of force were 
congressional witnesses and a single Executive branch official.  Legislators of both parties did 
not make public justifications favoring the use of force against Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11.  After September 11, 2001, Republican legislators began to focus more on Iraq—there 
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was a small but statistically significant increase in the tendency to support the use of force 
amongst Republican legislators.  Republican Senators Lugar and Hagel were representative of 
this slight increase.  The majority of the support for the use of force against Iraq after 9/11 came 
from Republicans in the Executive branch, such as that generated by President Bush and Vice 
President Cheney, and also, to a lesser extent by Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld and 
Ambassador John Negroponte.  Democratic Legislators generally did not increase their support 
for the use of force until late July, 2002, when discussion of the use of force against Iraq 
increased within all groups of government officials, Republicans, Democrats, Legislators, and 
Executive branch officials.  One notable exception to these trends was then-Democratic Senator 
from Connecticut Joseph Lieberman.  Lieberman’s support for the use of force began shortly 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was always much higher than his fellow Democrats and 
often more likely to discuss the use of force more than many Republicans.   
Government officials who most frequently referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks tended to 
advocate in their public statements the use of force against Iraq more strongly.  This relationship 
is slight but significant, but a small increase in the frequency of mentioning the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 leads to a substantial increase in Iraq Index score.  What is true of speakers who invoked 
9/11 is not true of speakers who mentioned Osama bin Laden.  Those government officials who 
tended to mention Osama Bin Laden the most, however, tended to have lower Iraq Index 
scores—that is, such speakers tended to discuss the possibility of using force against Iraq less 
often and with fewer justifications.  These two findings might seem contradictory, but perhaps 
those who mentioned bin Laden did so in order to advocate more effort in Afghanistan as 
opposed to Iraq, or to advocate more emphasis on the known terrorist threats rather than on a 
potential nexus with terrorism in Iraq.   
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In this chapter, the focus has been on individual government officials and how their 
support for the war changed over time.  This use of individuals as the unit of analysis has 
reinforced other findings regarding the political parties and branches of government.  
Republicans were much more outspoken in their public support for the war.  Congress was much 
less active than the Executive branch in advocating support for the use of force, even in the last 
few months prior to the start of the invasion of Iraq.  The Executive branch was more active in 
participating in public discussions, more focused on the problem of Iraq, and more supportive of 
the use of force throughout the third period.  For some individuals, namely Democratic Senator 
Joseph Lieberman and Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, their discussions of Iraq were atypical 
of their own political parties.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
In war, truth is the first casualty. 
Aeschylus 
 
7.1 WHY UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE FROM 2001 TO 2003 MATTERS 
Five years have passed since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.  In those five years, the decision 
to invade Iraq has faced growing criticism and frustration from the American public and 
government officials.  Since January 2006, a majority of Americans have considered the war 
against Iraq to be a mistake.157  In the November 2006 congressional midterm elections, 
Democrats took control of the House and won a narrow 51-49 majority in Senate.  Many, 
including President Bush, have viewed the Democratic victory as resting in large part upon 
widespread disaffection and frustration with the Iraq war.158  The continuing efforts in Iraq are 
likely to have some impact on the 2008 Presidential election as well.159  As the decision to go to 
war against Iraq in 2003 has become increasingly unpopular and may now be used as a political 
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wedge issue useful against political opponents, a revisit to the debate regarding Iraq prior to the 
invasion is in order.  This thesis is first and foremost a descriptive study of how government 
officials justified the war in Iraq.   
That there remains interest in how the war was discussed is also demonstrated by ongoing 
investigations within government.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is expected to 
soon release a report on whether Bush Administration officials’ public statements regarding Iraq 
accurately reflected the intelligence reporting that had been prepared on Iraq.160  A team of 
researchers at the Center for Public Integrity has issued its own analysis of the public statements 
of eight key Bush Administration officials, concluding that they made at least 935 false 
statements about the national security threat posed by Iraq.161  This analysis of what government 
official said regarding the use of force against Iraq allows a more systematic and inclusive 
characterization of the public record, by including both Executive and Legislative branch 
officials and being conducted in a manner that allows relative comparisons between groups of 
officials in how often they made their assertions regarding war with Iraq.  This descriptive 
analysis allows interested persons the opportunity to determine whether what they think they 
remember about the debate regarding the use of force against Iraq is accurate.   
After all, revisionism regarding the decision to invade Iraq has already taken place.  In 
November 2007, former Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove claimed that the Bush Administration 
was opposed to holding the 2002 Iraq Resolution vote before the Congress adjourned for the 
2002 congressional elections because such timing “made it too political.”162  Within that same 
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week, Bill Clinton, stumping for his wife Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, said that he 
had “opposed Iraq from the beginning.”163  Both statements seem to contradict what Americans 
think they remember about the debate that ended in March 2003 when the Iraq war began.  If 
truth is the first casualty of war, then there is value in attempting to rediscover lost truth through 
systematic analysis of the public record.   
Eventually, the private record regarding the war in Iraq will be available for analysis, and 
perhaps at that time this analysis of the public case for war might be compared with the internal 
decision-making process.  This may happen sooner rather than later in the United Kingdom, 
where the Information Commissioner ruled that the British government had to release private 
and confidential cabinet ministers’ notes regarding the Iraq war decision.  Although the opinion 
pertains to the United Kingdom, the aspects of the legal support for the release of ministerial 
notes could easily apply in the United States, namely public interest in transparent and 
accountable policy- and decision-making.164  Information Commissioner Richard Thomas wrote:  
In this case, in respect of the public debate and controversy 
surrounding the decision to take military action in Iraq, the process 
by which the government reached its decision adds to the public 
interest in maximum transparency.  This is reflected by, among 
other matters, the controversy surrounding the [British] Attorney 
General’s legal advice on the legality of military action and the 
ministerial resignations which took place at that time.  It is also the 
case that there is a widespread view that the justification for the 
decision on military action in Iraq is either not fully understood or 
that the public were not given the full or genuine reasons for that 
decision.165 
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There are three significant ways that this research project might be broadened through 
additional research.  The first way involves a media content study.  Having established that there 
were significant divergences of opinion regarding support for the use of force, it remains to be 
seen whether the media reported that there existed a diversity of opinions amongst government 
leaders regarding the use of force against Iraq.  How well did the major media outlets 
communicate the differences in opinion on Iraq war policy to the public?  Did the media report 
that the Congress was relatively lukewarm on the use of force against Iraq when compared to the 
Executive branch, and that Democrats were even more ambivalent on the war?  The second 
possible avenue for further research involves investigation into the relationship between the 
public deliberation of government officials and public opinion favoring the use of force against 
Iraq.  It might be possible to construct a model of government influence on public opinion in the 
run up to war using this Iraq data and opinion poll data.  Alternatively, the influence may run in 
the opposite direction, from public opinion to government, or involve additional factors.  A third 
possibility for further research involves examining the relationship between the public 
government deliberation examined here and the actual decision-making process that resulted in 
the use of force against Iraq.  Of course, examining this question, both historical and policy-
oriented in nature, will require knowledge involving government documents and interviews that 
will not be accessible for some decades to come.  As the behind-the-scenes information on Iraq 
becomes available, later research can return to this question and better address it.   
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7.2 FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS 
This research project involved a content analysis of the debate over the use of force 
against Iraq that occurred as government officials discussed the potential use of force from the 
beginning of George W. Bush’s presidency in January 2001 to the actual invasion of Iraq on 
March 19, 2003.  The results of this content analysis have supplied a historical and political 
frame of reference to identify how the debate actually occurred.  The content analysis has 
enabled relative comparisons between how the political branches of government and political 
parties supported the use of force against Iraq.  Additionally, the analysis made it possible to 
compare those individual government officials who were most involved in the public 
deliberation of the war.  On the basis of this empirical analysis, one can now evaluate the relative 
differences between groups’ political claims as well as evaluate some of the competing claims 
and potential revisionism regarding the Iraq war debate.  Using this analysis, it is possible to 
determine if what we think we remember about the debate regarding the invasion of Iraq 
comports with what actually was said, and which various arguments regarding war in Iraq were 
more dominant in the public deliberation produced by government.  Perhaps more importantly, 
this analysis has provided an empirical basis for a relative comparison between political parties, 
branches of government, and between some individuals, in how often they stressed various 
arguments in public.   
Under the U.S. Constitution, foreign policy is shared between the political branches of 
government.  Though the Founders envisioned Congress as the principle seat of government 
policy making, since World War II the modern presidency has generally increased its foreign 
policy power with respect to Congress.  No changes have been made to this constitutional 
arrangement; the primary reason the president dominates Congress in foreign affairs is political 
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rather than structural.  Since World War II, Congress has often seen fit to acquiesce to 
presidential foreign policies including the use of military force abroad.  The widely shared 
perception that the president’s unity of purpose and speed of dispatch are required to counter 
modern threats to U.S. national security has also contributed to Executive power augmentation.  
Thus, Congress is often in the position of responding to presidential activity and has often been 
content to defer to the Executive branch’s foreign policy.   
Despite this position, the Constitution’s structurally-imposed shared foreign policy power 
and checks and balances remain in effect.  In short, Congress has not lost its role in foreign 
policy due to some presidential “adverse possession” of constitutional authority over foreign 
affairs.166  Under the U.S. Constitution, the decision to use U.S. military force is a result of 
consultation, deliberation, and collective decision-making despite the lack of a clear demarcation 
between power that is shared and power that is solely executive or legislative in nature.  Even 
though the Constitutional arrangement between presidential and congressional foreign policy 
authority remains imprecise, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on clear 
congressional authorization.  Both the Congress and the president participated in the decision as 
well as the public debate on whether or not to use force.   
The 2002 Iraq Resolution was widely touted as bipartisan and overwhelmingly supported 
by Congress.  With the affirmative vote, President Bush proclaimed that, “America speaks with 
one voice.”167  The Executive and Legislative branches had engaged in discussion and debate 
concerning Iraq long before and even after this 2002 Resolution vote.  This analysis has shown 
that significant differences existed between how the political parties and the Executive and 
Legislative branches supported the war.  This lack of consensus was present despite the 2002 
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Resolution vote and the divergence between groups widened much further in the last few months 
prior to the March 2003 invasion.  Congress was most active in discussing Iraq prior to and 
during the formal consideration of the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  However, Congress had been 
increasing its focus on Iraq, as demonstrated by legislators’ increasing number of references to 
Iraq per transcript.  Thus, Congress increased its focus on Iraq consistent with its role of 
considering important national security matters and national policy.  The data of this analysis 
showed dramatically increasing numbers of observations as well as increases in focus and public 
advocacy for the use of force over the entire period of analysis.   
The data obtained through this content analysis has revealed a story of increasing 
preoccupation with Iraq and increasing divergences between Democrats and Republicans and 
between Legislators and Executive branch officials in how the use of force against Iraq was 
justified.  The debate that occurred reflected a decrease in consensus on the use of force against 
Iraq.  Instead of coming together, political differences between the branches and the parties 
diverged.  This divergence along party lines, while regrettable in the gravest matters concerning 
war and peace, might be anticipated given increases in party polarization over the last decades.  
What was unexpected is that the data also shows that there was a lack of consensus between the 
Executive and Legislative branches as well.  The divergences between the Executive and 
Legislative branches were greater than those between Republicans and Democrats.  Thus, while 
Republicans in Congress did generally tend to support the president in the use of force, they did 
not match the Executive branch in the frequency with which President Bush and other Executive 
branch officials made assertions favoring war.   
The content analysis was based on transcripts dated from January 19, 2001 to March 19, 
2003.  The first date corresponded to the date President George W. Bush was sworn in and the 
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second corresponded to the date that the U.S. invasion of Iraq began.  These twenty-seven 
months were divided into three separate periods to facilitate analysis.  During the first period, 
from January 19, 2001 to September 11, 2001, there was little discussion of the possible use of 
force against Iraq.  Out of 182 observations made during this time period, the mean Iraq Index 
score was merely 0.05 and the maximum Iraq Index score was 3.  Government officials who 
mentioned Iraq tended to do so 6.35 times per public appearance.  The second period covered 
September 12, 2001 to July 28, 2002.  During this second period, there was a mixed amount of 
public discussion concerning the use of force against Iraq.  While the mean number of references 
to Iraq increased only slightly over the first period, from 6.35 to 6.96, the mean Iraq Index score 
increased from 0.05 in the first period to 0.39 in the second.  While the typical government 
official’s average focus on Iraq increased negligibly, officials’ expressed level of support for the 
use of force against Iraq increased by a factor of nearly eight.  Executive branch officials were 
much more likely than Legislators to make arguments favoring the use of force against Iraq.  
This increase was almost entirely due to Executive branch officials making arguments in favor of 
the use of force.  The maximum Iraq Index score increased from 3 in the first period to 5 in the 
second.   
The third period of this content analysis concerns transcripts from July 29, 2002 to March 
19, 2003.  During this period, the attention that speakers paid toward Iraq was greatly increased.  
When discussing Iraq, the number of references to Iraq per public appearance nearly doubled, 
from 6.96 in the second period to 12.2 in the third period.  The distributions of references to Iraq 
made by speakers in this third period are statistically higher than the distributions of references 
made by speakers in the earlier two periods.  Speakers in the third period also had a significantly 
higher Iraq Index score.  After mean Iraq Index scores of 0.05 and 0.39 in the first two periods, 
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respectively, the mean Iraq Index score in the third period was 1.25.  This score is higher than 1, 
indicating that the typical government speaker who referred to Iraq at least once in a public 
appearance between also tended to give at least one reason (typically more) why armed force 
should be used against Iraq.  Executive branch officials tended to have much higher Iraq Index 
scores than Legislators, with scores of 1.93 to 0.61, respectively.  Republicans tended to have 
much higher Iraq Index scores than Democrats, with scores of 1.79 to 0.40, respectively.  The 
maximum Iraq Index score for the third period was 8, as opposed to only 3 and 5 in periods one 
and two, respectively.  The differences in these scores indicate the lack of consensus between 
political parties and branches of government regarding the use of force against Iraq.   
More of the observations of government officials concerned public statements made by 
Executive branch officials.  However, this may be a result of inadvertent sample bias—the 
Washington Transcripts database may preference Executive branch public statements over those 
of Legislators.  Nonetheless, the content and frequency data does support the notion that 
Executive officials had a higher focus on Iraq than did Legislators.  This was the case at the 
beginning of the Bush Administration in January 2001 up to the invasion.  With few exceptions, 
Executive branch speakers mentioned Iraq more per public appearance than did Legislators.  
Congress’ public support for the use of force against Iraq did increase after September 11, 2001, 
but starting in January 2002, Legislative branch speakers consistently produced lower Iraq Index 
scores than did Executive branch officials.  By late summer 2002, when Congress began hearings 
on how to confront Iraq, the Executive branch had statistically higher Iraq Index scores than 
Congress.  Congressional activity and congressional focus on Iraq did not peak until July-
August-September 2002, which corresponds to the months just before Congress formally 
considered and hurriedly passed the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  Despite the passage of the Iraq 
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Resolution, support for the use of force in Congress was significantly lower than that publicly 
advocated by the Executive branch.   
Congress was far less active than the Executive branch and far less publicly supportive of 
the use of force against Iraq.  The highest Iraq Index scores of all speakers were produced by 
Executive branch officials—of 394 observations of Iraq Index scores greater than 2, 274 scores 
(70.0 %) came from Executive branch.  Only 91 of the 394 observations of Iraq Index scores 
greater than 2 were made by Legislators (23.1 %).  Congress’ comparative lack of public 
advocacy in favor of war with Iraq should not be equated to congressional acquiescence in the 
president’s war, however.  Congress’ Iraq Index scores did trend upwards over all 27 months of 
the analysis.  Thus, Congress was likely moving toward expressing more support for the use of 
force.  Moreover, Congress generally decides for itself which witnesses to invite and consider—
thus even if the testimony congressional witnesses informed Congress in such a way as to cause 
an increase in the Iraq Index scores of congressional speakers, Congress itself had a significant 
role in this development.  Twenty-nine observations of the 394 with Iraq Index scores higher 
than 2 were congressional witnesses, and those congressional witnesses who had a low number 
of observations but had disproportionately high Iraq Index scores, such as Johns Hopkins 
professor Eliot Cohen and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were discussed 
elsewhere.   
The high water mark of congressional activity and focus on Iraq was immediately prior to 
the formal consideration of the 2002 Iraq Resolution.  This supports with the idea that Congress 
increased its focus on Iraq consistent with its role of considering important national security 
matters and national policy.  Congress ultimately chose to pass the Resolution, an outcome 
clearly within its Constitutional powers.  The data show dramatically increasing observations as 
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well as increases in focus and public support for the use of force over the entire period of 
analysis; this means Congress was increasingly involved in the process, was knowledgeable that 
the use of force was a likely outcome of the passage of the Resolution, and generally was in 
favor of the use of force being an outcome.  It is disingenuous to ignore congressional 
participation in the constitutional decision-making process of authorizing the use of force and 
accuse the Congress of passivity.  Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, did vote strongly 
in favor of delegating the authority to use force to the president, but Congress did so with a 
degree of public support for the use of force much lower than that possessed by Executive branch 
officials.  This lack of consensus in the third period was substantially greater between the 
Executive and Legislative branches than between Legislative Republicans and Democrats.  That 
the parties were and are polarized is often touted by the press.  That Congress was not as 
supportive of the Executive branch’s war prior to the invasion was not.   
Few government officials gave public justifications for the use of force prior to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.  Those who did were Republican officials in the Executive branch 
of government, among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Legislators of either 
political party did not make public justifications favoring the use of force against Iraq prior to the 
9/11 attacks.  Also prior to September 11, 2001, the differences between Democrats and 
Republicans were negligible.  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Republican legislators began to 
focus more on Iraq as demonstrated by a small but statistically significant increase in the 
tendency to support the use of force.  Still, the majority of the support for the use of force against 
Iraq after 9/11 came from Republicans in the Executive branch, such as that generated by 
President Bush and, to a lesser extent by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary 
Rumsfeld.  Democratic Legislators generally did not increase their support for the use of force 
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until late July 2002, when discussion of the use of force against Iraq increased significantly 
within all groups of government officials, Republicans, Democrats, Legislators, and Executive 
branch officials.  These differences indicate a lack of consensus regarding aspects of the use of 
force against Iraq, despite the expressed congressional support for the president’s Authorization 
to Use Military Force, passed in October 2002.  One notable exception to these trends include 
then-Democratic Senator from Connecticut Joseph Lieberman, whose support for the use of 
force began shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was always much higher than his fellow 
Democrats.  Lieberman was often more likely to discuss the use of force more even than many 
Republicans.   
Six months before the invasion, Republican speakers had Iraq Index scores 4.5 times 
higher than Democratic speakers.  Over the period of those final six months before the invasion 
of Iraq, Republicans were significantly more likely than Democrats to assert that Iraq possessed 
WMDs (34.4 % more likely, to be exact); more likely to allude to general links between Iraq and 
terrorism (30.6 %); more likely to mention that invasion was a method to disarm Iraq (27.7 %); 
and more likely to mention 9/11 in the same public appearances where they mentioned Iraq (19.1 
%).  These differences are not as large when only Legislative branch Democrats and Republicans 
are compared, but they nonetheless point in the same direction.  Republican legislators were 
more likely than Democratic legislators to assert that Iraq possessed WMDs (11.2 %); more 
likely to allude to general links between Iraq and terrorism (16.4 %); more likely to refer to the 
disarmament of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (11.3 %); more likely to mention that 
invasion was a method to disarm Iraq (11.2 %); and more likely to identify the invasion of Iraq 
with the war on terror (13.0 %).  Democratic and Republicans generally, as well as Democrats 
and Republicans in Congress, had rough parities between the rates that speakers of each group 
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mentioned that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the past (only a .01% difference between both 
pairs of groups).  There was also consensus between the frequencies that Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress supported the invasion of Iraq with humanitarian justifications (only a 
0.01% difference).  There was no consensus regarding the humanitarian justification when the 
Executive branch Republicans were factored in—Republicans generally tended to make the 
humanitarian justification 10.4 % of observations while Democrats did so only 2.3 % of 
observations, a difference of 8.1 %.  The picture that emerges from this data is not one of a broad 
bipartisan consensus, much less a consensus between the Executive and Legislative branches.   
For the entire twenty-seven months of the period of analysis, Democrats had on average 
lower mean Iraq Index scores than their Republican counterparts in government.  While many of 
the highest mean scores belong to President Bush and Vice President Cheney, the maximum Iraq 
Index score for all appearances by a Republican is a tie between Secretary Rumsfeld and his 
Deputy Paul Wolfowitz.  Many of the highest Republican Iraq Index score means are senior 
Bush Administration officials with relatively few appearances but significant maximum Iraq 
Index scores, such as Ambassador Negroponte and notable neoconservatives Richard Perle and 
Douglas Feith.  Senator Richard Lugar had the highest mean Iraq Index score of any 
congressional Republican.  The Democrat with the highest mean Iraq Index score as well as the 
highest maximum Iraq Index score for a single public appearance was Senator Joseph 
Lieberman.  Then-Democratic Senator Lieberman equated the invasion of Iraq with the war on 
terror nearly as often as the most ardent pro-war Executive branch Republicans such as President 
Bush or Vice President Cheney.  Cheney and Lieberman also referred to 9/11 more often than all 
other government speakers in transcripts where they also mentioned Iraq at least once.   
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Government officials who most frequently referred to the 9/11 terrorist attacks tended to 
advocate more for the use of force in their public statements, albeit weakly.  This relationship is 
statically significant but small with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of only 0.153.  
Nonetheless, a small increase in the frequency of mentioning the terrorist attacks of 9/11 leads to 
a substantial increase in Iraq Index score.  Referring to 9/11 only about 10% more frequently 
would increase a typical speaker’s mean Iraq Index score for all observations by nearly 0.5.  
Those government officials who tended to mention Osama bin Laden the most, however, tended 
to have lower Iraq Index scores—that is, such speakers tended to discuss the possibility of using 
force against Iraq less often and with fewer justifications, though this relationship is not 
statistically significant.  These two findings might seem contradictory, but it may be due to some 
government officials stressing bin Laden in order to advocate an increase in focus on 
Afghanistan as opposed to a new effort against Iraq.   
While the data shows that the Executive branch and Republicans tended to support war 
more often and more potently than Democratic Legislators, it would not be entirely accurate to 
paint that picture of a Congress passively supporting the president.  Individual actors within the 
Executive branch were more active than individual actors in the Congress in making public 
statements regarding Iraq, but this is likely due to the intense focus on the presidency for 
leadership in times of national crisis.  Congress remained active throughout the twenty-seven 
month period analyzed.  The support for the use of force in Congress trended upwards over the 
period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative branches, 
between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both branches 
greatly increased.  Still, the differences of Iraq Index score across groups and the frequencies that 
groups expressed content variables illustrates little agreement between the Executive and 
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Legislative branches and between the political parties.  The result was a breakdown in consensus 
regarding the use of force against Iraq, where Democrats can fairly blame the Republicans for 
their support of the president who was supportive of the invasion of Iraq and the president can 
rightly point out that Republicans were more supportive of his effort against Iraq and many 
Democrats’ public statements enabled the president’s policy.   
The more direct pressure a government official faces from the American electorate, the 
more political accountable that elite official may be.  This definition of political accountability 
ranks a Representative, elected every two years, as more politically accountable than the 
president, who, in turn, is more accountable than a Senator.  The least politically accountable, 
according to this definition, is someone who is not a government official but who testifies before 
Congress; only slightly more accountable would be an Executive branch official who testifies 
before Congress.  An analysis of the potential relationship between accountability and support 
for the use of force against Iraq identified a statistically significant but relatively small negative 
relationship between political accountability and Iraq Index score as the correlation coefficient is 
only -0.106.  At best, therefore, government speakers with low political accountability tended to 
make only slightly stronger arguments in favor of war in their public appearances.  There is 
much stronger statistical association between low political accountability and making high 
numbers of references to Iraq per observation (as high as -0.392).  Thus, people of the highest 
political accountability tended to discuss Iraq less each public appearance.  There are a few 
possible reasons for this.  First, many of those with lowest political accountability were 
congressional witnesses who focused on Iraq because that was their substantive expertise.  The 
more pessimistic ways to explain the reduced discussions by those with higher political 
accountability was that elected officials with the highest levels of accountability tended to 
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discuss Iraq less per public appearance and therefore may not have been as focused on the 
problem or as engaged in the public debate, or that those politicians were afraid of publicly 
discussion an opinion about the controversial use of force against Iraq.  The truth is likely 
somewhere in between these two extremes.   
This content analysis indicates empirically that the Executive branch was more active 
than the Legislative branch in making the public case for the use of force against Iraq.  The data 
illustrates that Congress became more actively involved after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and 
activity trended upward significantly the month before the October 2002 Iraq Resolution 
authorizing the use of force against Iraq.  Congress’ overall support for the use of force increased 
over the period of analysis even as the divergences between the Executive and Legislative 
branches, between the political parties in Congress, and between the political parties in both 
branches regarding the support for the use of force increased significantly.  The picture that 
emerges from this data is hardly one of a war-mongering president and an acquiescent Congress.  
The data does indicate that the Executive branch began the public deliberation regarding the use 
of force and Executive branch officials generally made the most public justifications for war 
against Iraq.  Republican legislators were less likely to make public statements supportive of the 
use of force against Iraq, and Democratic legislators were much less likely still.   
Despite the 2002 Iraq Resolution that seemed to indicate that America spoke “with a 
single voice,” there was actually a breakdown in consensus regarding the use of force against 
Iraq.  Democrats can rightly say that they were less in favor of using force against Iraq than were 
Legislative Republicans and Executive branch officials.  Legislative Republicans can rightly 
claim that Executive branch leaders were the cheerleaders for war.  The president promulgated 
the earliest and most forceful public support for the use of force, and it stands to reason that 
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critics of the war may focus their political frustrations on him.  President Bush and Republicans 
can rightly point out that while Republicans were more supportive of the president’s effort 
against Iraq, enough Democrats participated in the public deliberation with just enough support 
for the use of force to enable the president’s policy.   
Democrats were significantly more likely to refer explicitly to the national security threat 
posed by Iraq between September 12, 2001 and July 28, 2002 (the second period of analysis).  
Democrats made this argument 5.0 % of all observations to Republicans’ 1.9 % (a ratio of 2.6 to 
1).  When administration officials and congressional Republicans began to stress the threat posed 
by Iraq after July 29, 2002 in earnest, Democrats had already laid the groundwork for 
recognizing the threat posed by Iraq.  In the third period, congressional Democrats suggested that 
an invasion of Iraq would cost less than $100 billion two times more frequently than did 
congressional Republicans.  Democrats made this argument 3.6 % of observations to 
congressional Republicans’ 1.6 %.  The ratio is shy of 2 to 1 when Executive branch Republicans 
are factored into the ratio, but still similar.  By making these arguments, it may have been the 
case that Democrats undermined the possibility that government officials skeptical of the 
invasion of Iraq would be able to challenge the prevailing discussion.  Thus, those Democrats 
who were skeptical of using military force against Iraq and who might have been most likely to 
form a coalition opposing the use of force faced severe political hurdles.  American public 
opinion was strongly in favor of the use of force, and had been for several years.168  Democrats 
had been stressing the threat in the second period of analysis.  In the third period when 
Republicans were more likely to stress the threat posed by Iraq, Democrats were twice as likely 
to suggest that the war would cost less than $100 billion.  The level of consensus between 
                                                 
168 Alasdair Roberts, The Collapse of Fortress Bush: The Crisis of Authority in American Government (New York: 
New York University Press, 2008), 121-22.   
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Republicans and Democrats for references to “regime change” decreased over time, from 
Republicans outweighing Democrats by a factor of 3.06 and 1.24 to 1, to the point where 
Democrats only slightly outnumbered Republicans by a factor of 1.18.  This may indicate that 
regime change was one thing Republicans and Democrats could agree upon, which further 
undermined any opposition that anyone might have offered to the use of force.   
This may demonstrate that once the administration started to discuss the possibility of 
using force against Iraq, the Democrats had painted themselves into a corner regarding 
alternatives.  Perhaps the majority of Democrats could not walk away from supporting the use of 
force against Iraq.  Republicans made justifications more often than Democrats in the third 
period of analysis, as shown by their higher Iraq Index scores.  Government officials who were 
skeptical of the efficacy and prudence of an invasion of Iraq—those who might have been the 
most likely to eventually coalesce into full opposition to the use of force against Iraq—argued 
many of the same content variables that reinforced the perception of the threat.  Speakers with a 
mean Iraq Index score of 0 still mentioned that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the past, that 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraq had connections to terrorism.  Such 
officials sounded like the people who supported the use of force.  Thus, the speakers who were 
not hawkish ended up reinforcing arguments favoring the use of force.  This may have been why 
there was little opposition to the use of force in Congress and what opposition there was tended 
to be diffuse and disordered.   
Presidential politics may have played a role in how some Democrats supported the use of 
force against Iraq as well, although the effects are likely to be amorphous or tenuous.169  Out of 
75 Democratic Legislators that appeared in the FNS transcripts, five government speakers were 
                                                 
169 This point was first suggested to me by Representative Mike Doyle (D-PA).  Avishy Moshenberg and Lance 
Hampton, "Interview with Representative Mike Doyle,"  (Pittsburgh: Feb. 26, 2006). 
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presidential candidates for the Democratic nomination in 2004 and another five were candidates 
in 2008.  In 2004, the Democratic nominee candidates included Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-
CT), John Edwards (D-NC), John Kerry (D-MA), and Representatives Richard Gephardt (D-
MO) and Dennis Kucinich (D-OH).  Senator Edwards and Representative Kucinich ran again for 
the 2008 presidential nomination, joined by Senators Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Joseph Biden (D-
DE), and Christopher Dodd (D-CT).  Table 31 lists mean Iraq Index scores for these government 
speakers, as well as Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who was the only government speaker in the 
transcripts to run for the presidential nomination of the Republican party.  Because there was no 
Republican contest for the presidential nomination in 2004 and because McCain is the only 
Republican presidential contender, it is difficult to make generalizations about McCain’s support 
for the invasion of Iraq and the presidential contest.   
During Fall 2002 at the time the House was considering the 2002 Iraq Resolution to 
authorize the President’s use of force, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt justified his 
support for the bill which he co-sponsored, saying that the authorization would strengthen the 
Bush Administration’s credibility with the international community and with Iraq.  In effect, 
passage of the joint resolution would serve to avert war.170  However, Gephardt’s Iraq Index 
score was the fourth highest of all Democratic legislators with greater than two observations.  Of 
those speakers with more than six observations, Gephardt’s Iraq Index score is second only to 
Senator Lieberman’s support for the war.  This strong support for the use of force undermined 
Gephardt’s argument that his work for the Resolution was to avert war.  It is possible that 
Gephardt supported the use of force against Iraq in order to position himself as a strong and 
viable candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004.   
                                                 
170 "Senate Approves Iraq War Resolution: Administration Applauds Vote." 
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In context, Gephardt’s decision was unlikely to be just mere political calculation.  So 
many government speakers had argued that Iraq posed a national security risk; in fact, 
Democrats had done so more frequently than Republicans from September 12, 2001 to July 28, 
2002.  Many speakers asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and many 
speakers referred to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  These arguments tended to 
make it harder to achieve political traction because as speakers asserted them frequently and 
repeatedly, they reinforced the dominant frame of threat perception.  Democrats tended to argue 
more frequently that the war would be relatively inexpensive, less than $100 billion.  With these 
facts in mind, Gephardt’s support for the use of force seems more the natural and reasonable 
exercise of foreign policy than positioning himself for the 2004 presidential race.  Gephardt’s 
mistake was resting upon this reasonable exercise and frequently expressed assertions, leading to 
a lack-luster fourth place finish in the Iowa Caucuses for the 2004 Democratic presidential 
nomination.  Gephardt dropped out of the 2004 race shortly afterward; some aides suggested that 
Gephardt’s support for the war cost him support from Iowa caucus-goers.171  Lieberman’s 
presidential ambitions also suffered from his hawkish stance on Iraq.172   
In the course of their 2008 nomination campaigns, Senators Joe Biden and Hillary 
Clinton and former Senator John Edwards have each been criticized for voting for the 2002 
authorization to use military force against Iraq and initially supporting Bush’s war.  Clinton and 
Edwards have only two observations each, meaning that the calculation of their Iraq Index score 
was not based on as many observations as other speakers, and all four of their observations come 
from the third period, when the support for the use of force was at its highest.  Thus, their Iraq 
                                                 
171 Rachel L. Swarns, "Tearful Gephardt Bids Farewell to Race and Public Life," The New York Times Jan. 21, 2004. 
172 Lolita C. Baldor, "Lieberman Abandons Race for Democratic Presidential Nomination," The Associated Press, 
Feb. 4, 2004. 
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Index scores are very likely to be biased upwards.  Hillary Clinton’s Iraq Index score is higher 
than all Democratic Legislators except for Senator Lieberman.  Clinton mentioned Iraq in only 
two transcripts, with Iraq index scores of 2 and 1 for the two observations.  Edwards also 
mentioned Iraq in only two transcripts, but his Iraq Index scores were 2 and 0, giving him a 
slightly smaller mean Iraq Index score.  Biden spoke about Iraq in all three periods of analysis—
Biden’s mean Iraq Index score was 0 in the first period, 0.14 in the second, but was 0.61 in the 
third period.  The Democratic legislators’ mean Iraq Index score for the third period of analysis 
was only 0.39, putting Clinton, Edwards, and Biden much higher than the norm for Democrats in 
making arguments supporting the use of force.  Edwards did apologize for his initial support for 
the war in late 2005, but the data shows that his support was actually slightly smaller than 
Clinton’s.173  On the other hand, Clinton never alluded to connections between Iraq and 
terrorism as did Edwards and Biden; Edwards mentioned the 9/11 terrorist attacks and asserted 
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in both of his observations while Biden did so in 
the majority of his observations.  Clinton never made these assertions.  Clinton, like Edwards, 
asserted that efforts against Iraq were part of the war on terror, but Biden made this assertion 
four of eleven observations.  Thus, Edwards and Biden were much more active than Senator 
Clinton was in asserting the threat posed by Iraq was connected to 9/11 and terrorism.   
                                                 
173 Edwards, "The Right Way in Iraq." 
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Republicans
Rank (with other Legislators of same political party) 1st 2nd 4th 6th 9th 23rd 25th tied for 37th 6th
Joseph 
Lieberman
Hillary 
Clinton
Richard 
Gephardt
John 
Edwards John Kerry
Joseph 
Biden
Christopher 
Dodd
Dennis 
Kucinich John McCain
(D-CT)         (D-NY) (D-MO) (D-NC) (D-MA) (D-DE) (D-CT) (D-OH) (R-AZ)
Presidential contests 2004 2008 2004 2004 & 2008 2004 2008 2008 2004 & 2008 2008
Total Observations 11 2 11 2 6 29 8 4 9
Mean Iraq Index score 2.45 1.50 1.27 1.00 0.83 0.48 0.38 0.00 1.44
Highest Iraq Index score 4 2 4 2 4 3 3 0 3
Lowest Iraq Index score 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of times speaker explicitly characterized the 
threat from Iraq as imminent 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Number of times the speaker gave an explicit cost 
estimate for the war as less than $100 billion 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Number of times the speaker equated the invasion of 
Iraq with the war on terror 5 1 4 1 1 4 0 0 1
Number of times the speaker explicitly refered to U.S. 
national security interests to justify invasion of Iraq
4 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
Number of times the speaker explicitly mentioned 
international law to justify invasion of Iraq 6 1 1 1 2 5 0 0 5
Number of times the speaker referred to humanitarian 
concerns to justify invasion of Iraq 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Number of times the speaker referenced the 
disarmament of nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons to justify invasion of Iraq
6 1 2 0 2 6 1 0 3
Number of times the speaker alluded to a connection 
between Iraq and terrorism generally 6 0 2 1 1 4 0 0 2
Number of times the speaker explicitly referred to a 
specific terrorist or terrorist group operating in or 
cooperating with Iraq
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Number of times the speaker called for further 
analysis of costs and benefits of the invasion or 
opined about unanswered questions
0 0 1 0 1 8 3 2 0
Number of times the speaker explicitly referred to the 
possibility that Iraqi oil production is available a cost 
offset to the war or rebuilding costs?  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of times the speaker cast doubt upon the 
efficacy or futility of additional or continued 
international weapons inspections
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Number of times the speaker mentioned the 
possibility of a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United 
States
4 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 1
Number of times the speaker asserted that Iraq 
possesses WMDs 8 0 1 2 2 13 3 1 5
Number of times the speaker mentioned Iraq's past 
use of chemical weapons 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 2
Number of times the Speaker used the exact phrase 
"regime change" 0 0 0 0 2 7 1 2 5
Number of times the speaker referred to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks 7 0 7 2 0 8 0 3 2
Number of times the speaker mentioned Osama bin 
Laden 3 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 0
Democrats
 
Table 31: 2004 & 2008 Presidential Contenders and the Iraq War Debate 
 
This content analysis has presented a story that systematically demonstrates that the war 
in Iraq was supported more by the Executive branch than the Legislative branch, but that there 
may have been some enablement of this message from Democrats in Congress.  There were 
tremendous differences in how Democrats and Republicans discussed the problem of Iraq as well 
as how frequently members of the parties expressed support for the war.  The story highlights 
that there was little consensus between parties and branches of government.  In terms of 
congressional-executive relations, this story demonstrates that Congress was not passive.  
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Congress was involved in the debate about Iraq.  However, the data from these public statements 
demonstrates how difficult it might have been for any organized opposition to the war to form.  
Congress as a whole could not effectively consider and evaluate the nature of the threat posed by 
Iraq because too many speakers frequently highlighted the threat Iraq posed.  Few government 
speakers could challenge the basic threat perception frame because, even when the subject was 
Iraq and not terrorism per se, the memory of what happened on 9/11 was too fresh.  Thus, the 
result was a resolution that deferred to the president the discretion to make the final 
determination regarding an invasion of Iraq.  Congress deferred to the president, but the 
discourse regarding potential force against Iraq indicated that members of Congress often made 
public justifications for the use of force against Iraq—thus, legislators knew what they were 
doing in voting for the 2002 Iraq Resolution and presumably believed in what they were doing 
by publicly advocating such a position.   
Another lesson offered by this analysis is that Congress can get involved in decision-
making discussions too late to have much of an impact, or can contribute too little to impact a 
foreign policy decision.  The majority of the debate regarding Iraq occurred only a month or so 
before the 2002 Iraq Resolution and the majority of the speech came from the Executive branch.  
The Executive branch was more likely to stress the nature of the threat posed by Iraq than the 
Legislative branch.  The Legislative branch’s ability to rely on careful and prudent consideration 
of the costs and benefits of potential military action through budget control is not an effective 
mechanism to check the power of the president in foreign policy.  This is particularly the case 
when those Democrats who, ceteris paribus, might have been less inclined to support the use of 
force against Iraq but for the fact that Democrats tended to view the cost of the war as relatively 
cheap (less than $100 billion), or at least expressed publicly more so than Republicans did that 
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the war would cost less than $100 billion.  That, and in the eight to nine months prior (the second 
period of analysis), it had been the Democrats who had been more likely to publicly stress the 
threat posed by Iraq.  Thus, war decisions, in practice, tend to remain the province of presidents 
with a small circle of advisors while the Legislative branch acquiesces or defers to the discretion 
of the Executive branch—undermining Article I § 8’s “declare war” clause.  The political 
problem so described undermines the intent of the Founders, who wanted two strong and 
vigorous branches, the Legislative and Executive, each enlightened by attention to the national 
interest by virtue of various modes of representation and consensus development.   
This analysis has contributed to an empirical understanding of the differences between 
political parties and the Legislative and Executive branches regarding the Iraq war debate for 
reasons of historical or political use, but there are wider ramifications of this research project.  
To many, the decision to invade Iraq is another example of a passive and acquiescent Congress 
bowing to Executive power and presidential discretion in matters of national security.  However, 
the results here challenge this portrayal somewhat.  Congress was less supportive of the use of 
force than were members of the executive branch, but the data and results indicate that Congress 
was engaged in the debate.  The notion that congressional-executive relations is a zero-sum in 
the matter of foreign policy is overly simplistic, but it also does not seem consistent with the 
results of this analysis.  The Executive branch advocated for the use of force against Iraq by 
referring to the nature of the threat posed by Iraq, but so did many members of the Congress.  
The Executive branch argued that the war against Iraq could be prosecuted cheaply, a view also 
shared by much of Congress.  Congress was not so much a passive enabler but an active 
participant in the facilitation of the justification for the war.  This was true even though there 
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existed significant differences over many aspects of the decision to use force against Iraq 
between political parties and branches of government prior to the invasion on March 19, 2003.   
This analysis of differences between political parties and Executive and Legislative 
officials in their public governmental deliberation regarding the invasion of Iraq involved three 
research themes.  The first two themes compared the Legislative and Executive branches and 
Democrats and Republicans to address the following questions: Did groups of Executive and 
Legislative branch officials, as well as Democratic and Republican officials, have more or less 
focus on Iraq during the two years before the invasion?  Did the political parties and branches 
differ in how speakers of the two sets of groups supported the use of force against Iraq?  The 
answers to these questions was that the record of the debate indicates little in the way of 
consensus between branches of government and Republicans and Democrats, and that the 
divergence generally started after September 11, 2001.  The third theme examined the potential 
relationship between political accountability and justifications favoring the use of force.  
Government officials with the least amount of political accountability tended to discuss more per 
public appearance, but there was very little relationship between accountability and support for 
the use of force.  Although the relationship was statistically significant, the effect was slight 
indeed.  This small ray of good news should not be overlooked—publicly, at least, it would not 
seem as if a small group of government officials with low political accountability led the U.S. 
government into war.  On the other hand, the debate regarding the use of force in Iraq is largely a 
story of divergences between branches of government and political parties.  The data described 
here suggests a more active and hawkish Executive branch.  At the same time, the story of the 
Iraq war debate was more nuanced than the typical argument would suggest, namely that 
Congress tends to passively follow the Executive branch’s foreign policy.   
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APPENDIX  
CONTENT VARIABLE EXAMPLES FROM THE TRANSCRIPTS 
This Appendix gives examples taken from transcripts for each of the content variables in the 
coding instrument.  The additional details regarding the U.S. government speaker, date, and 
forum are provided below the illustrative statements.   
Content Variable 
Description Example 
1. Does the speaker 
have an 
identifiable 
position on Iraq 
policy (i.e., is at 
least one other 
content variable 
present)?   
This dummy variable was automatically coded as a 1 if at least one content 
variable per observation had the value of 1.  The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 
was performed only on observations where at least one content variable had the 
value of 1 (i.e., where the speaker had an identifiable position on Iraq policy).  
The analysis was based on 1,699 observations of U.S. government speakers’ 
public appearances.   
2. Does the speaker 
implicitly assume 
U.S. national 
security interests 
support invasion 
of Iraq?   
“Any nation, particularly my nation, but any nation, has a right at any time to act 
in self-defense, and our view is that the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by Saddam Hussein and his regime, which had demonstrated the 
ability to use them, even on their own population, which has demonstrated a 
rather brutal, repressive nature with their own population, and has raped and 
pillaged a neighboring country, we don’t want to give him a chance, the first 
chance to hit us.  We don’t want to give him the first chance to hit our friends 
and allies—whether it’s the Arab states in the region or Israel.  So, something 
has to be done…”  Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, speaking at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 10, 2002.  
Transcript  #1117.   
3. Does the speaker 
explicitly refer to 
U.S. national 
security interests 
to justify invasion 
of Iraq?   
“Confronting Iraq is an urgent matter of national security.”  President George 
Bush, in his Weekly Radio Address, October 12, 2002.  Transcript  #879.   
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Content Variable 
Description Example 
4. Does the speaker 
equate the 
invasion of Iraq 
with the war on 
terror?   
“Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave 
danger, not only to his neighbors, but also to the United States.  His regime aids 
and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.  He could decide 
secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for their use 
against us.  And as the president said on Tuesday night, “It would take just one 
vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our nation unlike any 
we've ever known.”  That’s why confronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a 
distraction from the war on terror—it is absolutely crucial to winning the war on 
terror.”  Vice President Richard Cheney, speaking at the Republican National 
Committee Winter Meeting, January 31, 2003.  Transcript  #424.   
5. Does the speaker 
explicitly 
characterize the 
threat from Iraq as 
imminent?   
“Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent, that 
Saddam Hussein is at least five to seven years away from having nuclear 
weapons.  I would not be so certain.”  Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 
testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002.  
Transcript  #1063.   
6. Does the speaker 
characterize the 
invasion of Iraq as 
a potential method 
to disarm Iraq?   
“With the countries of the Middle East, our friends and allies and the community 
of nations, we must also deal with the grave and growing danger posed by the 
Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein.  By unanimously passing Resolution 1441, 
the United Nations Security Council has offered Iraq a final opportunity to meet 
its obligations to peace and to the international community.  The Iraqi regime 
can either disarm or it will be disarmed.  The choice is theirs, but this cannot be 
postponed.”  Colin Powell, Secretary of State, speaking at the Heritage 
Foundation, December 12, 2002.  Transcript  #645.   
7. Does the speaker 
reference the 
disarmament of 
nuclear, biological, 
or chemical 
weapon to justify 
invasion of Iraq?   
“This is certainly a critical time for us to be considering American action against 
Iraq. President Bush has made clear to Congress, the United Nations and the 
American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and 
to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.”  
Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), speaking in a hearing of the House Armed 
Services Committee, January 30, 2003.  Transcript  #1063.  [Note that this 
content variable may be coded as a 1 even in cases where the explicit term 
disarmament was not used.] 
8. Does the speaker 
explicitly mention 
international law?   
“It's not as if we are coming to the problem of Saddam for the first time in 
September of 2002.  We have had 11 years of experience in which he failed to 
live up to his obligation under Resolution 687, and about 11 other resolutions of 
the UN, to get rid of those weapons.  I have absolutely no reason to believe he’s 
going to change his spots.  I simply believe—and what is so extraordinarily hard 
for democracies—that is to protect themselves and to risk the lives of their sons 
and daughters when they don't have overwhelming proof in the form of having 
lost the first battle.”  David Kay, former UNSCOM weapons inspector, testifying 
before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2002.  Transcript  
#1121.   
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Content Variable 
Description Example 
9. Does the speaker 
refer to 
humanitarian 
concerns to justify 
invasion of Iraq?   
“We are enthusiastic about the potential of the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
and commend our witnesses today for their efforts to implement the president's 
vision for the Middle East—a vision which includes the liberation of Iraq.  Iraq is 
a test of the extent of U.S. commitment to freedom for the people of the Arab 
world.  As President Bush has said: “The first to benefit from a free Iraq would 
be the Iraqi people, themselves.  Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a 
dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their 
lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein—but Iraqi lives and 
freedom matter greatly to us.”  It is the men, women and children of the Middle 
East which are the real wealth and value of these countries, and the United 
States will always stand firm for the demands of human dignity….My hope and 
commitment is for our brothers and sisters in the Middle East to be able to fulfill 
their dreams and immense potential, through the full exercise of their 
fundamental human rights and civil liberties.”  Representative Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (R-FL), speaking in a hearing of the Middle East and Central Asia 
Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, March 19, 
2003.  Transcript  #2.   
10. Does the speaker 
allude to a 
connection 
between Iraq and 
terrorism 
generally?   
“I have a hard time—I have a hard time telling the country that you should be 
comfortable that we covered all the bases in the wake of what we saw they were 
able to accomplish on September 11th.  I mean, that was a watershed in terms 
of the accomplishment—of a group of individuals to come together, utilize 
modern means of technology in terms of their communication, their planning, 
their organization, their travels—a type of discipline that prior to that time I don’t 
think we had seen.  So I am uncomfortable sitting here saying, look, we are 
taking every step.  But based on the fact that we are taking every step, you the 
American public should not be aware that there is a substantial risk out there 
that they could undertake.  And by “they” I mean not just those associated with 
Iraq, but those associated with al Qaeda or Hezbollah or somebody else.”  
Robert Mueller, FBI Director, testifying before the Joint House and Select 
Senate Intelligence Committees, October 17, 2002.  Transcript  #862.   
11. Does the speaker 
explicitly refer to a 
specific terrorist or 
terrorist group 
operating in or 
cooperating with 
Iraq? 
“We know about the meeting in Prague between Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi 
intelligence official.”  Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), speaking in a hearing of 
the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, March 19, 2002.  Transcript  #1493.   
12. Does the speaker 
cast doubt upon 
the efficacy or 
futility of additional 
or continued 
international 
weapons 
inspections?   
“The president emphasized the requirement for the weapons inspectors to be 
returned.  If the weapons inspectors are returned under conditions that are 
satisfactory to the United States of America, then obviously, the process would 
be, quote, “extended.”  But Saddam Hussein is as likely to allow a robust and 
effective weapons-inspection regime as I am to be the next astronaut.  He’s not 
going to do it.  And he hasn’t done it for four years.  So I don’t see how he finds 
himself on the road to Damascus.  But we’d welcome a return of the inspectors, 
a robust inspection regime and an iron-clad way of us making sure that he has 
halted and dismantled his weapons-of-mass-destruction capability.”  Senator 
John McCain (R-AZ), speaking to reporters at the Capitol, September 12, 
2002.  Transcript  #1100.   
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Content Variable 
Description Example 
13. Does the speaker 
say Iraq 
possesses 
WMDs?   
“Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction?  Sure, he does.  We 
know he has chemical weapons.  We know he has biological weapons.  We 
have been unable to ferret them out and find them.”  Richard Perle, Chairman 
of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, testifying before the Near 
Eastern And South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, March 1, 2001.  Transcript  #2151.   
14. Does the speaker 
mention Iraq's 
past use of 
chemical 
weapons?   
“For more than 20 years, Saddam has obsessively sought weapons of mass 
destruction through every means available.  We know that he has chemical and 
biological weapons today, that he’s used them in the past, and that he’s doing 
everything he can to build more.  Every day he gets closer to his long-term goal 
of nuclear capability.  We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to have nuclear 
weapons.”  Senator John Edwards (D-NC), speaking at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, October 7, 2002.  Transcript  #926.   
15. Does the speaker 
characterize 
intelligence 
analysis as 
interpretive or 
ambiguous?   
“Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed that we had "bulletproof" 
evidence of the link.  But a year later, CIA Director Tenet conceded in a letter to 
the Senate Intelligence Committee that the administration’s understanding of the 
link was still “evolving” and was based on “sources of varying reliability.”  In fact, 
the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have expressed their 
concern that intelligence is being politicized to support the rush to war.”  Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA), speaking at the United Methodist Church National 
Conference, March 4, 2003.  Transcript  #165.   
16. Does the speaker 
give an explicit 
cost estimate for 
the war as less 
than $100 billion?   
“[T]his war to disarm Saddam, as crucial as it will be, may cost—according to 
estimates reported today—$95 billion.”  Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), 
speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 26, 2003.  
Transcript  #218.   
17. Does the speaker 
call for further 
analysis of costs 
and benefits of the 
invasion or opine 
about unanswered 
questions? 
“With regard to costs, I think it’s irresponsible and extremely unwarranted for the 
administration to withhold key information for us as we make critical decisions 
about the budget and the implications of this war on our own fiscal 
circumstances.”  Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD), speaking in the Ohio Clock 
Corridor at the Capitol, March 11, 2003.  Transcript  #108.   
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Content Variable 
Description Example 
18. Does the speaker 
explicitly refer to 
any estimates of 
costs or benefits 
of an invasion of 
Iraq?   
“It seems to me that part of our function as a committee, and the reason why 
we’re seeking your advice and help, is that we should be laying out the nature of 
the threat and the range of opinion relative to the nature of the threat, but not 
only the nature of the threat, the timing of the threat, the time frame in which we 
have to respond to the worst case, and then lay out for the American people 
what not the certain costs are but what the probable costs are in terms of 
everything from our treasure at it relates to life as well as it does to property and 
cost.  And so that’s why I'm about to pursue a couple more questions with you; 
again, not—understanding that none of us know for certain what will happen 
once this is undertaken or even prior to being undertaken, if it is undertaken.  
The last Gulf War, as a coalition—which went extremely well, significant 
coalition, significant participation in the military undertaking as well as the 
aftermath—cost in today’s dollars about $76 billion, I’m told.  Am I giving the 
right figure?  Is that about right?  I think it was sixty-some billion in Desert 
Storm.  And in today’s dollars, I’m told it’s in the $75 billion-$80 billion range out.  
And of that, 80% of it was paid by the Japanese, the Europeans and others.  
Now, I want to make it clear for me, at least, that if I am convinced that Saddam 
has and is likely to use weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear 
capability, I think we have to be prepared to pay any price—70 billion, a hundred 
billion, 150 billion, whatever it would take—to protect our interests.”  Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-DE), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, August 1, 2002.  Transcript  #1206.   
19. Does the speaker 
give an explicit 
value for U.S. cost 
estimates of an 
invasion of Iraq?   
“We’re likely to run into big trouble unless we have big help from other countries 
in handling this.  And you shouldn’t feel empty-handed, Dr. [Eliot] Cohen [a 
congressional witness], in not having a ready prescription.  Neither has anyone 
else we’ve talked to.  We’ve probed them for answers to give us a little bit of 
depth and assurance that some of this planning is going on, and they can see 
how it works out.  It isn’t there yet.  And that’s a major concern we have, namely 
that we’ll be there.  And Mike O’Hanlon, CBO, for better or worse, they took a 
stab at it, and you're talking 15, $20 billion, they’re talking for a sizable force, 
over two years, $91 billion, and for a small force, $33.6 billion.  Big change, 
particularly if you run it out over 10 years.  It’s a substantial chunk of change 
that comes out of the defense budget.  To what end, we’re not really sure.  If it 
works, so much the better.”  Representative John Spratt (D-SC), speaking in a 
hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, October 2, 2002.  Transcript  
#960.   
20. Does the speaker 
explicitly refer to 
the possibility that 
Iraqi oil production 
is available a cost 
offset to the war or 
rebuilding costs?   
“Well, I think people are overlooking the fact that he’s [Saddam Hussein] been 
using a substantial amount of his oil income for military.  They [the Iraqis] won’t 
be needing that after this war is over.  We presume that a lot of that rebuilding in 
Iraq’s going to be done with their own money.”  Representative Ted Stevens 
(R-AR), speaking to the press in the Senate Media Crypt at the Capitol, 
February 26, 2003.  Transcript  #221.   
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21. Does the speaker 
specifically 
mention post-war 
or Phase IV 
planning?   
“[Speaking to Secretary of State Colin Powell]…I appreciated very much your 
outlining this afternoon what a new Iraq government might look like. Granted, 
we do not know that there will be military action….But in response to all the 
contingencies you were asked—that is, if a regime change occurred—you 
pointed out that it would have to be a regime that would help us find and destroy 
the weapons of mass destruction.  That will take some doing, as you pointed 
out—scientists, intelligence sources, everybody—but at least that's the 
formation of a plan that indicates some sound thinking about this area, which we 
asked for.  Secondly, with the government, you said we would try to raise up a 
government representative of the people, the democratic model as a basis, 
keeping the state together, with $20 billion of resources, possibly, from oil to 
help finance humanitarian projects for the people, and so forth.  A strong 
American presence required, both political and military, probably for some time, 
and prayerfully a lot of other presence of our allies, friends in the area.  And you 
said this is an opportunity to create.  Now, that is important.  And I suspect it 
comes not only from your own supposition, but from a planning effort on the part 
of the administration. In other words, there are people actually at work on this.  
The chairman and I have been asking for, in the hearings, evidence that even in 
our important discussion about war and peace, we are thinking about the 
consequences. And there are consequences obviously coming.”  Senator 
Richard Lugar (R-IN), speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, October 2, 2002.  Transcript  #1000.   
22. Does the speaker 
mention the 
possibility of a 
unilateral invasion 
of Iraq by the 
United States?   
“I would ask each of you [former Secretaries of Defense Samuel Berger and 
Caspar Weinberger] if you would respond to that question, your question, Mr. 
Berger, in this way.  Is it the opinion of—or what is your opinion as to if the 
United States would find itself, as it essentially does today, alone and if we 
would move in a military action to destroy Saddam Hussein unilaterally, or 
essentially unilaterally?  Is that wise?”  Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE), 
speaking in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 1, 
2002.  Transcript  #1206.   
23. Does the speaker 
urge a unilateral 
invasion of Iraq by 
the United States?   
“It is that the choice before the United States is a stark one, either to acquiesce 
in a situation in which the regime of Saddam Hussein can restore his economy, 
acquire weapons of mass destruction and pose a lethal threat to his neighbors 
or to us, or we take action to overthrow him.  In my view, the latter course, with 
all of its risks, is the correct one.  Indeed, the dangers of failing to act in the near 
future are unacceptable.  To that end, Congress should authorize the president 
to initiate large-scale military action against Iraq, and give him the widest 
possible latitude in acting, even in the absence of additional U.N. authorization 
to do so.…One final point that I—I hate to make but I think I have to make it—
it’s one of the ways in which our determination will be understood, particularly in 
that part of the world, is if we make it clear that we're going to do this 
anyhow.…I do tend to think that once it’s clear that this is going to happen, other 
countries will sign up, for a variety of reasons, some good, some not so 
good.…And the other thing is that, particularly in that part of the world, people 
respond to success.  And so if the campaign is a fairly successful one, I think 
the amount of support that we will get, or at least really pretty benign 
acquiescence, is quite substantial.…[I]ronically, the more determined we look, I 
think the more likely—the more determined we look to do it even alone, the 
more likely we are to get the support that we want.”  Dr. Eliot Cohen, Johns 
Hopkins University professor, testifying before the House Armed Services 
Committee, October 2, 2002.  Transcript  #960.   
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24. Does the speaker 
mention the 
possible 
multilateral 
invasion of Iraq?   
“The U.N. Security Council, the NATO alliance, and the United States are 
united: Saddam Hussein will fully disarm himself of weapons of mass 
destruction; and if he does not, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm 
him.”  President George W. Bush, speaking at a press conference, December 
2, 2002.  Transcript  #692.   
25. Does the speaker 
supports 
multilateral 
invasion of Iraq 
only with UN 
approval?   
“If the administration decides to go to war with Iraq without a Security Council 
resolution explicitly calling for such enforcement action, what do you think the 
impact of that decision will be on the international coalition against terrorism?  
Isn’t it going to get harder for some of the key governments who will be seen as 
cooperating with us in the Iraq situation to be able to cooperate with us as well 
with regard to the effort against terrorism?  I find it hard to believe, based on 
what I’ve heard in many conversations with diplomats from these [Arab] 
countries, that there isn’t a danger and a price to be paid, in terms of their ability 
to help us in the war against terrorism, if we go forward with this Iraq action 
unilaterally.”  Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), speaking in a hearing of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 6, 2003.  Transcript  #374.   
26. Does the speaker 
use the exact 
phrase “second 
resolution”?   
“And the other point to make is that it is clear from statements that have been 
made by other permanent members of the Security Council, particularly France, 
that there was no United Nations resolution that contained an ultimatum piece -- 
a clear threat of military action if Saddam did not disclose and destroy his 
weapons of mass destruction; that not the United States, but some of the other 
members of the U.N. Security Council closed the door to a second resolution at 
the Security Council.  It’s regrettable.  I mean, it is a shame that there is not 
more international support for this effort, which we are about to lead at 
considerable expense to ourselves and putting more than 200,000 Americans 
into harm’s way, not—in a cause that is not only critical to our own security but 
critical to the world's security.”  Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), speaking in 
the Senate Radio/ TV Gallery at the Capitol, March 17, 2003.  Transcript  #43.   
27. Does the speaker 
use the exact 
phrase “fight to 
the enemy”?   
“The attacks of 11th September have impressed on, I think all of us, the 
importance of taking the fight to the enemy and maintaining the initiative.”  
General Tommy Franks, Command-in-Chief of Central Command [title change 
to CENTCOM Commander], testifying before the House Armed Services 
Committee, February 27, 2002.  Transcript  #1556.   
28. Number of times 
speaker uses the 
exact phrase 
"regime change" 
(an ordinal level 
variable) 
“Do you view a regime change as an act of self-defense—a regime change in 
Iraq as an act of self-defense by this country?”  Representative Lindsay 
Graham (R-SC), speaking in a hearing of the House Armed Services 
Committee, September 18, 2002.  Transcript  #1063.  [In this hearing, 
Representative Graham used the exact phrase “regime change” 5 times.] 
29. Does the speaker 
explicitly refer to 
the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks?   
“Today I do want to discuss the task of preventing attacks of even greater 
magnitude than what was experienced on September 11th—attacks that could 
conceivably kill not just thousands of Americans but potentially tens of 
thousands of our fellow citizens.”  Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 
testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002.  
Transcript  #1063.   
30. Does the speaker 
explicitly mention 
Osama bin 
Laden?   
“The only other point on your historical comments about Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein are absolutely correct.  After 9/11, a lot of things changed, 
including the need to be somewhere. There were some marriages of 
convenience that I think that over time we’ll be able to show.  And we’ve gotten 
a lot smarter about Osama bin Laden.”  Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of 
State, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 30, 
2003.  Transcript  #428.   
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31. Does the speaker 
make an explicit 
assignment of 
blame to Osama 
bin Laden and/or 
al Qaeda for the 
9/11 attacks? 
“You know, on—you cited, you make reference to the terrorist attacks and that 
September 11th changed the world, and of course—at least we believe it 
changed the world; over in Europe, I think it only—think they changed 
America—but you know, the fact of the matter is that what I see is, who did we 
go after, after September 11th?  We didn’t go after Iraq, we went after al Qaeda 
and bin Laden.  And so we identified what was the threat to the United States, 
and a year later we were pursuing that element of terrorism against our 
country.”  Representative Robert Menendez (D-NJ), speaking in a hearing of 
the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002.  Transcript  
#1056.   
32. Does the speaker 
refer to any party 
other than bin 
Laden and/or al 
Qaeda for actual 
or potential 
involvement in 
planning or 
carrying out the 
9/11 attacks? 
“Been a lot of reports, Mr. Secretary [of State Colin Powell], saying that there 
are links between the September 11 terrorist attacks and the recent anthrax 
attacks and Saddam Hussein.  Is that just a manufactured report, or is there 
accuracy to it?”  Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), speaking in a hearing of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 25, 2001.  Transcript  #1750.   
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